

**CONTRIBUTION OF COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES TO SECURITY IN  
LAMU WEST SUB- COUNTY, LAMU COUNTY, KENYA.**

**ONYARI AKAMA JARED**

**MA (ST. PAUL UNIVERSITY), B.A (EGERTON UNIVERSITY)**

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POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PEACE STUDIES, KISII UNIVERSITY**

**2023**

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Onyari Akama Jared	_____	_____
Reg. No.: DAS 60258/15	Signature	Date

### **RECOMMENDATION BY THE SUPERVISORS**

This thesis project has been submitted for examination with our approval as university supervisors.

- |  |           |       |
|--|-----------|-------|
| 1. Dr. Pia Okeche                                  | _____     | _____ |
| Lecturer   | Signature | Date  |
| Department of Political Science, and Peace Studies |           |       |
| Kisii University                                   |           |       |
  
- |                                       |           |       |
|---------------------------------------|-----------|-------|
| 2. Dr. Daniel Rotich Kandagor         | _____     | _____ |
| Senior Lecturer                       | Signature | Date  |
| Department of Philosophy and Religion |           |       |
| Kisii University                      |           |       |
  
- |   |           |       |
|---|-----------|-------|
| 3. Dr. Ungaya Godfrey                             | _____     | _____ |
| Lecturer  | Signature | Date  |
| Department of Political Science and Peace Studies |           |       |
| Kisii University.                                 |           |       |



**DECLARATION OF NUMBER OF WORDS FOR PHD THESIS**

Onyari Akama Jared

ADM NO DAS/60258/15

Faculty: Arts and social sciences

Department: Peace and Conflict Studies

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1. Dr. Pia Okeche

Signed: \_\_\_\_\_ Email \_\_\_\_\_ Tel \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

2. Dr. Daniel Rotich Kandagor      Signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

3. Dr. Ungaya Godffrey              Signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

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## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate my thesis work to God Almighty, my wife Josephine, two daughters Eunice and Christine and many of my friends for their encouragement and support. A special feeling of gratitude to my loving late Mum, Father and maternal grandmother whose words of encouragement and push for tenacity ring in my ears. My sisters more especially Elder sister Kerubo have never left my side and are very special.

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## ABSTRACT

The twenty-first century has brought to the fore the challenge of terrorism and violent extremism, and the fact that it continues to afflict families, corporations, and countries than ever before, resulting in the loss of lives and properties. This is in spite of the fact that strategies to combat terrorism have accumulated over time, the issue of terrorism continues to escalate in many developing countries and Kenya is no exception and continues to witness increasing terrorist attacks. This study sought to examine the contribution of counter-terrorism strategies to Security in Lamu West sub-county, Lamu County, Kenya. In particular, the study was guided by the following specific objectives: to examine contribution of the stakeholders-partnership engagement on counter terrorism strategies to security in Lamu West Sub County; assess contribution of institutional framework on counter terrorism strategies to security in Lamu West Sub County; analyze the effect of public response to counter terrorism strategies to Security in Lamu West Sub- county, Lamu county; and to evaluate the influence of security agencies response to counter terrorism strategies security in Lamu West Sub- county . The study adopted the social learning theory, soft model theory and securitization theory. The study used a descriptive research design and census method of sampling was used where all the 43 respondents participated in the study. Questionnaire and interview schedules were used to collect data from the respondents and participants. Descriptive statistics were used to analyze quantitative data while thematic analysis was conducted for the qualitative data. The findings from the study were presented in the form of frequency tables and descriptions (narratives and verbatim). The study found out that 74.4% of the respondents were of the opinion that strategies that had been used in Lamu sub-county to counter terrorism were effective, while 25.6% had a contrary view. The study reports that incorporating public actions, strengthening institutional capacity of stakeholders including the police have proved effective in terrorism prevention efforts. The study concludes that although there exist terrorism threats in Kenya, the counter-terrorism strategies adopted have contributed effectively as it has reduced violent attacks in major towns, but they need to be strengthened. There are several recommendations from the study. One, there is need to strengthen stakeholder engagement including the famous community policing of 'Nyumba Kumi' as this helps seek support from the community and other related stakeholders. Two, Sensitization could be undertaken for the members of public and security agencies. Three, there is need to enhance security sector reforms for professional policing and fair administration of justice and ensuring the security agencies are trained on how to handle the community members. Four, there should be shared collaboration between non state actors and state by creating better mechanisms for improving relationships between the community and police as well as improving efficient and effective counter terrorism measures.



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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ACLED</b>	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
<b>ASF</b>	African Standby Force
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>CJTF-HOA</b>	Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>GSU</b>	General Service Unit
<b>GWOT</b>	Global War on Terror
<b>IAEA</b>	International Atomic Energy Agency
<b>ICTA</b>	Information and Communications Technology Authority
<b>IEDs</b>	Improvised explosive devices.
<b>IOC</b>	International Olympic Committee
<b>IRA</b>	Irish Republican Army
<b>IRC</b>	International Rescue Committee
<b>ISIL</b>	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
<b>KDF</b>	Kenya Defense Forces
<b>SLT</b>	Social learning theory
<b>P/CVERLT</b>	Preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism.
<b>PSO</b>	Peace Support Operation
<b>SPSS</b>	Statistical Package for Social Science
<b>TCC</b>	Troop- Contributing Countries
<b>US</b>	United States



<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>UNC</b>	UN Command
<b>UNOCT</b>	United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism
<b>UNOWAS</b>	United Nation office for West Africa and Sahel
<b>VERLT</b>	Violent Extremism and Radicalization that lead to terrorism
<b>WADA</b>	World Anti-Doping Agency
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization

## **LIST OF ACRONYMS**

<b>AMISOM</b>	African Union Mission in Somalia
<b>ITERATE</b>	International Terrorism Attributes of Terrorist Events
<b>NGOs</b>	Non-Governmental Organizations
<b>PhD</b>	Doctor of Philosophy
<b>NACOSTI</b>	National Commission of Science Technology and Innovation

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 Background of the Study**

Terrorism poses a serious threat to states, corporations, households, and individuals. In the twenty-first century the risk of terrorism and violent extremism is on the rise and rapidly destabilizing regions in the world. This is owing to the fact that it results in a lot of negative consequences that lead to destruction of property, leading to injury and death of persons (Nacos, 2016; Walker, 2018). According to White, (2020) terrorism has taken the center stage in the growing security threats facing many countries worldwide. As a result, governments are grappling with the right strategies to combat the ever-evolving terrorism trends, this is in spite of the fact that although expertise in the disruption and suppression of terrorism accumulated overtime, few countries have developed and implemented strategies aim specifically at permanently countering terrorism. Olawale, (2020) argues that in as much as strides are being made toward the development of a coherent approach to counterterrorism in many regions. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent attacks around the world prompted many states to re-evaluation their counterterrorism strategies. Bryden and Bahra, (2019) add that counter-terrorism strategies are continuously being confronted by an evolving terrorism and targeted violence.

According to Savell, (2021) the United Nations Office of Counterterrorism (UNOCT) globally leads and coordinates an all-of-United Nations (UN) approach to prevent and counter terrorism and violent extremism. The UN, (2020) further argues that the UNOCT scaled up its efforts to help member states achieve a world free from terrorism by adapting

and innovating to meet this challenging moment. In the unprecedented 2020 environment, promoting multilateral cooperation remained at the center of UNOCT's work (Debisa, 2021).

The current strategies to prevent, detect, and disrupt terrorist activity in many countries worldwide mainly focus on disrupting already planned attacks or the physical security of critical infrastructure. This is a reactive policy. While aggressive response to a known threat or vulnerability is a critical component for any counterterrorism strategy, this posture forces the nation to continually respond to situations that are already dangerous, a situation akin to treating symptoms, rather than the underlying disease. Failure to adapt newer approach to terrorism ensures that the government will remain on the defensive. More importantly, such a one-dimensional strategy is unsustainable over the long haul. homeland security community should develop a holistic plan to prevent the development of homegrown terrorists and the maturation of domestic terrorist threats to complement existing counterterrorism measures. To be most effective, the national strategy should permeate federal, state, and local approaches to both counterterrorism and social policy.

Counterterrorism can be described as the effort by governments to counter terrorist activity. There is a scholarly controversy on how to categorize a government's counter terror actions and policies. Scholars Ronald Crelinstein and Alex Schmid (1993) contend that the most common way to differentiate amongst counterterrorism response options is to separate them into "soft line" and "hard line" responses. Soft line responses address the root causes of the terrorist activity, whereas hard line responses address the actions taken by the terrorist

organizations. Crelinstein and Schmid show a second method of separating counter terror policies is to divide them into domestic criminal justice matters or treating them as an external "form of war or low-intensity conflict." A state that views counterterrorism as a criminal justice matter will target terrorists with an internally focused police force. To the contrary, a state that views counterterrorism as a form of war will target terrorists with a foreign-focused paramilitary organization.

The international community had engaged with the issue of terrorism long before that calamitous September morning ten years ago. For decades, the United Nations has brought the international community together to condemn terrorist acts and developed the international legal framework to enable states to fight the threat collectively. Sixteen international treaties have been negotiated at the United Nations and related forums that address issues as diverse as the hijacking of planes, the taking of hostages, the financing of terrorism, the marking of explosives, and the threat of nuclear terrorism. Additionally, in response to deadly attacks in East Africa and the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, the Security Council, in 1999, decided to impose sanctions on the Taliban and, later, on Al-Qaeda. The Council created a list of individuals and entities associated with these organizations that are subject to a travel ban, assets freeze, and arms embargo.

According to Saka and Cohen-Louck (2014) terrorism is an extreme situation that is attributed to chronic, unpredictable, and uncontrollable and a deadly threat that can influence people's lives and also the welfare of the person. Romanov, Zussman, and Zussman (2012) state that terrorism creates fear, anxiety, individual's lack of security,

uncertainties, and helplessness among people in the communities. Additionally, Lowry and Lating (2002) argue that terrorism can be random, with undefined targets and attacks people randomly in any part of society, diverse ages and doesn't target specific gender. Their goal is to destabilize the social order by increasing the frequency and intensity of attacks and inflicting mass casualties. Therefore, effective counterterrorism is geared toward helping the general public maintain their daily routines and personal sense of security by deterring, uncovering, foiling, and defeating attacks; ensuring efficient first response; and facilitating recovery from these attacks (Howard, 2004; Weisburd et al., 2009; Perry, 2014).

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

Although sustained efforts by Government of Kenya to combat terrorism and extremism is evident, today's challenge posted by terrorism and extremism continue to implicit greater pain to families, corporations, and the country's economy. Notably, since bombing of USA Embassy in Nairobi and recent terrorist attacks in Garisaa University, Westgate, there have been massive increases in government efforts (increase in expenditure) counter-terrorism strategies, as well as a proliferation of programs designed to fight terrorism. Although the adopted counterterrorism strategies provide a sense that Kenya is secure, and their absolute effectiveness may not always be easily assessed. Subsequently, this is worsened by the fact that there are emerging challenges that hinder the full maximization of the aforesaid strategies.

Considering the changing nature of security challenges in Lamu West Sub-County, and in particular terrorism activities attributed to Al-Shabaab (ALS), the security forces have been

deployed on several occasions either to respond to terrorism incidents or to pre-empt terror threats within the country. However, the failure of deterrence methods in reducing further terrorist attacks in Kenya calls for continued debates on the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies and their implications on national security in Kenya. This standpoint is necessitated by the fact that a precipitating event often precedes the outbreak of terrorism, and there seems to be a common pattern of government actions that act as catalysts for terrorism (Coolsaet, 2013). Therefore, the study sought to examine the contribution of counterterrorism strategies and their implications on national security in Lamu West Sub County, Kenya.

### **1.3 Objectives of the Study**

In this section, the study presents the objectives that guides the study:

#### **1.3.1 Broad Objective**

To examine the contribution of counterterrorism strategies to security in Lamu West Sub County, Kenya.

#### **1.3.2 Specific Objectives**

- i. To examine the stakeholders-partnership engagement on counter terrorism strategies to security in Lamu West Sub- County.
- ii. To assess the influence of institutional framework on counter terrorism to security in Lamu West Sub - County.
- iii. To analyze the effect of public response to counter terrorism strategies to security in Lamu West Sub -County.

- iv. To evaluate the influence of security agencies response on counterterrorism strategies to security in Lamu West Sub - County.

#### **1.4 Research Questions**

This study was guided by the following research questions.

- i. How does stakeholder-partnership engagement contribute on counter terrorism strategies to security in Lamu West Sub-County?
- ii. What is the contribution of institutional framework as a counter terrorism strategy to security in Lamu West Sub- County, Kenya?
- iii. How does public response contribute to counter terrorism strategies to security in Lamu West Sub- County?
- iv. What is the contribution of security agencies response on counterterrorism strategies to security in Lamu West Sub - County?

#### **1.5 Significance of the Study**

The study findings contribute to many sectors of the economy. First, it highlights the contribution of counterterrorism strategies to security in Lamu West Sub - County, understand best counterterrorism approach to use in the region, hence, enhance knowledge skills and deeper understandings on the appropriate approach to counterterrorism in Kenya. Secondly, the findings contribute the scholarly literature on counterterrorism strategies and enriches terrorism information, skills and understanding of development principles for critical stakeholders.



In addition, the study findings help policy makers in the state, communities, civil society, the private sector, and international partners. For example, the findings from this study will also help to strengthen Kenya National Police, Ministry of Interior and National Security Advisory Council, to developing in terms of relevant up-to-date policies that will help to enhance approaches to the application of counterterrorism initiatives in countering terrorism. Lastly, by helping stakeholders in the region the findings act as a source of public awareness on the most effective counterterrorism strategies including their implication on security of Lamu West Sub County in Lamu County, Kenya.

## **1.6 Justification of the Study**

It is arguable that no state can consider itself immune from terrorism. As such, early prevention of terrorism through counterterrorism strategies in Africa is not achievable, by the state and security services alone. In the past decade, the United States has helped bolster Kenya's domestic security and security capacity, by assisting in the development of the Kenya Defence Forces Rangers, National Intelligence Service, the General Service Unit, and the Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU) a specialized police unit tasked with counter-terror responses. These domestic security and military services serve at the forefront of Kenya's counterterrorism efforts against an enemy in the name of Al Shabaab. The rapid increase in terror attacks in Kenya has aroused the attention of scholars and more studies are thus needed to help investigate what constitutes terrorism, counterterrorism, and its effect on national security.

### **1.7 Assumptions of the study**

This study examined counter-terrorism strategies employed in addressing terrorism activities in Lamu Sub West - County, Kenya. In this case, the underlying assumption was that:

- i. The selected county could provide data, which would provide inferences on issues of terrorism across other regions in Kenya. The target population included diverse individuals living and working in various organizations in Lamu West Sub County.
- ii. The respondents and participants could accept to participate in the study, by answering our questions accurately.
- iii. Studies on terrorism have used several methods and the researcher's belief in this study was that the methodology adopted could help to generate data that can demonstrate the contribution of anti-terrorism strategies in the aforesaid area/region.

### **1.8 Scope and Limitations of the Study**

This study covers the period ranging from 2011 to 2021. Terrorist attacks have recently been in the rise in Lamu West Sub-County, Kenya. This study examined anti-terrorism strategies affecting security in Lamu West Sub - County, which has suffered many terrorist attacks due to its geographical proximity to Somalia. As such although many other counties in Kenya have suffered terrorist attacks, this study only focused on Lamu West Sub County, Kenya.

Considering the vast geographical area covered by the research, and as stated elsewhere that the nature of terror attacks across these counties being rampant, there were limited resources to cover the entire study area. As such, the study focused only Lamu West Sub County, Kenya. Concerning the targets of the underlying offence, there is a critical controversy about

whether acts against non-human targets can be labeled as terrorism. One of the limitations was that the topic under study is a sensitive area, in which many of the respondents could not be comfortable to answer or discuss. The researcher thus had to work closely with them explaining the aim of the study.

In seeking to understand the possible limitations and delimitations of this study, it was crucial to appreciate that being a new area of research, the researcher could face the hurdles under investigation of finding vast subject matter experts, owing also to the sensitive and technical nature of the topic under investigation. This researcher intentionally adhered to the appropriate research procedures and all sources of information were fully acknowledged as far as possible. Also, before the research tool is administered, consent was sought.

The study of terrorism counterstrategies employed to address terrorism in Kenya context seemed to be recent, hence lack of data or reliable data compelled the researcher to limit the scope of the analysis, the size of the sample, or it can be a significant obstacle in finding a trend and a meaningful relationship. Besides, this study largely depended on having access to people, organizations, data as well as documents and, which for whatever reason was limited in some way.

## 1.9 Operational Definition of Terms

**Al - Shabaab:** in this study, the term is used to refer to a terrorist organization mainly operating in Somalia and largely carrying out terrorist attacks in most East Africa especially Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, and other neighbouring countries.

**Anti-terrorism strategies:** in this study, the term is used to refer to defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property from terrorist attacks.

**Counterterrorism:** For the purposes of this study, the term defines as an idea or practice used by the government agencies (police, military, and intelligence agencies) to prevent terrorist attacks from occurring.

**Effectiveness:** is a measure of the success in achieving the desired counter-terrorism objectives.

**Interventions:** is a planned and targeted operation aimed preventing or responding to terrorism activities

**Policies:** these are guidelines developed to guide decisions taken in the counter-terrorism process.

**National discourses:** entails how to organize the growing countries aiming to transcend the existing national order.

**National security:** is the safety of a country especially from threats such as terrorism, wars or even espionage.

**Non-state actor:** refers to organizations and individuals who are not affiliated with, directed by, or receive funding from the government.

**Risk perception:** is the subjective judgment that people make about the characteristics and severity of a risk. It describes natural hazards and threats to the environment.

**Security:** refers to the state in which a person feels protected or safe from harm.

**Strategies:** involves a comprehensive plan of action where government seeks to achieve success in the fight against terrorism.

**Terrorism:** entails the use of violent deeds to terrify the people in an area as a way of trying to achieve a political goal.

**Threat:** is an intention by armed groups or individuals to cause harm or loss to other people and their property.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter has reviewed previous studies on terrorism, and counter-terrorist strategies. The chapter also has discussed the theoretical foundation and the tactics and methods of modern terrorism and conceptual.

#### **2.2 Concept of Terrorism**

Globally, the definition of terrorism is considered highly subjective primarily determined by political and economic consideration of many governments (Knudse, et al, 2015). To many, terrorism remains an important topic for most scholars and government around the world because of its effects on society (Brit et al, 2014). According to Harsen (2013) terrorism is an evolving global problem and one of the most complex and demanding security issues for many governments around the world. Therefore, approaches adopted in fighting terrorism have inmate benefits and challenges which require close attention, and this suggests that tools and methods used to counter terrorism should complement each other. Hence, the terrorist attacks have attracted a lot of attention from both media clergy, politicians, scholars, policy makers and the members of the public more importantly, the distinction between terrorism at others forms of insecurity such as guerrillas or armed movement continues to arouse debate.

Terrorism is explicitly seeking attention and can promptly lead to psychological impact, hence perceived as a way to reduce the effect and Philip Zimbardo explains terrorism is

simply about a simple factor psychology (Bongar, 2007). He observes that terrorism is just a psychology of fear. It is a form of psychological warfare, perpetuated by people who want to engage in revolution so as to attention of the media and aren't interested in seizing people's property and they kill people to send a message in way that make them feel as if their symbolic is achieved. Terrorism is a means to an end rather than an end in itself, in which terrorists "want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening, not a lot of people dead" (Orehek & Vazeou-Njeuwenhuis, 2014; Pg?). Several other scholars have sought to provide a framework for assessing counterterrorism. Christopher Hewitt lists six specific categories of counter terror policies a government can adopt: ceasefires, negotiations, improved economic conditions, collective punishments, the use of security forces and political reforms as classifications for anti-terror policies. Similarly, in her essay, "Institutional Responses to Terrorism, The Italian Case," Donatella Della Porta, uses changes "in legislation, the policy of the police apparatus, and the actual activities of the security forces and courts in order to assess a state's response to terrorist attacks." She analyzes counter-terrorist strategies by addressing changes in government policy.

Koehler (2019) argues that the emotional nature of the term terrorism makes it more difficult to define. Simply terrorism is a threat or the use of violence to achieve political, religious, or ideological reasons to influence the attitudes and can differ from other typed of violence in the target while the definition of the concept abound, international community has not been able to reach conclusion in the general definition.

Chaliand and Blin (2016) maintains that the difference in the narrow approach to define terrorism problem is aimed at identifying special class of terrorist activities –international or transnational terrorism, moreover the conceptualization continues to gain attention of policy makers’ especially global powers of the west. Indeed, the concept is based on two significant assumptions in the west; especially the USA is dominant authority leading to establishment and maintenance of emerging global order. Also, actions taken by the strategic institutions in the establishment if global orders can be either be legitimate in the definition or interest of the population affected by the global orders are adequately represented in the global system interestingly such narrow forms of terrorism are conducted by non-state actors which may or may not receive support from dissident countries or population with intention of challenging or changing the terms of prevailing social orders.

Terrorism is characterized by the loss of lives, damage to property, adding to suffering to already population who are innocent members of the society. Belasco (2011) argues that it was unfortunate that in modern society, these terror acts continue to be witnessed and is not particular to a particular region but globally something, originally seen during French revolution of 1970s. Broadly terrorism is a term involving the use of violence to create fear in society or communities. Based on the argument by Belasco (2011) it would be important to point out that in the absence of a globally agreed and legal definition of terrorism it becomes desirable to consider, an effective and prevention –based internationally accepted response where principles of law (process and human rights) is respected. As Silke (2013) puts it, several international and regional legal tools already exist and can be utilized to



counter terrorism mainly through investigations and prosecutions of anyone suspected or found to have committed the offence.

The notion that terrorism can be understood and conceptualized as a specific method of violence – whether ideological based – is one strand of modern academic wisdom in terrorism studies. Furthermore, in this context, Schmid (1983) suggests that terrorism is a combat method whose victims are randomly or symbolically targeted and there is no reference made as to who carried out the combat (Schmid & Tinnens, 2015). Along similar studies Crenshaw (2015) argues that in terrorism debate, the identity of perpetrator doesn't matter in the combat method while Pillar (2001) maintains that terrorism is something people do rather than whom they are or their achievements. Therefore, terrorism can be defined by the nature of its actions and not by perpetrator's identity. As a result, modern terrorism certainly targets mainly civilians, and it becomes clear that this phenomenon is derived from the general evolution of political structures and emergence of media.

Furthermore, Siegel (2021) observes that there has been endless debate for decades on the meaning and used of the term terrorism. Following 9/11 attacks the terrorism became all-pervasive and its use continue to be used more extensive in fact much has been published on terrorism in many countries Europe, USA, Asia, and Africa. Consequently, literature and discourse continue to be very influential on how scholars explain the meaning and use of the term in public discussion. This study discerns that what is predestined as a threat to terrorism in on country varies from each other and despite terrorism debate become only subject of more systematic research following 9/11. The fluid and the contested nature of the

term has been a topic under study by researcher for a longer time. Several past studies offer good understanding of what can be described as acts of violent terrorism and the nature of incentives requires for using the term (Siegel, 2021; Carli et al. 2017).

According to Carli et al. (2017) terrorist attack not only the military nor against the anyone opposing them because the ultimate goal is normally the death of a leader compared with 19<sup>th</sup> Century terrorism, the 21<sup>st</sup> century terrorist activities are mainly targeted at civilian whose loss of wellbeing may be anticipated to evoke a desired response from those in opposition anyone following the news globally. It becomes very important to point out that the concepts of civilian and combatants are always used in the working definition of terrorism. Two critical issues are evident in civilians in simple term is not applied in lower-level guerrilla warfare where people engaging in conflicts are not formally registered in any nor receive suppliers that can help detect them as soldiers. As such their status as civilians is challenged, making application of this term terrorism to be potentially subjective.

The origins of terrorism are lost in antiquity. Terror and terrorism are as old as the human discovery that people can be influenced by intimidation. From early 1960s to the early 1980s, the term terrorism was also applied to the violent left-wing groups, as well as nationalists (Sederberg, 1995). Therefore, the use of violence to achieve political objectives came to be recognized as the weapon of the weak against the powerful. A minority syndrome spread so far that these groups were willing to espouse the cause of other groups in the world. This has led to international linkages and terrorism began to be viewed as sub-national warfare. Contemporary terrorist organizations have assumed a transnational character. They operate beyond the national boundaries of their target states. In the post-

Cold War era, the transnational character of these terrorist groups has necessarily brought forth to them certain advantages, viz., global networking with potential allies, arms suppliers, and other terrorist groups, as also the generation of transnational support (Lum, Kennedy, & Sherley, 2006).

Although the international and regional instruments available are effective prevention approaches (especially in interventions that target particular criminal acts) such as hostage – taking or hijacking of planes. Most countries implement them differently (Granor 2005) Consequently, the responses by the criminal justice in the investigation and prosecution of the crimes related to the crimes relation to terrorist attract increase in international support for more effective measures to counter ship terrorism response has resulted to stronger international cooperation in terrorism strategies. This has hardened the persecution of individuals engaging in terrorism acts. One of the most important features of combating terrorism is to maintain the physical security at the highest level; and the protection of important people, the usage of metal detector in public spaces that are crowded and open to threat such as airports, shopping centers and the protection of infrastructure units that are strategically important are the measures to be taken at first place.

According to White (2021), terrorism has taken the center stage in the growing security threats facing many countries worldwide. As a result, governments of the world are grappling with the right strategies to combat the ever-evolving terrorism trends, despite the fact that expertise in the disruption and suppression of terrorism has accumulated overtime, few countries have developed and implemented effective strategies for combating and

countering terrorism. Olawale (2020) argues that, as much as many strides are being made toward the development of a coherent approach to counterterrorism in many regions' significant challenges to effective cooperative action in Africa remain. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent attacks around the world prompted many states to re-evaluate their counterterrorism strategies. On a similar note, Bryden and Bahra, (2019) posit that counter-terrorism strategies are continuously being confronted by an evolving terrorism and targeted violence, despite the ongoing global leadership and coordination of prevention and counter terrorism efforts by the United Nations (Savell, 2021). In this context, the UN emphasizes the need of a multi-agency policy strategy to counter terrorism and violent extremism as evidence in the US, UK, Switzerland, Germany, Italy, and Turkey (Debisa, 2021). In the case of the United States, terrorism groups such as Islamic State (IS), al Qaida and Hezbollah continue to plot attacks, in spite of the counterterrorism measures put in place.

As the threats posed by some terror organizations continue to evolve in the United Kingdom, the country works to build consensus to degrade and defeat these adversaries (Source?). In Germany, Switzerland, and the rest of the European Union, terrorism is largely being tackled, through a combination of diplomatic and military efforts (Debisa, 2021). A recent study by Thomas (2012), on the effects of terrorism on the community, the study showed that after terrorist acts, some people suffered from severe post-traumatic stress disorders, anxiety, and major depression. In addition, the study by Thomas (2012), provided a good overview of the prevention of terrorism and its links to community cohesion. In this respect

Thomas examines some of the policies, organizational, and impact tensions of prevention in the context of community cohesion.

According to Ganor (2014) violent terrorism is considered a dynamic process in which individuals come to accept violent terrorism as possible, conceivable even genuine courses of action. Moreover, no single outline that incorporates all terrorists and there is clear-cut conduit which leads people to terrorism Siegel (2021) opines that some scholars, lawmakers have described terrorism differently examples the scholars in USA began to differentiate various forms of terrorism in 1970s. The strategic significance of African nations in the fight against terrorism was raised after September 11 US attack. This led to African being described as world's soft underbelly for international terrorism. Consequently, it changed the continent's strategic significance because the US began to identify weaker countries who were likely to pose more threats to national security.

### **2.3 Tactics and Methods of Modern Terrorism**

There is strong evidence to suggest that in their targets modern terrorism in the recent years have adopted several tactical and methods that are similar to those used by states during armed conflicts intense (Deen, 2005) A continue discussion points out that, over a century terrorists organization have begun to code their targets areas or victims something which resembles professional military codes because they respect distinction between soldiers and officials as well as civilian population (this was evident in the assassination of Archduke F. Ferdinand of Austria in June 19/4 (Lind, 2014). This case took place approximately mid-19<sup>th</sup> century when increased industrialized weaponry promoted lack of targets in killing the enemy became more indiscriminate and very deadly.

In their view Cooney and Bigman (2015) stresses that the advanced means and methods of wars used during the total wars in 20<sup>th</sup> century, effectively teaches people who became post-wars terrorists and also anyone who would adopt a more illegal weapons and forms of fighting – Guerrilla warfare. Moreover, in the present society, use of advanced bombing strategies or weapons of mass destruction and many others can be a recurring phenomenon. Several scholars maintain that total wars are a modern issue – they came in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century (Qurashi, 2018; Schmid, Forest, & Lowe, 2021). It is thought that technology gave rise to terrorism all over the world and further many attacks on government installations would modernize the fight against terrorism and hence counterterrorism followed a certain way.

Furthermore, Silke (2013) maintains that several non-state perpetrators often use violence to coerce their enemies by creating fear, and in history this was evident when Jewish Zealots assassinated their enemies while fighting during Romans Empire in 1605. In fact, Guy Fawkes who was also known as Guido Fawkes attacked the British parliament while terrorists assassinated many senior government officials and also head of state. As such, in what appeared as the most disastrous consequence in human history, Bosnian Serb student, Mr Gavrilo Princip shot and killed Archduke Franz Ferdinand from Austria, and this triggered several events including the First World War and it also affected millions of people. Elsewhere, the attacks that took place September 11, 2001 depicts how terrorist groups are influenced by religion, and they can use violence to pursue their goals.

Balasco (2011), states that, the modern conceptualization of terrorism without intention made it real the political conceptions of terrorism. Possibly, at the end they rely on the terrorist's intention to describe it and the process of terrorism involving an unfolding dialectic of the actions and reactions. According to Chalian and Blin (2016) terrorism has become simplified in intentional actions hence this short cutting of the causal chain in the process in which terrorism facilitates both the political, negation of history and rhetorical of response. Terrorism has also been viewed by some scholars as highly complex and a constantly changing phenomenon getting attention of local, national, and international agenda besides being linked to a wide variety of many groups. An important issue is the use of psychological research on terrorism. Certainly, counter terrorism continues to be a major issue among governments particularly contemporary Kenya which has in recent years began with issue including not only intelligence and the law enforcement but health sector.

A notable empirical source of new terrorism is radical right violence, especially USA. For example, the shock of Oklahoma City in 1995 brought unknown groups to international attention. According to Barkun (1996), believe in the generic conspiracy theory is a common dominator in debate on American radical right. Belasco (2011) observes that the difficulty in the definitions of the term terrorism is in the agreement based on the determination of here the use of violence is legitimate hence, the modern definition of terrorism always elicit debate. The use of terrorism to achieve political needs is common to state and non-state actors. A significant number of definitions have been generated by agencies, with links with governments and are systematically biased by excluding government. The modern label "Terrorism" is highly pejorative and suggests a lack of legitimacy and morality. Moreover,

the actions of terrorism are always a tactic that is committed by the perpetrators as part of their military or geopolitical agenda.

Onat, Bastug, Guler, and Kula (2023) notes terrorism activities have continued to grow in complexity and become very sophisticated in recent years because of the downturn in the economy, advancement of technology and emerging failed states. Accordingly, the online incitement to radicalization to violent extremism has risen in recent years and this is attributed to the growth of internet, especially the social media and the increase attention in online platform. In summary technology has changed the security of many states. In a recent nationally representative US survey, the fear of cyberterrorism was ranked seventh among 88 different types of fears, while it ranked 19th in 2017 (Bastug, Onat, & Guler, 2023). According to Onat, Bastug, Guler, and Kula (2023) the fear of cyberterrorism is a particular type of terrorism fear that has gained growing interest, especially following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In fact, some scholars predicted an increase in cyberterrorism attacks after 9/11 and discussed the possibility of catastrophic cyberterrorist attacks perpetrated by global terrorist groups (Denning, 2013).

Deen (2005) argues that terrorism is a very organized use of terror acts and often violent as a way of coercion. However, the international community doesn't have a binding and criminal law definition of the term. The standard definition sees it as the use of violent actions aimed at creating fear, religiously executed and also policy and ideological motivated or aimed at achieving these goals they deliberately target non-combatants safety. Moreover, some definitions today include actions of unlawful and war.



Terrorists conduct violent actions against their targets as part of their representation of their terrorist group. According to Cooney and Bigman (2015) terrorists are individuals who subscribe to claim affiliation to a terrorist group or movement, whether or not they participate in the violent or other terrorist activities (Black, 2004). The United Nations (1999) defined terrorism as:

...act envisioned to cause, death or severe physical injury to a civilian or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act, Pg.29

In one strand of standard academic wisdom in terrorism literature is whether terrorism should be understood and conceptualized as a violence method irrespective of the ideology cause adopted. In this context Schmid (1983) suggests that terrorism is a combat method where random or symbolic victims are targeted without reference as to who carried out this combat method (Schmid & Tunney, 2015). In similar manner, Crenshaw (2010) observes that the identity of individual execution or actor is not important to this method of combat. To pillar (2001), terrorism is something in which people, groups or states do rather than who they are or anything they are trying to achieve at the end. In this way terrorism can be described as the nature of the act and not who executed, identities of perpetrators. Today's terrorism tends to target mainly civilians. The phenomena derive from the general evolution of structures of political acting and emergence of the media platforms.

Gassebner and Luechinger (2011) assert that a number of terror activities by Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram fails within new wars definition, hence depicting a sign of new wars. On the same note, Dowd (2019) points out that both the two terrorist organizations (Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram) use disproportionate attacks in their wars against their targets, tactics which are mainly targeted at innocent civilian. A notable case is the Boko Haram's attack and captures of girls the Chibok School in Nigeria (United Nations, 2019). Another notable of new war among the terrorist organization relates to method of financial wars. In this case, compared to old wars, that were financial by states through tax the new wars get funding from private entities and unknown people. This is the case for Al-shabaab and Haram, believed to receive financial support from private and more on donations from sympathizers.

Siegel (2021) notes that the concepts of terrorism, its meaning, and the usage for attracted an endless disagreement for decades. It is evident offer 911 attack the word seems all pervasive and its usage became ever more extensive, in fact much has been published on terrorism in USA, Europe, Asia and Africa. Consequently, studies are very influential on how researchers currently understand terrorism in the public sphere. The study discerns that what is predestined as a threat to terrorism is one country. Varies from each other and although terrorism has only become a subject in several systematic research soon after September 11, 2001, attack, previous offer, and what terrorism implies and the nature of incentives in using the term. These attacks of September 11 appear to have shaped how most countries confronted terrorism with increasing its military spending, enhancing of aviation security and law enforcement powers.

According to Global Terrorism Index (2017) based on the usage violence as well as force by the terrorist, it comprises a wide range of institutions such as individuals with military training and experience in what Whittaker calls throw away operatives who tend to be untrained on conducting suicide mission , additionally , the use of violence demonstrates slowly evolving terror tactics and strategies such as assassinating, bombing, arson, hijacking , hostage taking and sabotage among others (Global Terrorism Index , 2017). Terrorist groups have also adopted some recent tactics such as unconventional forms of terror (unclear terrorism (attack on nuclear reactors and fabricating dirty bomb).

High tech terrorism involves cyber-attacks ecological terrorism and also terrorism acts targeting to destroy cultural heritage especially by ISIS. The flow of foreign terrorism flightless has continued to slow with few cases being reported. Nonetheless the marked decrease in territorial control by terrorist group in Iraq and Syria ISIS forces many foreign fighters joining the group to make choice whether to join them or leave the region, meanwhile adoption of UN resolution 2396, security council has realized significant step in making step in meeting the challenges caused individuals returning or relocating to the region, In East Africa, Al-Shabaab continue to dominate or control a significant rural parts of south and central and entirely the groups terror activities has been felt in almost every part of Somali because they have created fear and intimidation tactics.

The attacks carried out by Al-Shabaab in Nairobi and other major urban areas have mainly targeted the civilian population with notable use of suicide vests. Similar attacks in rural Keya especially along the border of Kenya and Somalia with security being the main targets

and terror groups have often relied on the use of some improvised explosive devices (IED) the terrorism groups seem to be exploiting weaker links such as local community grievances to recruit new members expand of their networks and extend their geographical reach. Most certainly these factors contributing to terrorist attacks in Kenya may not changes in short term but the country might continuing to be alert for some time.

Chaliand and Blin (2016) posits that similar features of new wars related to the terrorism phenomenon uses technology and the internet mainly social media – Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and other available online tools. In the case of Al shabaab and Boko Haram, use of social have been one of their best tools in their targets and could reach even young people who constitute majority in social media usage especially when recruiting them. Indeed, the internet has continued to be used by terrorist groups or individuals in their communication and in coordinating its terrorism activities such as fundraising to raise money to support its activities (Chaliand & Blin, 2016).

Generally, the internet has increasingly shaped how new wars been fought especially how terrorists carry their activities and display impact of their attacks. Several studies have examined the nature of terrorist's use of internet. For instance, Conway (2006) in a study found that the key functions if internet to terrorist groups include information dissemination, fundraising, networking, recruitment and providing information to their members. This was evident when Al Qaeda operatives strongly utilized the internet in planning and coordinating attacks of September 11, 2001 (Ilardi, 2009). Therefore, internet becomes cyber-planning tool for the terrorist groups or individuals.

While internet has been used by terrorist to enhance their activities, it can also help in the counterterrorism role. A large amount of knowledge on terrorism activities and their targets can be found online on websites, chat rooms and other internet communications. Moreover, increasing use of internet by terrorists give greater opportunity to government agencies to review large amount of data which can be compiled and at the same time analyze for counterterrorism purpose. In fact, counter-narratives with strong facts can be passed through online forums, photos, and videos.

#### **2.4 Forms/types of Terrorism**

The phenomenon of terrorism has fueled endless debate and many forms/types of terrorism have been identified. For example, state terrorism is conducted by government, or any terrorist act carried out directly by or encouraged and supported by any state (country) or any terrorist acts by the government against its people or support international terrorism (Belasco, 2011). Moreover, Monty (2019) strongly argues that state terrorism is a controversial concept like terrorism itself. Elsewhere, Chaliand and Blin (2016) suggests that although not always the norm, state terrorism can be characterized by threats or use of violence, political objective, debate to change status quo, intention to spread fear by targeting civilian population in the terrorism acts.

According to Ganor (2014), targeting innocent civilian population is a problem especially when trying to differentiate state terrorism and other forms of violence perpetuated by the government. Domestic regime may encourage state terrorism against people across orders or

anyone perceived as foreigner by they don't attacks its own people because their belief is purely based on violent attacks on democratic societies. While referring to civilians in USA, Johnson (2000) proposed that terrorist attacks innocent and undefended people precisely since American military and sailors seemed invulnerable and hence, in this frame, civilians are selected as rational targets because of the ease of such operation or easy to carry out terrorist attacks.

As argued by Lond (2010) dictatorship regimes can perpetuate or encourage terrorism acts against their members something democratic regimes doesn't do, although they may engage in state terrorism especially against other countries. According to Carli et al (2017), when a country declares war or sends its military to fight armed groups, it cannot be referred to as terrorism nor its use of violence to administer punishment among criminals committing crimes. Nonetheless, it can be argued that democratic states are potentially able to perpetuate terrorism, and this was witnessed for many years in Israel believed to have carried out terror activities against Arab world.

Along similar thoughts, Siegel (2021) maintains that terrorism is an extreme form of aggression in which non-state actors' attacks civilians' population as part of its political aim in order to spread fear. Additionally, the threats from terrorist attacks were progressively got the attention of the world such as the media portrayals, global concerns policy makers and scholarly research one incident which has continued to be reference point is the September 11, 2001, where terrorism received huge media attention quantified in terms of space and time devoted to its might a challenge (Chatiand & Bliu, 2016). Consequently, USA

government spends over 1.2 trillion dollars in the war on terrorism over ten years since the Bittack of 2001 up until 2011 when Osama Bin Laden was killed.

According to Monty (2010), terrorists is unlikely to carry their attack larger cities but more on communities of either size although planning or mitigation of either size can remove 100% of the risk of terrorist attacks. Early mitigation and preparedness can reduce the risk owing to the lack of information, on previous harmed frequency of attack greatness and damager parameters, there is no clear guess on the probability of a future occurrences or terrorists' activities and therefore this becomes an interesting area of study. Terrorist organizations o individuals often engage in a certain psychological warfare suggesting that attacks by terrorist individuals and organizations are motivated by more than just an attempt to cause harm to the victims. More important such attacks by terrorists seeks to communicate with people being victimized are the soft and hard targets serve primarily to generate messages to reach a vast majority of population via media platforms.

As argued by Ganor (2014) the instruments to Counter terrorism involves disrupting their ability of conduct an attack mainly though identification of potential threats and subsequently eliminating any real or the Perceived threats. However, the nature of terrorist's organizations remains versatile and flexible since it doesn't originate from one area location which could, suggest that counter terrorism is cyclical, with intelligence leading to stokes which, leads demands for more intelligence. It is important to note that solving the problem of terrorism lie more in collaborative efforts among key actors both military and non-

military tools such as media, civil society organization, intelligence agencies, academic institution in which the multiagency underlie approach (Land, 2010).

There is widespread agreement that the situation tends to advance terrorism justifying the ideologies intensified appeal (Chaliand & Blien, 2016). Even though enactment of terrorism can be a problem to some of the goal of each actor (not harming children, preserving individual's physical safety); terrorist can justify ideologies are likely to increase if it appears to be the main and at three the only instrumental means in attaining individual political goal. To accept terrorism as the only possible way a person has to believe a perpetrator harms the individuals or group and the only aggression against the culprit-can remedy the situation and attacks on civilian population is the way (Kruglanski et. al, 2011).

Terrorism is a technique which is as old as warfare itself, contrary to the popular notion that terrorism was born out of the nineteenth century nationalist movements. This appearance of the term in French Revolution and its terrorism activities. Similar to all political issues terrorism can be defined by quality between the proposed ideas and its implementation. Moreover, terrorism exists mostly in a cultural and historical perspective and for three decades, terrorism activities were linked to Marxist ideology; terrorist groups in Marxist ideology are few today but they were dominated in 1970s and 1980s. The same can apply to the whole period in which terrorism existed, Shape by political context that were born, live and die. While terrorism is a concept which has always witnessed continuous reinvention hence lack continuity between each terrorist's generation signals a break with the past.



Today, the significance of the cultural element vs more evident in the discussion of terrorist movement inspired by religion that in the days of nationalist or strictly ideological inclination. In the case of Hamas and Al Qaeda, they combined, political aspirations (destruction of USA and Israel) which religious undertone which can serve primarily recruitment and hence finds an echo in the ideologies of other movements. Modern rational choice theory, as advanced by Cornish and Clarke (1986), assumes that offenders are rational people who seek to maximize their pleasure and minimize their pain. In essence, the rational choice perspective suggests that individuals take advantage of opportunities to commit a crime when the expected benefits exceed the expected costs (Nagin & Paternoster, 1994). Expected benefits include tangible gains as well as psychological benefits including the thrill of breaking the law.

Further literature shows that early phase of terrorism in Palestinian was mainly political and secular and shifted to religiosity in 1980s after the Iranian revolution (Asinovsky 2018). As argued by Siegel (2012) today's terrorism mainly targets civilians and such action derives its power from political structures and emergence of the media platforms. In the case of the west the political structure is thought to have evolved into democracy in the late 18th Century. Also, contemporary media, which is an important component in the liberal democracies, emerged in tandem. At the moment the political legitimacy of a democratic society and its elected team lies with its citizens and that is why terrorism is effectively in democratic states than in government under dictatorship. As widely thought it may not because dictatorship is highly efficient in finding and punishing individuals engaging in terrorism, but they may not have greater leeway than democracies in the actions since the

impact is broad. Therefore, it is not wrong to suggest that today's terrorism in part is a result of democracy.

Monty (2019) draws information from the department of state report entitled patterns of global terrorism, 2001 to demonstrate that six terrorist organizations fall in the category and this include LABU Nidai organization, Al-Gamas, Al-Ismamiyya (Islamic groups) Hizballah (Party of God) Al-Jihad (Egyptians Islamic Jihad), Mulahedin Kalq organization and Al-Qaeda. Accordingly, each one of this group is very radical Islamic based group that has always supported the creation of Islamic state in Palestine instead the Israel and also remove USA influence in whole of Middle East region.

Further research suggests that some of these terrorist organizations have advocating establishment of a new world order based on extremist Muslim views (Monty, 2019). The groups operate in a global fashion and have a support network across the world. When we critically look at its collective activities these terrorist organizations have the ability to strike targets virtually in any region and the ideological objectives threatens interest of security agencies beyond their region. Moreover, with advancement in communication technology including internet and open space allowing them to move freely, there is a virtual nation that holds many tools of power information military and economic means (ibid). Therefore, numerous studies are conducted to and out situations capable of provoking terrorism. The terrorists may be deprived and people who are uneducated and well. Educated it is also through that it companies young male and usually highly over-represented in many of the terrorist groups, but this does not mean men only engage in terrorism there is widespread

evidence to confirm women who actively participate in terrorist's activities (Cooney & Bigman, 2015).

Unfortunately, the growing terrorism groups in Africa are evidence that some parts of the continent may not enjoy peace. Probably there will be some regions where normality might not exist as they continue to experience competition from scarce resources, strife, diseases, and other maladies. It is such problems combines little hope of realizing absence of these problems that have been linked or believed to fuel growth of extremist movements. All these have been associated or found to be the root cause of terrorism in Africa. As argued by Widmer and Pavesi (2016) several societies seen to be at peace are far from peaceful.

Shechory-Bitton (2013) opines that Africa's past has witnessed numerous problems ranging from sufferings, oppressive regimes, and endless chain of missed opportunities. If well utilized, could have positively changed the lives of the larger population in the continent. Additionally, it is suggested that it will be too late to avert the catastrophe even if magic could happen where African governments becomes capable and responsive to need of its citizens, donor funding that increases self –reliance as opposed to dependence on aid, and international community increases interests and concerns in what is happening in the African continent. Emerging problems brought about by global warming have given rise to compound the old problems witnessed in the past. The developed countries with strong governments might encounter difficulties navigating the tremendous changes particularly those caused by climate. And to expect many countries that are already fragile to succeed without experiencing challenges is unrealistic.

According to Deen (2005) terrorist strategy is an important way to conceptualize the transformation of terrorism today as a resort to revolutionize violence which has been documented by David Rapoport as an influential concept of waves of terrorism. Terrorists undertake its activities to instill fear in the victims and also attract attention of the government who then commits huge resources to respond to those attacks and hence supports the goal of terrorism. In addition, there was 'anti-colonial wave' beginning with principle of determination of post-World War 1 including Aaland Islands Arbitration of 1921 and its evolution after World War 2 with a notable case being civil wars in Algeria and the war in Vietnam.

According to Records, (2003), tactics used in each of the terrorism waves reflects those adopted by USA during armed conflicts since demobilized military in whole of the ages returned to their homes after the end of the war well trained to use force. Furthermore, Records (2003) asserts that using violence to create fear among diverse audiences to prevent festivities from taking place or coerce them into believing in certain behaviors. Therefore, using such violence serves states and diverse regimes for a longer period. In previous decades, many domestic and international terrorist groups drive and at the same time today's terrorist organizations have begun using dissimilar strategies of terrorist acts such as hijackings, bombing, assassination, and kidnapping of diplomats to achieve their goals and as first established to be real threats to western states. This was evident in the eyes of scholars, law enforcement, politicians and lawmakers and they began to recognize diverse terrorism so as to counter them.

There is widespread agreement that terrorism does not only occur in a particular country but both rich and the poor as well as modern and industrialized and less developed economies. It also occurred during the process of transition and development and former colonial countries and independent ones and those that are established nations and the countries that are considered less democratic. In fact, the list could be longer, but it acts as a demonstration of diverse situations in which countries should take into consideration. Most certainly, this state of diversity tends to make the generalization of terrorism difficult because of many types of what are termed as 'terrorism'. The different types of causes and many scholars can differentiate between domestic and international terrorism as well as separatist terrorism, and socio-revolutionary terrorism.

As argued by Siegel (2021) several factors such as quality of shared political experience, common attribution of target and collective coordination are used to differentiate diverse forms of terrorism. For example, lesser forms of terrorism including psychotic, criminal violence and socio-pathic. Terrorism groups are considered to be weaker than most governments who they often target and hence they become vulnerable to retaliation from the government. As the government becomes more constrained in using force, it experiences less costly in the attribution approach and increase time in which terrorist holds hoping they achieve their main goal. The main targets of the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks were Americans and Israelis, but Kenyans suffered the greatest losses in terms of both lives lost and injuries, not to mention the socioeconomic upheavals these events caused. According to Chaliand and Blin (2016), sub-Saharan Africa, which for a while appeared to be immune, has recently

been a target of terrorism carried out by regular armies, irregulars, and armed groups. In the Great Lakes region, where the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has cost three million lives, largely civilians, the issue is particularly urgent. In the backdrop of globalization, Africa has, incidentally, become a terrorist target, as indicated by the bombings of the American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. The employment of terror in Africa is reminiscent of that of the Thirty Years' War. For its part, Latin America has seen its share of guerrilla warfare throughout the years, especially in the cities. Particularly in the style of guerrilla warfare practiced by the Tupamaros in Uruguay, the rebels inevitably turned to terrorist tactics.

Within a five-year period, Kenya was the scene of two terrorist attacks: the 1998 US Embassy bombing and the surface-to-air missile assaults on an Israeli airliner taking departure from Mombasa airport in 2002. These events made the Kenyan government aware of the issue of international terrorism. (GoK). The pattern of the incidents suggested that US and Israeli interests were the main targets of the terrorists. Although the 2002 terrorist attack in Mombasa, which was planned by the leader of the East African Al Qaeda cell Fazul Abdullahi Mohammed (also known as Abdul Karim), was deemed a failure because it did not result in the large number of casualties the terrorists had hoped for, there was still a threat from Al Qaeda to harm US interests in Kenya.

Kenya made the decision to militarily intervene in the conflict in Somalia in response to the security risks in order to defend its own security. In 2011, the Kenyan defense forces (KDF) invaded Somalia and engaged in combat with Al-Shabaab, seizing many of their strongholds

inside the country. The Kenyan forces initially entered Somalia without the permission of the government, but they were later incorporated into the AMISOM peacekeeping mission with the support of the AU and UN Command (UNC) (AMISOM, 2012).

Huckerby (2019) explains that the peace agreements between the north and south was one of the causes of the genocide in Darfur because it allowed Sudanese soldiers to join the fight. These soldiers, along with the Janjaweed, a group of armed nomadic herders, have committed countless atrocities against the non-Arab farming communities in that area. In these circumstances, it almost seems that peace and war are a zero-sum game; where there is peace, there is conflict. War against an outsider can bring people who are at odds with one another together, so it can also go the other way. In a continent where alliances and allegiances frequently change, both peace and war can be precarious states.

While investigating Saudi Arabia's strong support of several Mosques in Nigeria, Mali, and Nigeria, some of the countries that have experienced civil wars, Sounanye (2019) points out that Saudi Arabia is trying to create favourable space for certain ideology that considers Islam teaching. He suggests that there is link between radicalization, conflict, and the growth of terrorism doctrines in most African states. Additionally, support by Saudi Arabia has contributed to the spread of Ideologies of terrorist organization in Africa and mainly target youth and the unemployed groups. Indeed, these have been associated with the spread of terrorism in most parts of the world and poor governance leaving space for terrorists to fill and offer social services, hence attracting those who are unsatisfied (Pelz, 2007). Terrorist organization employ Wannabi interpretation of Islam to identify their enemies and

justify their attacks when using violence (Moghadan, 2008). Therefore, they tend to advance their strategy which always justifies violence against innocent targets (civilian population).

## **2.5 International and National Response to Terrorism and Extremism**

While use of terrorism as a means of achieving political objectives, experts in this field propose that governments should always attempt to find out the root causes of this issue and act to reduce the problem in the society (Blackbourn, McGarrity, & Roach, 2019). International experts argue that the appearance of Islamic groups that have mainly offered financial support by Saudi Arabia and other Pearsian Gulf countries and individuals have contributed to the problems and certainly continuous terrorist attacks in the region.

“Terrorism undertakings across the world may share some parallels, and thoughtful are also likely to divulge significant modifications narrowly associated to the socio-political context in which they have advanced and continue to evolve. It is this facet in particular that this study sets to discover particularly from the Kenyan context, a country that has witnessed several terrorist attacks mainly along the coastal region.” The United Nations (UN) is of the opinion that many measures have been already taken to deal with the scourge of terrorism, many of them effective. This means that legal measures are being employed differently between states to enhance diplomatic relations (UN, 2019). According to McAleenan (2019), diplomacy is an instrument used to enhance or build consensus to promote international cooperation and it helps countries to understand the needs of each one of them so as to effectively fight corruption.



Once a terrorist attack has been launched and set in motion, security forces employ intelligence both for proactive offensive thwarting operations and for responsive defense measures (Perliger et al., 2009). In a response to attacks that are not thwarted by the offensive–proactive activity, terrorists should be stopped once they are on their way to the targets. To foil launched attacks, there is a sequence of workable procedures to delay the terrorist’s movement, once an attacker is enroute to the target. The series of possible tactics includes setting up roadblocks, generating traffic jams, and closing certain public facilities or streets. There are two main purposes for generating such obstacles: The first is to slow down the terrorist to delay the attack. This provides the police with more time to bring special operations units to engage with the terrorist on course, and to simultaneously organize better defense for the potential terrorist target(s). The second purpose of the obstacles is to compel the terrorist to establish additional communication channels that increase the prospects for enhanced “HUMINT” and “SIGINT” intelligence gathering. The enriched intelligence and better police deployment allow special operations units to engage with the terroristic route and increase the probability for interdiction before the attack takes place.

An effective response to terrorism requires the ability to organize and respond quickly and proficiently to prevent or at least reduce the damage of a terrorist attack. Police officers must thus be trained and equipped to confront the terrorism threat. Kelling and Bratton (2006) maintain that counterterrorism has to be woven into the working procedures and practices of every police department, so that it becomes part of the daily thoughts of officers on the street. Scholars and policy analysts also have debated how to measure the effectiveness of

counterterrorist strategies and tactics. There is limited literature on the topic of whether or not Israel's operations have been successful, and there are few studies with respect to how Israel's counter terror strategies actually rate in relation to these measures of effectiveness. Furthermore, several methodological approaches have been designed to measure counterterrorism's effectiveness, but there is an open debate regarding which approach is most valid.

Oyewole (2013) highlighted three foremost counter-terrorism measures to include military-based, justice-based, and political-based. Proponents of military-based counter-terrorism measures are convinced of the fact that terrorists are nihilist. The author further contended that the fact should not be denigrated therefore, that terrorists who threaten states should be faced with a military counter-terrorism strategy that serves to stop further attacks by the terrorists. This military-based approach employs the idea of war on terrorism which Oyewole (2013) argued that it positions the fight against terrorism in military terms as an enemy-centric war and charges the armed forces with the responsibility of developing and effecting strategic responses. However, this may be emotionally satisfying in the immediate term, in view of the human and material cost of the war on terrorism, but on the other hand, it casts a shadow of fear and destruction that no one would want to live with permanently.

Sen et al (2009) suggests that terrorism can pose a serious that terrorism can pose a serious challenge to governments, corporations, households, and individuals in society. In the twenty century the risk posed by terrorist and extremism are on the rise and rapidly destabilized regions in the world. This is the view of the fact that it results in a lot of

negative consequences that lead to destruction of property and human life (Nacos, 2016; Walker, 2018).

There is strong evidence to suggest the continued terrorism activities have had negative impact to many Muslims community living in United Kingdom (UK) Innes 2011). In other studies, Spalek (2009) despite being broad focused on the effect of the community – based counters terrorism policing and prevention. Therefore the gap in this studies show that the present strategy adopted to prevent detect and disrupts the activities of terrorism in USA were vague and tend to concentrate on terrorism activities that have already been planned attacks or important critical infrastructure and tend to be reactive considering sustained or the vulnerability of critical component required for any a country to continue responding to dangerous situations ; some situations a kin to symptoms as opposed to underlying diseases. In case where they fail to adapt to a multi-agency approach to counter terrorist attacks, the government will always remain in defensive and such one–sided strategy might not be sustainable in the long run.

As part of its efforts to fight terrorism, African Union (AU) has invested heavily funding of the region’s led counter terrorism related peace support operations and African Standby Force policy framework and coordination structure. Nonetheless, it has not been discussed especially the key drivers and the enablers of the regional terrorism and these includes African and non-African charity organizations, multinationals, and state-funded terrorism.

The organizations also manage financial sector of the terrorism operations, facilitate its transactions, purchase terrorist-sourced natural resources, sell weapons and other supplies to the terrorist organizations and establish their communication and intelligence networks. As observed by Ganor (2014), the AU has not given attention to these issues nor attempt to name and shame anyone involved let alone the perpetrators who are involved because it lacks the capacity and strength. Many experts have warned that African countries have either poorly established intelligence agencies or are too suspicious of each other to share intelligence of terrorist activities. The African Union has preoccupied itself with military response which has hindered its ability to assist member states handle the governance deficits that have provided an enabling environment to the terrorist organizations.

Although AU has continued to make progress, its response to extremism and terrorism is not holistic or coordinated as required (Koehler, 2019). According to Ganor (2014), several factors perceived to be separate, but possess interlinked threat include terrorism, small arms and light weapons, transnational organized crime, illicit financial flows, insecurity along the border and illicit extraction of natural resources. However, this may not only interlink but are increasingly reinforcing threats, emanating mainly from the same network groups.

According to the United Nations (2019) the terrorist attack on the Dusit D2 hotel in Nairobi was the worst recent attacks since 2015 which had witnessed significant improvements in operations and coordination were achieved within the Kenyan security sector. Ganor, (2014) opines that effective counter terrorism is one that aims to eliminate the fundamentals cause of terrorism. Preventing it through varied means including attempts to counter financing of terrorism and such prevention strategies becomes very important not only because of loss of

life and damage of property but also threat of democratic process and legal order. It should also be one that provides clear and well-structured response mechanisms in the event that a terror attack does occur. This research therefore argues that past experience with fighting terrorism in Kenya has shown that most approached initiatives so far employed by the state have largely been reactive rather than proactive. While incidents of terror attacks have reduced over the last two years, they still occur. To effectively counter terrorism therefore, the state needs to drastically change in approach to one that pays attention to proactive initiatives tailored towards preventing terrorism rather than reacting to the problem whenever terrorist attack. Therefore, it is important for governments to sustain its terrorism preparedness by enacting counterterrorism legislation and reduce corruption especially within its security system. Simultaneously, issues such as inequalities in socioeconomic development in a country need to be addressed in minimize locals being sympathetic and also offering support to anyone joining terrorist groups. In addition, Kenya should continue supporting Somalia and peace talks in Sudan since their success is likely to witness reduce terrorist attacks in the country.

The exact nature of terror attacks and extremism and their processes are still poorly understood. As study response investments to the same need to be made in technology, skills, research, analysis and innovating new approaches to countering terrorism (Koehler, 2019). Siegel (2021), notes that it must be cherished from the inception that the United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy, “Violent extremism, involves both external circumstances, referring to domestic and international circumstances, as presented in the internal, or personal, factors.” Personal factors are things such as a person’s environment or

their religious or political socialization over some time. It seems that over time, the use of hard power has failed to stop terrorism and radicalization, in some circumstances it has just aggravated the situation, and therefore, the soft power has become a preferable option (Long, 2010).

Coppock and McGovern (2020) state that optimistic predictions for Africa are frequently introduced with the exhortation that all that is required is better governance, free markets, the eradication of corruption, or some other reforms that is simple to declare but all-too-often close to impossible to carry out. According to Ogbonnaya, Ogujiuba, and Stiegler (2014) governments should enhance their capacities to protect its borders and the lives of its citizens. However, this protective role of the state has been threatened by both international and local terrorist groups. In Algeria for example Islamic Maghreb wants to overthrow the government while Boko Haram on the other hand is trying to spread faster in West Africa becoming a real threat to the region's stability. This shows how important states in Africa needs to review its counter-terrorism strategies as terrorist group continue to seek ways of expanding their activities.

Indeed, there are several terrorist organizations that have threatened national security in many African countries. According to Huckerby (2019), some of these groups includes Al shabaab, Al Qaeda, Lord's Resistance Army, Boko Haram, and others which have made governments commit huge resource in the fight against the group's activities. Consequently, in previous years Organization of African Unity (OAU) now replaced by African Union (AU) with 55 member states has actively been involved in counter-terrorism efforts

spanning over 40 years. Coppock and McGovern (2020) notes that some of the terror groups require unique approaches and AU has demonstrated that it has a clear mandate which is regarded as interventionist especially on issues affecting the continent. What is more interesting in the counter-terrorism discussion is the collaborative approach among the regional organizations within the region. By working together, it can prevent and disrupt terrorist activities through shared information and well-coordinated joint investigations and a sustained effort to bring terrorists to justice. Therefore, effective counter-terrorism cooperation is more than attending workshops or other forums and sharing of information.

According to Abrahams (2018) there were rising concerns on counter-terrorism measures adopted in Africa which was viewed initially as weak. In fact, Stephen Townsend, The Head of USA Africa Command in March 2020 argue that efforts by international community and African states may not realize its objective of preventing further attacks especially increasing threats in Western African states and Sahel (Seldin, 2020). Clearly, there are numerous causative explanations for attacking civilian population in Africa as the end came. Moreover, the competition between some terrorist groups and religious extremists remains a big problem to civilian and challenges governments in and outside Africa. Acknowledging and developing mechanisms might serve to reduce further attacks. This requires sober engagement with the group to delegitimize their use of violence in addressing their issues.

While it is reasonably simple to predict which nations would fit into these various categories, Coppock and McGovern (2020) note that Africa's experience over the past decade highlights the extent to which there is no space for complacency. The mid-1990s

heralded a new generation of African leaders, but many of them, particularly those from Ethiopia, Uganda, and Rwanda, have subsequently proven to be disappointing, reverting to authoritarian political and economic control techniques as a result of weak institutions. Others, like Mozambique and Liberia, have outperformed expectations, while Tanzania, Ghana, and Botswana have quietly continued with reforms.

According to Julius (2013), the counter-terrorism framework clearly takes humanitarian goals into account in a number of ways. Humanitarian exceptions or permissions to engage in business with designated entities may be included in anti-terrorism legislation and punishments. According to Mulinari (2019), the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) pledged in January 2013 to continue using humanitarian derogations in penalty regimes imposed by the Council and applied to all Member States. It further stressed that any actions taken by Member States to combat terrorism must adhere to their commitments under international law, including international human rights and humanitarian law.

Although there are well coordinated international attempts to counter terrorism, the UN's approach is confronted with compliance by member states. Talat and Zeshan (2013) maintain that the UN global counter-terrorism strategy which was adopted in 2006 emphasize the humanitarian issues in general and the counter-terrorism goals by recognizing issues of rule of law and human rights as the cornerstone in the war against terrorism. On counter-terrorism measures pursued by African countries demonstrating it heavily influenced by united nation counter-terrorism center which ensures member states have strong strategies to confront terrorism. In their main counter-terrorism policies or in funding



agreements with humanitarian actors, several foreign funders specifically include international law, fundamental humanitarian principles, and sector standards, according to Julius (2013).

In light of comprehensive counterterrorism policies, Mulinari (2019) emphasizes that as a result, terrorism has continued to be a top priority for the international community, including security players. According to Julius (2013), terrorist operations have been on the rise throughout Africa, with a focus on the continent's eastern, northern, and western regions. According to Julius (2013), this expansion is shown by both the number of nations affected by terrorist attacks as well as the number of terrorist incidents. Coppock and McGovern (2020) assert that over the years, hundreds of civilian deaths have been attributed to Al Qaeda and its allies making them a complex network of terrorist organization. The terror group has for a long time become dominant with flexible operational strategies helping them gradually grow in violence against the civilian population. Recent reports show that there has been increased attacks on the civilian by 47 per cent between 2019 and 2020; this is 31 per cent of the terrorism activities in the continent compared to 17 per cent in 2017 (African Militant Islam Group, 2020). Most certainly the increase in the attacks against civilian targets can be linked to expansion of the terrorist group network in the region.

According to Chaliand and Blin (2016) conflicts caused or linked to religious ideologies have contributed to many resource and ethnic conflicts in most countries in Africa. Most notably in Central Africa Republic has witnessed conflicts since 2013 between two religious (Muslim Saleka and Christian Anti-Balaka) armed groups exacerbated by hate speech and

rhetoric's (Sclein, 2017). The initial resource-based conflict that has been going on in Nigeria between mainly Muslim Fulani herders and Christian ethnic farmers. These conflicts have been mainly dominant in the middle belt (North Central) especially when democracy was returned in 1999. The result of such conflicts is destruction of crops and contamination of water by cattle as well as harassment of women. According to O'Grady (2018) Boko Haram, the region's terrorist group, topped the death becoming the country's (Nigeria) greatest threat ever witnessed in years. Many times, these conflicts are the result of aggressive leaders advancing their own political and personal agendas rather than a true "clash of civilizations" (Huntington 1996). In most of the attacks by Boko Haram, the civilian population always becomes victims, something attributed to religious identities and justifications.

Schlein (2017) maintains that the threat from terrorists will continue to become a security concern for most African nations. It becomes essential to identify two primary factors that have contributed to increase in religious conflicts and competition among terrorist groups especially following collapse of ISIS Caliphate in Syria (Abrahams, 2018). As such, this is not complete and as civilian attacks continue to rise, some factors come to play including responsibility by government and terrorist organizations in most of the conflict from it. Nsaiba (2020) argued that besides terrorist attacks carried out by non-state actors, government in some countries – Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso – always victimize civilian population.

The human rights organizations have demonstrated that government security forces from have attacked citizens seen as sympathizers with the radicals in an effort to stop the spread of terrorist violence (Mednick 2020). Despite the fact that these terrorist groups are not directly responsible for these civilian murders, they are frequently made stronger by the radicalization of the populace (Lake 2002). A shift in focus by global powers away from counterterrorism may worsen these problems. Terrorists prosper in favorable circumstances, according to research on political violence. Additionally, terrorists can recruit, put together, and launch operations when there are power vacuums (Abrahms & Glaser 2017).

Terrorist groups will have even more freedom to operate, according to Moghadam (2008), as the US and other Western nations shift their attention away from counterterrorism operations and toward the dangers posed by China and Russia in a time of "Great Power Competition" (Mattis 2018). The Trump administration stated in December 2020 that it was removing its 700-strong contingent from Somalia. The majority of these troops were special operations forces, who were involved in missions to target al-Shabaab as well as training and advising Somalia's counterterrorism forces (Cooper, 2020). This choice has sparked worries that the organization will resurface as a result of the US withdrawal (Kenya warns US 2020).

According to Thomas (2012), the failures are most likely to involve nations with a long history of bad governance, such the Central African Republic (CAR) or the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). According to Debisa (2021), stronger systems for handling intra-state conflict ought to keep top-down conflict from resurfacing. The main means of

resolving disputes locally, however, will continue to favor violence due to local population pressures and societal changes brought on by globalization. The Sahelian region would be most impacted by this, which runs from the Sudanese state of Darfur in the east to the Central African Republic (CAR), southern Chad, northern Cameroon, Mali, and Niger. The Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya tri-border region has the potential to develop into a hub of social upheaval.

Mulinari (2019) emphasizes that refugees are frequently targeted by terrorist organizations as potential recruits. Individuals, especially young individuals, join extremist organizations like Boko Haram and al-Shabaab for a variety of reasons. This statement emphasizes another characteristic of new wars, namely, the fact that many terrorist organizations frequently have youth-led terror actions. According to Cooney and Bigman (2015), young people join these organizations to benefit financially because there are few job opportunities for most African youth. This makes sense in light of the truth that both Boko Haram and al-Shabaab are terrorist organizations whose operations are predominantly supported by young people, including young women, who join as extremists in response to conditions like poverty, insecurity, injustice, etc. Both Boko Haram and al-Shabaab continue to take advantage of these conditions and the associated depressed economic situations by finding and offering the youth other opportunities to entice them to join these terrorist organizations.

## **2.6 Anatomy of Terrorism**

Terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on USA land have raised many questions. First is the issue of identification of the perpetrators and mostly this can be provided by the motive of the attackers? According to Koehler (2019) the planning and execution of attacks coupled

with extreme use of violence means the terror groups or individuals distinguish them from other organizations. Moreover, these are groups or individuals who advocate for the use of violent means to advance their religious or political ideologies to attract the attention of government or international community. Extremist beliefs that are violent can be expressed on a variety of topics, such as politics, religion, and gender relations. The likely causes of terrorist radicalization are varied, complex, and unique in each instance (Nye, 2011)." In this case, developing counter-terrorism strategies requires knowledge of strategic logic behind or that motivate terrorist individuals to adopt violence.

Terrorist groups pursue diverse strategies to achieve their long-term objectives. Scholars have suggested that terrorist seek to build member's morale, advertise their activities, and advance its provocation (Thorton, 2012). The attacks by terrorists can adversely affect human right raising disturbing concerns since the victim's rights are violated, their rights of movement are violated too and physical integrity. In many cases, terrorism can destroy a government and threaten peace and security as well as social and economic progress besides effects at personal level (Gilpin, 2009). Therefore, the listed issues are clear effects of human rights, and it became important to note that person's security is greater government's responsibility (Cook, 2020). In order to get or attain their political objective, the terrorists often need to provide right information to the audience and the target government is the focus since they can allow them access to their requests. Therefore, states have a duty to protect both their citizens' and others' human rights by encouraging measures to protect them from the threat of terrorist acts and bringing those responsible to justice. Therefore, states have a duty to protect people's human rights, both of their own citizens and those of

foreigners, by encouraging measures to protect them from the threat of terrorist attacks and by bringing those responsible for such crimes to justice (Shechory-Bitton, 2013).

In a study on the dangers that terrorists pose at work Howie (2007) noted that the prospect of terrorism had a sizable number of unfavorable effects on Melbourne workplaces. The management of diversity and inclusion in the workplace, cultural shifts toward a security-conscious mindset, and elevated work-related stress were the most significant. To put it another way, "terrorism directly affects the exercise of some human rights, specifically the rights to life, freedom, and physical integrity. The current study, which examines both internal and external dangers contrasts with Howie's study, which focused solely on a small area even if it was piloted within the setting of a workplace background. Additionally, both studies aim to show how seriously terrorism-related activities might endanger a nation's stability.

According to Siegel (2021), the term "terrorism" also serves as a means of reprimand within the political establishment. "The tag has the effect of disciplining appropriate thoughts and beliefs among individuals who belong to it by using compromise and harmony in the face of alleged threats to the community. Terrorist activities have the potential to harm governments, destabilize civil society, compromise international peace and security, endanger social and economic progress, and may have a particularly negative impact on particular groups. The exercise of fundamental human rights is directly impacted by each of these (Bramwell, 2020).

According to Chaliand and Blin (2016), Somalia has gained attention recently as a result of an uptick in piracy activity close to its shores; yet a potentially much more serious threat resides in its southern areas. Al-Shabaab, is likely to offer safe areas to international terrorists who are determined to undertake their attacks aimed at Somalia's neighboring countries and even the West" if Somalia descended into complete destruction, according to Wallensteen and Sollenberg (2001). The fact that not all of the areas inhabited by Somali tribes were included in the new Somali state is the most potent seed. Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia are home to sizable Somali minorities. (Betts, 2010). The European powers, along with the strong Ethiopian empire, divided up and conquered the populous Somali areas in the eighteenth century, which laid the foundation for this seemingly odd spread of the Somali people (Hyndman, 1999).

There is evidence to suggest that terrorist organization including Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslim (JNIM) have collaboratively carried their attacks always attacking security forces but at time turn violently against each other. These terrorist groups have openly operated largely from Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso and their aim is to establish Salafi-Jihadist kind of state. According to Parkinson, Philips and Strobel (2020) the cost of the conflict between the groups is borne by the civilian. The competition witnessed in the groups is evident when members of JNIM defect to join ISGS especially in Mali and Burkina Faso and what is interesting is that individual cells of ISGS demonstrate autonomy in some areas and tend to decentralize its leadership structure. It is estimated that in every single attack by ISGS, about 3 civilian deaths are reported (Nsaibia,

& Weiss, 2020). Therefore, countering activities of the terrorist groups has not completely prevented attacks against civilian targets (Tinti, 2020).

According to Coppock and McGovern (2020), having persistent border disputes and low-intensity conflict might occasionally be advantageous for a government. These pursuits offer a helpful diversion from the dishonesty and ineptitude of a nation's leaders. Additionally, although their government is defending national sovereignty, citizens could be reluctant to voice their criticisms. Making peace, in Harper's (2012) opinion, eliminates these deterrents and the inclination to refrain from criticism, allowing people to focus on what is actually happening in their own country—and perhaps not be satisfied with what they see. With regard to Somalia, this is what has occurred, at least in part. The people of Somalia switched their focus to their long-standing conflict with Ethiopia by reaching a peace agreement with them.

According to Julius (2013), there has been an upsurge in the number of religiously inspired terrorist organizations around the world in recent years. This extreme religious ideology is a characteristic of modern wars in and of themselves. For instance, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab are both terrorist groups with a religious focus whose objectives include spreading Islam in Nigeria and Somalia, respectively. According to Ganor (2014), ideology, especially religious ideology, contributes to or serves as a fertile ground for the recruitment of people into terrorist organizations. According to Cooney and Bigman (2015), those with strong ideologies that are comparable to those of terrorist organizations are vulnerable and are more likely to be enlisted by these organisations.



The influence of counterterrorism measures on humanitarian action has not been thoroughly researched, according to Mulinari (2019), despite the fact that human rights and counterterrorism issues are receiving attention on a global scale. As argued by Lavanya (2016), in early 2011, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) were asked to commission an independent comprehensive study on the impact of counter-terrorism measures on principled behavior in order to advance the research and analysis of these issues, including from a more global perspective. Julius (2013) argues that the battle against terrorism necessitates cooperation and contributions from a variety of national and international entities, including law enforcement agencies, the military, intelligence services, the financial industry, the diplomatic service, and health groups. Success depends on teamwork, coordination, and organization.

According to Gassebner and Luechinger (2011), the al-Shabaab insurgency in Africa has also been at the center of public discourse and has prompted calls for more extensive local, national, and global counterterrorism measures. According to Borum (2015), the group has also made a sizable contribution to the continent's instability and further polarized an already fractured Somali community. Al-Shabaab, the Islamic extremist organization that controls Somalia, had its roots in the middle of the 1970s, when Siad Barre's oppressive and corrupt government was being opposed. According to Borum (2015), the failure of the Barre authority to address the economic hardships Somalis residing outside of colonial borders experienced sparked this uprising. According to Spencer (2015), who contends that there has

been a movement from old to new terrorism over the past few decades, Hansen (2013) argues that the large numbers of displaced individuals have been attributed to the idea of new terrorism. According to Dowd (2019), the two most salient characteristics of contemporary terrorism are the prominence of religious ideas in this phenomenon and the tendency of terrorist organizations to use extreme amounts of violence against all targets.

According to Dowd (2019), these findings show in concrete terms the realities of both al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, two Islamic organizations engaged in similar warfare. They also conduct indiscriminate terror attacks with the intention of causing the greatest amount of damage and casualties. Al-Shabaab's ability to commit terrorist acts is presently waning, according to a United Nations report. The recent attack on the Dusit D2 hotel and office compound in Nairobi, Kenya in January 2019 showed that the organization still poses a severe security danger to the continent.

Due to Kenya's proximity to Somalia and the impending terrorism risks, its upward economic trend is projected to slowly wane (Coppock & McGovern, 2020). Kenya is not an exception because it is well known that economic progress slows down as long as attacks continue. The academic studies contrast that the effects of terrorism on FDI are actually still in their infancy, but instead, they are rapidly gaining popularity as a result of the September 11 incident. As a result, this is setting the stage for performing this study to reveal information that may have lain hidden for many years. For example, it is of perception in Kenya that political marginalization of some sections of the populace, to be specific, the coast and northern Kenya, and thus the emergence of terrorist's groups.

Terrorist attacks have been carried out in Kenya that were intended to harm foreign interests but ended up hurting the entire nation. Foreign terrorists are finding asylum in Kenya and receiving unintentional backing from a restive group that has been marginalized as a result of radicalized Muslims' unwillingness to help against the threat. The country's proximity to a region that is riddled with wars has had a severe impact on her security position, and Somalia's lawlessness has given terrorists a place to hide out while developing WMD. The porous border between Somalia and Kenya has also permitted the admission of militant groups, which has resulted in the execution of terrorist acts. Kenya was consequently put in a predicament to which she had to react. She has been able to piece together a counterterrorism plan, and whether it is effective or not will be discussed in the following chapter of this research. After its selection as the frontline anchor state for the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in the Horn of Africa region, the United States has assisted Kenya in strengthening its internal security and military capabilities during the past ten years.

Al-Shabaab has demonstrated a developing knowledge of the value of propaganda. The organization exploited this understanding to gain the support of the Somali people in their fight to overthrow the current government and install an Islamist one. While the establishment of an Islamist state in Somalia continues to be Al-Shabaab's top priority, it is impossible to deny that Al-Shabaab's desire to take part in the global jihad. A closer look at Al-Shabaab's shifting rhetoric regarding goals, operations, and threat suggests that al-Shabaab's tactic and strategy have changed.

## **2.7 Stakeholder-Partnership Engagement in Counter Terrorism Strategies**

In recent years, terrorism and extremism have received huge attention from scholars and practitioners (Chaliand & Blin, 2016; Ravndal & Bjoorgo, 2018; Tinnes, 2020). According to Chaliand and Blin (2016) there will inevitable disagreement regarding what drives terrorism with some arguing that terrorism is a political activity which can be a strong form of protest. It becomes important to examine the underlying reasons that motivate them to carry out violent attacks. To them, their actions are justified, and valid and such arguments rely on causality and objectivity to examine all important aspects that can affect how terrorism occurs and manifest itself. Hence, understanding the cause and motivations behind terrorism is more crucial than ever because without them, it will be hard to develop fair and efficient long-term counter-terrorism remedies.

According to Siegel (2021), there have historically been few credible conclusions concerning the origins of terrorism that have been experimentally evaluated in cross-national, quantitative studies. Theoretically, quantitative research on armed conflicts and civil wars has advanced far more than that of terrorism. However, there has been some progress in terrorism research in recent years. This progress has come from testing theories about the causes of terrorism, and new research has shown that the causal relationships between socioeconomic and political conditions and terrorism are quite similar to those previously discovered in studies of civil wars in a number of ways. Numerous studies on the subject of terrorism have been published since the 1960s, yet remarkably few of these articles explicitly address the core reasons. Since the 1970s, when the number of publications on the topic exploded, terrorism research has seen a consistent increase in

output, while some claim the quantity has not kept pace with quality advancements. It is true that a number of facets of terrorism, such as membership in extremist groups, civil unrest, and suicide terrorism, have been addressed recently. There hasn't been much progress made in this area despite the abundance of academic studies and political debates urging for a deeper examination of the causes (Silke, 2003).

The evolving threat posed by terrorist and violent extremist groups requires multi-faceted, agile, collaborative, and innovative approaches by stakeholders at the international, regional, national and community levels. Engaging with diverse partners and embracing openness to a multitude of perspectives is fundamental to responding to the complex challenges posed by terrorism and violent extremism. Partnership networks have been branded as a new form of global governance with the potential to bridge multilateral norms and local action by drawing on a diverse number of actors in civil society, government, and business. Does the rise of global partnerships imply a re-location and diffusion of authority from government to public-private 'implementation networks? In the field of sustainable development, the emergence of governance structures based on private authority, private regimes and a mix of public and private actors is particularly pronounced. Partnerships have been framed as innovative forms of governance that can effectively address the three 'deficits' of global environmental politics: the governance deficit, implementation deficit and participation deficit (Haas, 2004). Proponents argue that voluntary multi-sectoral networks, spanning the public-private domain, capture the essence of 'governance from below', counter the participation gap and effectively address the implementation gap in global environmental

politics. However, the positive assessment of the Johannesburg partnerships has not gone unchallenged.

Strong and effective partnerships with Civil Society organizations, the private sector, academia, regional organizations and other non-state actors such as foundations, networks and associations contribute to better understanding and knowledge, deepen learning and policy discussion, and assist with the evaluation of impact and results of counter-terrorism. Such partnerships also drive innovation and strengthen the design, development and implementation of ideas, projects and innovative solutions to counter terrorism and to prevent and counter violent extremism.

According to Chaliand and Blin (2016) terrorism is an area of attention in contemporary conflicts especially in the context of armed conflict. The introduction of new strategies aimed at instilling fear in the general public other than victims tend to create a basis for the emergence of terrorism as a strategy, but several challenges can impede the efforts. In this section, therefore, the study examines the external challenges on domestic terrorism in African continent mainly by analyzing terrorism challenges emerging home-grown terrorism and Africa's efforts to combat terrorism / counterterrorism strategies.

Even though counterterrorism has become a major task for law enforcement, there are only a handful of counterterrorism models that demonstrate effective strategies, tactics, and best practices for policing terror. What is more, not much is known about how these models can be systematically evaluated and quantified for their effectiveness (Lum et al., 2006;

Weisburd et al., 2009; Perry, 2014). The lack of evidence-based counterterrorism models and of systematically evaluated strategic and tactical measures is a result of two factors. First, law enforcement intelligence and security agencies are not enthusiastic about collaborating with researchers because they fear this could expose and compromise their counterterrorism methods, tools, sources, and tactics. Second, this type of research runs into difficulties in operationalizing success. The determination of cause and effect is complex because of other historical variables, which make the creation of a control situation complex (Perry, 2014).

While there is evidence to suggest the use of community engagement has reduced the fear of crime, improved problem-solving, and enhanced perceptions of and relationships with the police, evidence for its impact on crime reduction is limited. This could be due to what method is used to measure the impact on prevention or how prevention is viewed, as the term is very complex and difficult to evaluate. There is a need to establish the 'input' before an intervention is introduced such as how many people could/would have been radicalized if an intervention was not introduced? Establishing such input is vague and difficult. Although communities are seen as of value to counter-terrorism, there is also a recognition that the current approach is incapacitating to community organizations and institutions. As such it is argued that community-level work can be strengthened by real community participation that works towards building ongoing and permanent relationships, which involves inclusion in decision making at local level, rather than a reactive and top-down response (Silverman 2017, p.1101).

There is widespread agreement that some of the features of view wars is relevant in the discussion of the terrorism as exemplified by both book haram and Al-shabaab terrorist groups (Siegel 2021) similarly Ganar (2014) demonstrates that the contribution of the fore mentioned terrorist groups in the death displacement of civilians in Africa exhibits similar characteristics as new wars. To this end, Cooney, and Bigman (2015) stresses the need for comprehensive measures to counter terrorism in Africa and considering the complexity and lethal nature of these terrorist group it becomes very important to adapt ewe strategies to resolve the problem human security-based approach considered o effective counter terrorism measure.

The United Nation (2019) adds that the armed confrontation between terrorist group, Al-shabaab and Somalia army has led to human right violation displacing civilian population most of who live in camps within Somalia and others crossing over to neighboring countries with some getting to travel to either USA or Europe. Further, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHRC) in a 2018 report found an increase in the number of people who had been forcefully displaced in the previous (2017) to about 68 million. In fact, protruded problem perpetrated by Al-Shabaab in Somalia continue to be one of the most reported crises which contributed to huge displacement in Africa continent.

States have the obligation to protect their citizens from terrorism and contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. The United Nations has recognized the importance of the state's obligation and through its various organs has articulated key principles which states should adhere to while combating terrorism: counter-terrorism laws



and practices must comply with human rights law. Counter-terrorism is defined as “the practices, tactics, techniques, and strategies that governments, militaries, police departments and corporations adopt in response to terrorist threats and/or acts, both real and imputed.” (Haripin, Anindya, & Priamarizki, 2020) Member states should take appropriate measures against terrorist acts, but they must act within a framework of protecting human rights. This means that all human rights should be respected while countering terrorism.

According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2018) report Somalia was placed at position fifth worldwide in producing largest number of refugees and also Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). To this effect the implications to neighbouring countries, witnessed Kenyan’s response by developing holistic plan to prevent any homegrown terrorists and grow of domestic threat to support existing counter terrorism structures. Moreover, to enhance its effectiveness, the national approach develops needs to permeate state and the local measures to social policy and countering terrorism.

The international cooperation plays a significant role in the fight against terrorism, and it becomes a strong pillar of UN’s counter-terrorism strategy. For Government of Kenya, this is very crucial since activities of Al-shabaab or Al-Qaeda have proved that no single country can win this war against terrorism. Coppock and McGovern (2020) emphasizes that counter-terrorism strategies used have expanded and the traditional measures tend to maintain some dominance though there are new one to support them. The importance of adopting innovative response when confronting complex and emerging threats posed terrorist and extremists cannot be overemphasized. More in terms of managing individuals returning

from conflict situations is certainly detecting and preventing any attacks on home land (Huckerby, 2019).

As terrorists have continued to develop several ways to use internet to advance illegal activities providing them opportunities to gather intelligence and other activities to prevent and counter activities of terrorists (Ragazzi, 2017). It is also noted an important amount knowledge on the functioning or ta times terrorist targets can be extracted from the websites and other internet sources. Additionally, the rise in increase in internet use among terrorist individuals and groups corresponds with an increase in electronically information which in most cases is complies and analyzed in order to use in terrorism acts (Browns & Koffi, 2009). The security agencies and other authorities are developing more advanced tools at alarming rate in order to respond effectively in the prevention of direction and deter cases of terrorism attacks, mainly the internet-based activities. Indeed, using traditional ways to investigate things such as dedicated translation and identification of terrorist's threats continue to expand. In studies conducted in the USA following September 11, terrorism attacks, Schaibe and Sheffield, (2012) investigated whether allocation of resources towards intelligence led strategy to counter terrorism. Schaibe and Sheffield, (2012) found that increased allocation of resources towards the war on terrorism by the military inadvertently diverted monies from key areas of development and these subsequently affected functions of intelligence and planning. Rudner (2004) contends that intelligence for war against terrorism addresses threats posed by terrorist.

Koehler (2019) postulates that terrorism in most countries across Africa has been on the rising trend in the last decades notably; non-state armed groups such as terrorist groups,

militia rebel groups have increased their attacks on civilian population in their violent campaigns. Shechory-Bitton (2013), asserts that this has been evident in Somalia, Mali, Mozambique, and Nigeria among other African countries where acts of violence have been targeted at civilians. In response to these attacks head of United Nation office for West Africa and Sahel (UNOWAS) described impact of violent terrorist acts as “unprecedented” and the humanitarian consequences are alarming and increased significantly with much causality witnessed between 2016-2020 in some West African countries Mali. Burkina Faso and Niger. As such most of this violence are attributed to conflicts between Islamic states operating in greater Sahara (ISGS) and Al Qaeda affiliated group, Jamaat Nasrat al-Islam wall Muslimin (JNIM).

The data from Armed Conflicts Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) in 2015 show a total of 381 terror attacks were targeted at civilian population in Africa leading to 1,394 deaths. Further studies confirm sharp increase in the subsequent years and by 2020, about 7,108 attacks on civilian had been carried out leading to 12,519 deaths (Raleigh Linke, Hegre & Karlsen, 2010). Moreover, the continued threats posted terrorism rose where by 2020, seven of the top ten nations worldwide with terrorism threats were found in Africa. Global risk consultancy Verisk Maplecroft emphasizes that a highly complex and a changing behavior of terrorism is at the forefront of every government agenda, nationality or international.

According to Kyriakidis (2020), the subject regarding the effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies has started receiving enhanced attention from developing states in Africa. In light

of the growing threats from violent extremism around sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), counterterrorism is focused on eliminating the causes of terrorism as well as on preventing it through the use of various approaches, which tactics, frameworks, and strategies that governments, militaries, police, and corporations adopt to attack terrorist threats or acts, both real and imputed (Kuwali, 2020). In Kenya, a recommendation to secure borders from terrorist attacks resulted in the adoption of the *Operation Linda Nchi* on 4th October 2011 which means a counterterrorism strategy that led the Kenyan government to send Kenya Armed Forces (KDF) to Somalia to pursue and eliminate Al-Shabaab militants. Another strategy adopted by many African countries including Nigeria is the community policing model similar to the *Nyumba-Kumi* security initiative' adopted in Kenya (Maza, Koldas & Aksit, 2020).

Arguably, the counterterrorism efforts in the East African region have been vibrant, considering that terrorism happens to be a threat to the region, in spite of shared intelligence service, military and security training, combined with logistical and financial support; the brutality of terror groups such as the Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab, and Islamic State, still persist in the sub region. A dynamic counterterrorism strategy is thus crucial (Mroszczyk and Abrahms, 2021). For instance, through the East African Counterterrorism Initiative, Combined Joint Task Force and the National Counter Terrorism Centre, the Republic of Kenya, continues to fight the war against terror on various fronts, that is, internationally, regionally, nationally, and locally; but setbacks still exist in as far as organization and effective implementation of counterterrorism is concerned.

According to Silke (2013), terrorist innovation challenges status quo assumptions about the nature of terrorist threats and emphasized the need for counterterrorism policy and practice to react to changes in terrorist tactics and strategies including also to trying to anticipate them. The Kenya Defense Forces launched operation 'LINDA NCHI' on 14th October 2011. The United Nations, (2019) found that in both Kenya and Somalia, the actions of al-Shabaab have left thousands of people maimed, dead and displaced. For instance, in that occurred from 15 to 16 January 2019 terrorists murdered 21 people in the Dusit hotel complex in Nairobi County and, on June 15, 2019, in Wajir County, twelve police officers were killed, and others injured when their vehicle struck an improvised explosive device. In the case of Somalia, it was reported that about four al-Shabaab militants attacked Asasey hotel, the death toll of the attack on which took place on the 12 June 2019 included a prominent Canadian-Somali journalist and other foreign nationalities, including 1 Briton, 3 Kenyans, 3 Tanzanians, and 2 Americans. In the Kenya-Somalia border, the latest terror attack on 12 October 2019 led to several Kenyan police officers being killed when their vehicle hit a roadside bomb near the Somalia border.

Siegel, (2021) notes that the National government in Kenya together with various County governments, and other international, local organizations and security organs, have adopted various counterterrorism strategies in an attempt to prevent more terrors attacks. For example, in 2015 alone, al-Shabaab killed 836 people, an 18 per cent decline from 2014 (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016). Nevertheless, 201 saw the group's deadliest attack which targeted civilians; Kenya's Garissa University College attack that killed at least 147 people. In 2019, terrorists' attacks in Kenya killed 59 people and injured 29 more

people (Menkhaus, and Shapiro, 2020). However, the counterterrorism strategies do not seem to effectively achieve the intended results as terrorism cases are still raising steadily, especially in the Nairobi County. Mombasa, Wajir and Lamu West Sub County still continue to persistently receive an increase in waves of terror attacks. The County Government of Lamu continues to struggle with an upsurge of terrorism activities, some of the areas most affected include, Mpeketoni, Manda Island, Ngongoro locality and Dodori forest among other areas.

The terrorism of 1998 when USA Embassy in Nairobi was targeted entered Kenya into record of global terrorism. In fact, four years later, another terrorist attracts targeted Israel Hotel in Mombasa with another terrorist using shoulder –launch Missile to fire at an airlifter full of Israel Tourists. What followed is more terrorist attacks and recently Al-Shabaab seems to have penetrated Kenya as witnessed the September 2013 of Westgate shopping Mall in Nairobi country. This led to about 67 deaths and again in April 2015, the group attacked Garissa University in North-Eastern Kenya killing 148 students and staff. According to Papale (2021) although security agencies responded promptly, poor coordination among the security agencies affected the process of countering or minimizing the effect of the attack at the university.

Monthy (2019) observes that, Al-shabaab members –perceived as converts into Islam –have continues to carry out the attacks within Kenyan. It is estimated that 10% of Al-shabaab total forces is Kenyan fighter in 2012. They are popularly known as “mujahideen” by Al-shabaab core members and are characterized by younger in age and overzealous poor

making easy target for recruitment. Moreover, their unique profile from the Somalis and Arab militants gives them the advantage to blend with general public of Kenya and complicates their identity which would lead to early arrest. Further reports suggest that terrorist group Al-Shabaab, has always wanted to grow recruit multi-ethnic generation of fighters in the region. A notable case is the convert who helped in the attack in Kampala, Uganda.

The security agencies in Kenya strongly believe that the group is trying to use Kenyans to conduct its attacks while the foreign attackers escape unscathed. This does not mean Muslims regions in Kenya and Tanzania cannot be targeted for recruitment; they are also vulnerable. Generally, Kenya is among some countries that are directly targeted by the terrorist-global use of violence to achieve their mission for example Kenya and Tanzania suffered the terrorist attack of 1998 which killed over 250 people with nearly 5,000 having diverse injuries most of whom were Kenyans. Some years later, other terrorist attacks took place killing 13 people and injuring 80 people.

Scholars have often raised issues with anti-terrorism acts – for example – a study by Mulinar (2019) nearly half of the respondents expressed great concern on the oversight strategies related to the anti-terrorism act. According to the study findings, activities of the security officers and certain executive power (listing of entities as terrorists) are not subjected to adequate review. It reveals that the most notable shortcoming of the act could be the government's failure to create accountability, reviews and oversight measures that can cover all aspects and manifestations of the national security policies. It is suggested that a

government should not be able to prioritize the safety and rights of some people over others because it must protect all members of its society. Counterterrorism measures should not be discriminating and targeting only certain groups of people. Isolating people from the greater community and depriving them of their rights will not lead to a more prosperous and safe society. On the contrary, such measures increase inequalities and divisions within society which is harmful for people and is conducive to a violent and insecure environment (Yilmaz, 2009).

There have been continued negotiations among member states on additional international treaties, and a well drafted convention on international terrorism. The convention can complement the existing international framework on anti-terrorism tools and can built on the main guiding principles that are already in the current anti-terrorism convention – value of criminalizing offences related to terrorism, making them punishable by law, of perpetrators; the need to enact law that creates exemption of such outlawing political, ethical, religious, racial, or related ground. A strong member state has the ability ti take actions to avert attacks by terrorist individuals or groups, and the prominence on the need of remember countries to jointly work together by exchanging information and make them available to others with the greater measure of support in the deterrence, enquiry, and trial of terrorist perpetrators (UN, 2005).

The United Nations, (2005) intimates “that The Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force currently comprises of 31 bodies inside and outside the United Nations system. Their obligations array from counterterrorism to conflict deterrence and resolution, human rights,



asylum, non-proliferation and disarmament, refugees' protection, capacity building, human rights, cultural and interreligious dialogue, education, development, health, and peacekeeping.” The extensiveness of the Task Force entities parallels to the inclusiveness of the tactic. This range of know-how also lets the United Nations system and applicable entities to give together to funding the Member States. An efficient and effective policy for counter terrorism needs to be multi-directional.

According to Potter and Hepburn (2012), “anti-terrorism systems cover largely in physical terms (as well as in other magnitudes, such as type and degree of the terrorism threat, political and diplomatic implications, and legal issues. In this environment, the development of a tenacious Anti-terrorism protection system is a formidable task.” Such a system should bring together varied state-of-the-art technologies to facilitate untiring intelligence, observation and exploration missions, and prospective acts. “Counter-terrorism strategies that are used in Ethiopia as well as Kenya were influenced or driven by the USA (Silke, 2014). In the effort to fight terrorism, the tactic focuses on both anti-terrorism and anti-terrorism measures. Counterterrorism refers to those measures that are aimed at averting, discouraging, and answering meritoriously to actions of terrorism while anti-terrorism processes are those engaged to shrink the susceptibility of individuals and property to terrorism acts (Talat and Zeshan, 2013).”

The international community has since 1963 expounded 14 collective legal mechanisms and four adjustments to monitor terrorism (UN, 1995). Those mechanisms were established with the help of the UN, and its specialized agency, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) who were open to involvement to all the member countries. In addition, the international

community in 2005 presented proposals that were applicable to three of the collective mechanisms to explicitly account for the terrorism threat. According to UN (2005) most countries on 8th July 2005 adopted the amendment to the convention on Physical of the Nuclear Material while agreement was reached on 14th October in the same year to the protocol of 2005 to the convention of the Suppression of Unlawful Acts contrary to the safety of maritime navigation.

Knudsen (2015), posits that "counterterrorism involves policy programs and interventions that are intended to prevent people from committing violent acts that are linked to radical ideologies of any kind, whether they be political, social, or religious in nature." According to prior experiences, soft power may be a more effective strategy to combat radicalization. Researchers who studied the links between violent acts in society and subsequent violent acts performed by those who had already experienced violence gave rise to social theory.

As argued by Knudsen (2015), "the best way to reach other young people who are considered at risk or are coming from marginalized parts of society" is with a soft approach. The greatest way to reach adolescents and prevent them from becoming radicalized, according to statistical data, is through programs incorporating sports, the arts, cultural events, social media, broadcast media, and peer-to-peer groups. The safety of the activists doing these outreach programs must be kept in mind. Government must collaborate closely with community leaders and civil society for soft power programs to be effective, and their engagement must be perceived as genuine. Soft power aims to combat terrorism by focusing on disrupting the cycle of its ideological expansion because the proliferation of terrorism might just as easily be explained by the idea of social interaction. According to Coppock and

McGovern (2020), some explanatory paths for this tendency may be provided by the literature on terrorist targeting.

According to Huckerby (2019), some of these targeting tactics may be linked to internal or external sources, such as ideological explanations or principal-agent issues. External variables include interorganizational competition. In the case of Africa, there are at least two such ideas that merit investigation and might shed light on the pattern. According to Coppock and McGovern (2020), there is a glut of armed groups vying for influence, power, and access to resources on the continent, many of which are linked to well-known international terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, or ISIS.

Studies in Kenya have emphasized on approaches that incorporates community feedback because it facilitates effective measures to mitigate radicalization (Badurdeen & Goldsmith, 2018). This was also recognized in Kenya National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) in its 2016 strategy which placed more emphasis on the partnership between security agencies and the public, civil society as well as private sector (Ogada, 2017). Although stakeholder partnership engagement is well received, counterterrorism practitioners and scholars are concerned about its contribution in countering terrorism in communities with unique interests. Along the same line of thought, there is the question of spelling out roles of each stakeholder. Rosand, Miller, and Ipe (2009) reports that partnership between external donors and civil society led to the establishment of IGAD's Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT) which has become instrumental counterterrorism capacity building in the region.

It is worth noting that strong and effective stakeholder partnerships between various interest groups contribute to better understanding and knowledge, deepen learning and policy discussion, and assist with the evaluation of impact and results of counter-terrorism interventions. Several counties in Kenya developed action plan which spells out how building relationships with stakeholders can build social capital and a sense of belonging. Pickering, McCulloch and Neville (2010) suggest that police, through community engagement, can build trust and a sense of belonging when relationships are based on strategies like building partnerships in community-oriented policing.

## **2.8 Institutional Framework on counterterrorism strategies**

Institutional framework exists in every country to help in decision and approvals of activities. According to Clews (2016) notes, the efficiency and reliability of local institutions varies and are dependent on quality and their resourcing. Institutional structures vary from country to country, but whatever the specific structure is like, it is essential to have mechanisms for dialogue and co-ordination. Therefore, a poorly functioning or under resourced institutional structure creates major problems in society. In fact, there can exist lack of clarity in terms of responsibilities between different government organs.

Coppock and McGovern (2020) hypothesize a social structure and order, excellent communication is necessary for good administration of society and politics, and successful communication necessitates agreement on terminology definitions. Coston (1998) argues that the government should partner with other stakeholders such as civil society to

effectively address issues of terrorism. However, some argue that government-civil society may concentrate preserving civil society's autonomy and view such alliances as a threat to the core principle of civil society's principle. For example, in Nigeria government Military Joint Task Force and the revived Multilateral Joint Taskforce with its neighboring countries aimed at countering terrorism and extremism in the region.

Available literature confirms that effective counter terrorism intervention programs consist of early intervention, de-radicalization, disengagement, and reintegration and rehabilitation (Neumann, 2016; Sinai, 2017). In this approach, coordinated, diverse strategies at the micro, and macro levels are needed, along with a variety of counterterrorism partners and strategies. These actions must be thorough, threat-focused, and suited to the current situation while also being long-lasting (Ahmed et al, 2018; Van den Bos, 2018). There is growing stream of literature that maintain that coalitions or stakeholder partnership plays an important role in the war against terrorism because they offer crucial information that they cannot gather alone, and they can isolate terrorist groups from their sources of international support (Rasmussen, 2021). This narrative has been confirmed by Bhulai and Fink (2016), in their study on strengthening regional cooperation to prevent and counter violent extremism in South Asia. Chaliand and Blin, (2016) opine that it is important to note that by focusing on the problem of terrorism some countries such as Netherlands and the USA apply different strategies in fighting terrorism (Abozaid, 2020; Harris, 2017). For instance, the USA appears to consider it necessary to carry out severe actions and to adopt an aggressive strategy that includes finding, apprehending, and eliminating terrorists.

Kebir, et al (2020) studied and mapped the 9/11 Al-Qaeda terrorist network by gathering publicly available information on 19 hijackers of Al-Qaeda and applying basic social network centrality and community measures with the help of social network tools to identify the key players and leaders in the network. This research gives some vision for further work and research into the terrorist networks analysis. Knoke, and Yang (2019) studied social network analysis and multi-agent models for destabilizing networks. It explains the challenges in disrupting networks that are large, distributed and dynamic in nature. It also proposed multi-agent model for agents, knowledge and tasks based on various meta-networks (like social network, knowledge network, information network, assignment network etc). Carley [12] proposed an approach for evaluating destabilization strategies for covert terrorist networks by using data in publicly available records, newspaper reports, and professional journals.

The success of war on terrorism have been the focus of many countries beginning with proposed anti-terrorism approach used by international community in Afghanistan to overthrow of Gaddafi regime in Libya and implementation of strategies that ensure ISIS were weakened (Xiuyu, 2019). The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and claims of anthrax spores reveal huge vulnerabilities which require advanced ways to confront terrorism. In one of the studies, Woo (2018) examined the behaviour of flying robots in drone operation in using global positioning system, detector, and camera. He reported that information used together with detector and a camera effectively manages radioactive materials used by terrorist groups and individuals. Additionally, information captured can be

transferred or shared with relevant government agencies who can respond early, or response team can take action to make a highly optimized decision.

Similarly in a study of strategies used in Ghana's war on terrorism, Prah and Chanimbe (2021) found out that the security officers adopted several strategies. For example, they utilized Gardner's multiple intelligence (interpersonal and spatial-visual) officers in civilian combat gear taking temporary shelter in the community and were able to walk around in plain clothes interacting and collecting information from members of the community. Also, security software was put in use at border checkpoints to quickly identify potential terrorists and find any smuggled products. As part of preventing new and diverse terrorism, Ghana conducted training programs for stakeholders engaging in counter-terrorism both at international and local level for the officials to understand how to unearth emerging trends in terrorism (Prah, & Chanimbe, 2021). Furthermore, there have been calls for governments to prevent international terrorism from entering their borders by developing an effective control system on issuance of papers to identify them such as travel documents. In similar note, Mulinari (2019) argues that engaging diplomatically with anyone who voluntarily chooses to defect from terrorism or rejects terrorism ideologies is an important step done to advance peace and stability. The other approach is considering giving them amnesty, presidential pardon and if there are adequate reasons to confirm their improved behaviour while at prison, can reduce sentences period.

Sloan (2002) investigated whether USA is able to meet terrorist threat by locating counter-terrorism strategies within the local context. What motivated Stephen Sloan is the threat of

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), attacks as in the case of 9/11 which could lead to greater loss of lives and disruption of civil order. The study found out that it was mainly integration at all levels that would help USA effectively develop proactive measures that collect counter-terrorism intelligence from different segments of the population. Indeed, by concentrating even local levels in intelligence in areas targeted by terrorists, it provides opportunity to mobilize public through existing programs to help them identify potential threats posed by terrorists.

According to Cronin (2002) the terrorist attacks in Kenya can be categorized into leftist, rightist, religious and nationalistic. Therefore, manifestation of the dominant forms of terrorism evident in Kenya has historical sequence. More problems facing Kenya are attributed to its position in hosting large number of refugees from Somali. Similarly, the changing nature of conflicts in Somali, it continues to contribute to more refugees coming to Kenya as the Islamists in Somalia try to advance their agenda. Consequently, this has become a major security problem in Kenya because the home-grown terrorist is used to attack (Harper, 2012). In fact, the national security and economic is compromised due to threats from terrorist attacks because tourism and aid workers were targeted where some were kidnapped and taken to Somalia by Al-Shabaab (Erikson, 2013). Based on this background, it becomes very important to examine effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies adopted to confront terrorism activities that has threatened security of the world.

As terrorism continues to threaten security of nations, there emerges involvement of women and girls in carrying attacks, yet they have been ignored in counter-terrorism strategy. There



is evidence to suggest that women provide advantage to terrorist group who require resources or publicity to advance their cause. Many people view gender as untapped resource and are willing to include women in counterterrorism. For instance, inclusion of women was evident in the Global Counter-terrorism Forum and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in a workshop held in May 2014 in Turkey and later in October 2014 in Austria has become the foundation for the strong call of women or inclusion of gender in the fight against terrorism (Canton, 2021).

Drawing on the history of fighting terrorism, Sloan (2002) emphasis that the best way towards defeating terrorism can be to detach and restrict their activities and destroy them using intensive and sustained actions. Therefore, economic sanctions and political pressures have been used to regulate some state promoters who have exhibited little impact on the individual group that may sustain an independent present. Conversely, considering general expanse and the complexity of some of the international terrorist group; this requires government to identify the terrorist suspects, try to locate where they operate and subsequently destroy their capabilities to design and function.

United Nation (2019) observes that there have been acts of terrorist attacks since 1975 in Kenya, but the recent attacks have become deadly. Consequently, the results are many deaths due to increasing number of violent terrorist attacks in the country. This led to Kenya's focusing on training and equipping of security agencies on counter-terrorism strategies. For example, US Anti-Terrorism Assistance Department equipped and trained police officers, custom and immigration officials to help them detect and investigate terrorism incidents (Buigut & Amendah, 2016). Some of the terrorism cases such as

Wesgate by Al-shabaab and Garissa as well as Mpeketoni have increased national security anxiety. To ensure security is not pushed high in the national agenda, several counter-terrorism initiatives have been taken to confront and ultimately put to end terrorist attacks. This leads to indiscriminate raised and often target suspected individuals as part of the measures to prevent more attacks.

It is also important to recognize that the continued terrorist attacks and September 2001 US experience have fundamentally altered how terrorism is perceived by most governments. According to United Nations (2019) decision by USA to create strong African Command is a testament that US military views Sub-Saharan Africa as a growing terrorist threat which requires early interventions. Moreover, such decision is mainly motivated by the realization that fragmentation of US military intelligence gathering and training offered to regional security have failed to address the growing threats posed by terrorist networks in East and Southern Africa, a significant presence of radical Islamic organization and the expanding presence of terror group supported by Iran linked to Hezbollah in West Africa that occasionally collaborate with Al-Qaeda.

The terrorist attacks on the US on September 11, 2001, and many others worldwide has given terrorism debate an unprecedented global meaning. In African, what is complicating counterterrorism is the tremendous social and ethnic diversities who compete over geographical boundaries. For example, Sunni-Salafist group are always seeking to organize terrorist groups to set up Islamic Caliphate. It is though that Saudi Arabia has heavily invested to build Salafist Mosques which frequently operated by Imams who have always

denied that a more tolerant Sufi adaptation of Islam is strongly in Africa. It becomes important for governments to avoid focusing links between extremists' violence and the Islam to avoid provoking those who believe in Islamic teachings. Therefore, segmenting society on a religious basis may create a clash among communities.

Despite recent studies on terrorism focusing on international context, their cell groups locally have been an unending feature of Africa. In fact, it is most African countries mostly affected by terrorism or extremism. The AU's counterterrorism strategy is the continent's extension of UN resolution 1373. AU further states that in Kenya's context, prevention of terrorism act offers how to confront terrorism. Most importantly, the act seeks to counter terrorism activities at all levels by ensuring terrorist suspects are arrested and prosecuted if they commit terror related offences that target Kenyans and foreigners within Kenya's soil.

At the most extreme level, state and sub-state actors might have a stake in maintaining war and chaos because it gives them more chances to reap and conceal gains and thereby support the numerous patrimonial networks that give them legitimacy. There is a propensity to associate politics with areas of higher disorder, be they war or crime in conditions of resource depletion, when there are no other effective ways to maintain neo-patrimonialism. To get or keep a piece of the pie, violence is required. In this way, an opportunity for reward and a necessary resource are created out of disorder, and there is no incentive to push toward a more institutional ordering of society. The inherent escalation dynamic of basic survival politics necessitates the use of violence and terrorism as a logical consequence. Few people

have a choice but to take a side and defend their interests with violence as resources diminish and competition becomes increasingly violent.

According to Roberts and Em (2003), many people in areas witnessing attacks perceive themselves possible targets and hence become victims of terrorism. Hence such perception of risks shapes people's choice of how they cope with the issue and adjust. For example, people tend to have cognitive assessment of the level of attack such as logical and emotional reaction related to threats and pick them as real and they lack control over them (Broum, 2015; Slovic, 2002). In most cases, where people do not know potential terrorists or predict their plots, they lose their own ability to cope with it. Nevertheless, the perception of threat also includes the private evaluation of the threat, which involves nonrepresentational variables similar as intensification of the frequency of rare extreme events and beliefs regarding the trouble's causes (Kahneman et al., 1982; Short, 1984). Some of the perceived threats include perception of control over the threat, meaning people's feeling of control over their terrain, allowing them to manage with external pitfalls. Again, a situation can arise in which the external trouble is seen as willful, which causes paralyzing anxiety and a strong feeling of helplessness (Fischhoff et al, 2003; Seligman, 1975).

The "regional peace-keeping mission sanctioned by the African Union with the endorsement of the United Nations in Somalia" is the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It is approved to help temporary legislative designs, carry out a public safety plan, train the Somali security powers, and help establish a solid climate for the conveyance of philanthropic guidance (Mikael, 2013). As a feature of her obligations, AMISOM likewise

upholds the National Legislature of Somalia's powers in their fight against Al-Shabaab aggressors (Lavanya, 2016)." According to Mogire and Mkutu (2011) t Kenyan politicians perceive counterterrorism as an imperialist tool that the US was using to pursue its global security agenda. Kenyan politicians and prominent members of civil society further believed that the US was the driving force behind the development of counterterrorism measures because the US government viewed Kenya as a strategic location for its counterterrorism operations in the Horn of Africa.

Terrorism is currently new in the Horn of Africa. There have been frequent attacks across most countries in the region. Al Shabaab pronounced its resolve and progressively revealed its ability to carry attacks all over the five East Africa countries. Their first major international attack came in July 2010, when al-Shabaab carried out two suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda. With the lack of a second major attack and the launch of a major offensive against Al-Shabaab in the fall of 2011, many dismiss the Kampala bombing as his one-off attack, greatly weakening Al-Shabaab. I decided that I did. The group said it would lose control of the territory and focus on asymmetrical attacks rather than holding land (Lavanya, 2016).

The construction of emerging global environment of rising unpredictable and risks have been responded through multifaceted efforts to regulate movement of people across borders something which Kenya ignored until Al-shabaab increased its presence in the country. Hansen (2013) notes that "Al-Shabaab has closely tracked its efforts with other troop-contributing countries (TCCs)." Therefore, out of six major countries, Al-Shabaab has

attempted to attack four in the past year. Agents attempted a bomb attack, and Ethiopian authorities announced they had arrested five Somali co-conspirators on Dec. 19. Uganda remains a sign. The U.S. Embassy in Kampala has warned against Uganda over the past year. It has issued several terrorism warnings, most recently on July 3, 2014, citing a clear threat to Entebbe International Airport.

In any democratic society, it is the government's responsibility to reduce disparity in public service and development by offering equal opportunities. This has given rise to the debate on the relationship existing between terrorism, economic and development performance. Accordingly, a dominant view put forward by scholars is that transnational terrorism is largely attributed to level of poverty and underdevelopment witnessed in most Africa countries (Johnson, 2001; Tyson, 2001). This view is supported in a study undertaken by Blomberg and Rosenbdorff (2009) who found that democratic organizations and high income reduces incidents of people engaging in terror related activities. It is also reported that most states with less economic freedom are likely to witness more terrorism cases (Gassebner & Luechinger, 2011) Elsewhere, Lai (2007) notes that countries with more economic disparities are likely to witness more attacks or people joining terrorism organization compared to advanced/civilized. In fact, underdeveloped societies are more likely to harbour terrorist groups which developed societies are targeted by the terrorist groups. (Krueger & Laitin, 2008). Additionally, Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justesen and Klemmensen (2006) argue that there is no relationship between education or poverty and terrorism but rather factors only influence political outcome. In a study, Haghparast, Shakeri and Pourjabli (2020) analyzed causes of political underdevelopment in most Muslim states

involved in terrorism. They found that terrorist organizations exploit unemployed youth and anyone facing harsh life conditions. Recent studies show that some terrorists have come from broken families which are economically impotent.

In some cases, terrorism can be seen as systematic extension of political failure in a country. When people attempt to seek service from the government and fail to get the government's attention to their issues, they use violence as a response mechanism. However, the conventional opinion among conservative academics studying terrorism "perceives terrorism as inherently involving violence or the threat of violence. Since a belief system needs at least contain some element of dogmatic proof or validation of violence in order to be useful to terrorism, the idea of a non-violent theology that helps terrorists" seems somewhat contradictory because it might lead to non-violent (Richards, 2015). Crenshaw (2011) argues that after the September 11 event, terrorists demonstrated their capacity to threaten international peace and stability. On that note, they presumed that most of them working in the field thought that an agreed definition would accompany notorious acts, any discussion on the concept of terrorism. She also asserts that instead of the enemy's moral character, why not have a neutral definition of the concept that would generally capture all acts of terrorism.

In more concrete terms, notable progress on counter-terrorism response has been consistently changing from centralized to a more relatively devolved where terrorist threats are more unstructured. According to Gadarian (201) this is evident when there is a lower level of smaller groups. In fact, the absence of notable groups can confine themselves to people who are enthusiastic about recourse to violent attacks. However, more resources can

be used to advance democratic institutions and support more effective strategies. A fundamental change of lawlessness and alienations that empowers some leaders to terrorize people motivates groups such as Al-shabaab and Al-Qaeda to have significant following. This implies that a proactive is needed to prevent any violent terrorists in future.

Given the devastating causes and threats posed by the terrorists, the need for a holistic approach to counter the crime of terrorism calls for a sustained fight against it by the UN Security Council in fall 2001 (UN, 2001). After September 11 the Security Council adopted resolution 1373 and urges member states to react to the crime of terrorism with tough measures within the ambit of their domestic laws, but the resolution avoided the definition of the concept. It is worth noting that with this, it is hoped that key skills of the security sector agencies and other key stakeholders shall be enhanced in order to smoothen the coordination of national counter terrorism efforts. This study aims to enlighten and stimulate the National Security council and other Key policy makers to develop stronger policies that will help to step up policy that will enhance and support multiagency approach to countering terror. In addition, this study aims to be able to contribute to action-oriented strategies by Government of Kenya with its key agencies, actors, and stakeholders in Kenya.

## **2.9 Public Response to Counter Terrorism Strategies**

The advocates of community participation believe that besides serving as a means of getting things done, involving the people in solving their own problems also brings many lasting solutions to said problems or challenges. First, it allows for the redistribution of power that in turn enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic



processes, to be deliberately included (Arnstein, 1969). It also brings people together in creating and making decisions about their environment. Participation brings about individual empowerment, as people gain skills in assessing needs, setting priorities, and gaining control over their environment (Kreuter, Lezin and Young, 2000). Public engagement requires building trust between officials and community members in order to establish a relationship of collaboration. Experience proves that such relationships cannot be built overnight and should be cultivated and maintained over time in order to have effect. It is critical to have at least the beginnings of such relationships in place before engaging the community on the issue of radicalization to violence and empowering them to become part of the solution.

Involvement by community members is a way to incorporate local values and attitudes into any programme and to build the layman's perspective into the programme. Community members' involvement can also provide access to local leaders, resources, and technical skills not otherwise available (Bracht and Tsouros 1990). Above all, participation engenders a sense of identification and continuing responsibility for any programme, often referred to as the principle of ownership (Carlaw, Mittlemark, Bracht, et. al., 1984). The aptness of this theoretical orientation is underscored by the increasing realization that no government or authority has the means to solve all the public problems adequately, and in the case of security, that the local people as stakeholders in their communities not only understand their neighbourhoods better but share the common aspiration of promoting and protecting it. It is also this realization that explains the increasing demand for state police, an arrangement whose proponents believe would bring policing closer to the local people.

Communities can work together to stop young people from becoming radicalized toward violence or joining terrorist organizations, according to Mulinari (2019), who asserts that this is another counterterrorism strategy. Rehman, Nasir, and Shahbaz (2017) report on a study done in Pakistan where they found that while there are many diverse opinions regarding what makes a young person susceptible to radicalization, most would concur that there is no one way. Instead, it is noted that potential contributing factors include the existence of radicalizers, the propagation of global extremist narratives, the accessibility of extremist content, problems with group or individual identity, personal crises, altered situation or circumstances, underemployment, links to criminality, social exclusion, grievances, and a lack of faith in political structures and civil society. Communities can play a critical role in keeping young people safe by working preventively, frequently in collaboration with local authorities, the police, or youth workers.

When engaged in counterterrorism efforts, traditional law enforcement has tended to focus its efforts on terrorists and their active supporters. Terrorists, however, give great attention to their audience; that is how they recruit. In order to therefore counter-radicalization to violence and recruitment most effectively, practitioners should work with local communities to highlight the specific locally persuasive counter-narratives that refute or negate the narrative advocating violence as the answer to perceptions of injustice inflicted on self, family or community. David Bayley (1986) explains that community policing is something that everyone talks about, but no one quite knows what it means. This view is reinforced by Van Hauwaert, and Huber, (2020) who argues that community policing characteristics are rather difficult to pin down. An important factor in critically examining community policing

is the fact that it is a philosophy and/or theory that has arisen from policing practice and not practice that arises from theory. There have been numerous attempts to define and evaluate community policing (Bennett, 2018). Primary interventions against radicalization, or against a crime, require the following: direct contact with the public (not just criminals or suspects), public consultations and partnerships (Sarre, 1996). These three criteria could also be said to be short-hand definitions of community policing (direct contact, consultation, partnerships). Community policing can only ever offer a partial solution to many of the contemporary issues faced by policing institutions (Morgan & Newburn, 1997).

There is strong evidence to suggest that terrorist attacks can cause ripple effects that negatively affect economic prosperity of a nation. According to a study by Chaliand and Blin (2016) terrorism has direct economic destruction of a country's infrastructure and indirect effect on the economy by creating uncertainty in most markets. Most notably, Coastal and Northeastern areas have suffered heavily because there has been decreased tourists visiting the region and this is attributed to travel restrictions imposed by foreign governments (Njoya, Efthymiour, Nikitas & O'Connell, 2023). Additionally, the survey noted that the 2013/14 hand grenade attacks in Nairobi, which account for nearly 60% of the nation's GDP, had a significant impact on commercial activities in the Nairobi and Mombasa Counties.

Wood and Kathman (2015) discovered that when rebel factions are competing, violence against civilians rises. Intergroup rivalry can jeopardize access to resources, raise the likelihood that civilians would defect, and encourage predation against the populace as a

result, all of which encourage civilian targeting. Raleigh (2012) also links organizational rivalry to attacks on civilians. Terrorism can benefit militant groups by upsetting governments and projecting strength in comparison to adversaries.

It can be noted that considering the rapid development in competition between terrorist groups on the continent, Chaliand and Blin (2016) suggest that it makes sense to apply inter-organizational theories of terrorism to the continent. Jihadist militants have relocated many of their operations from the Middle East to Africa as a result of the Caliphate's swift fall in Syria (Abrahms 2018). This has led to an increase in bloodshed as different groups compete for money, sympathizers, and legitimacy. This geographical pattern doesn't seem to be going anywhere soon. Olivier Guita explains in an article, "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: A Threat for the West" that Africa is going to be the battleground of jihad for the next 20 years and it's going to replace the Middle East (Guita, 2010). Colin Clarke and Jacob Zenn believe that as groups compete for organizational supremacy, the battle between the Islamic State and Al Qaeda affiliates "will drive competition for prestige, recruit, and resource, metastasizing the threat."

According to Knudsen (2015), this action resulted in anarchy over time as warlords divided the nation among themselves. Internal conflicts can sometimes be distracting; they are not always external to the nation. According to Wood and Kathman (2015), when Darfur-based rebels started attacking police stations, army outposts, and other targets, the Sudanese army was still engaged in the Second Sudanese Civil War in the south of the country. The army was originally unable to fully defend against the attacks since they were already worn out

from their battles in the south. Sudanese troops were redistributed to go after the Darfur rebels when the civil war between the south and north came to an end.

Community security activities often focus on building the state and its institutions, often missing the fact that supporting such institutions does not necessarily lead to security strategies and outcomes that are people-centered. Additionally, the strategy of focusing on the military and the police contradict the principles of efficiency and economic sustainability, as building these institutions from scratch is an incredibly resource-intensive endeavour, particularly for combating terrorism (UNDP, 2009). However, in the context of complexity and continued insecurity, these two institutions stand as the most obvious actors to reform. Literatures have also shown that community security programmes are seldom coordinated and that reforms tend to be sectoral rather than all-encompassing of the entire security sector (Kantor and Persson, 2011). Reforms, according to community security principles, should be carried out in a way that is complementary to or in line with other security programmes. Therefore, supporting the development of police services without supporting at the same time the criminal justice system will, for example, have a limited impact on community security.

In examining the fight against Boko Haram terrorism in the north-east region of Nigeria, Hassan (2015) claims that the civilian JTF structures make up about 60 percent of all counter-terrorism mercenaries, and that they support the government special military Joint Task Force (JTF) in combating terrorism. According to Hassan (2015), “the civilian JTF

may become an effective alternative to the government's military JTF, which has been accused of rights violations.

## **2.10 Security Agencies Response to Counterterrorism Strategies**

According to Mulinari (2019), counterterrorism has gained prominence in international relations during the past ten years and is still covered in the news virtually every day. Most certainly this can be attributed to the current wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, that have also led to some opposition to such military or "hard" methods of fighting terrorism. States and civil society have looked out for milder, frequently preventive strategies to deal with violent extremism in part as a result. Indeed, some empirical data points to the efficacy of related counterterrorism efforts, for example, protective measures (metal detectors at airports) aimed at increasing air travel can contribute to the reduction airline jackings and attacks against diplomatic facilities (Enders & Sandler, 1993).

United Nations, (2005) argues that the task force implementing the counterterrorism strategies currently comprises 31 bodies inside and outside the United Nations system. Their obligations array from counterterrorism to conflict deterrence and resolution, human rights, asylum, non-proliferation and disarmament, refugees' protection, capacity building, human rights, cultural and interreligious dialogue, education, development, health, and peacekeeping" The extensiveness of the Task Force entities parallels to the inclusiveness of the tactic. This range of know-how also lets the United Nations system and applicable entities to give together to funding the Member States.

Bayley and Weisburd (2011) worried that police involvement in counterterror work can be a threat to the legitimacy of local police, undermining the aspirations of community policing. Involvement in covert intelligence gathering and the perception of an intolerance of cultural diversity and political differences could see police perceived as politically partisan and anti-democratic. However, the police need the help of the public, of all communities. In everyday life people watch over each other's properties, they monitor behavior in their streets, they contact the police when they feel a law has been broken or when community safety is threatened.

Regional peace-keeping mission operated by the African Union with the support of the United Nations in Somalia," according to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It is permitted to assist in the support of interim administrative structures, carry out national security plans, train Somali security forces, and help establish a safe environment for the distribution of humanitarian aid (Mikael, 2013). AMISOM assists the Somali Federal Government forces in their conflict with Al-Shabaab extremists as part of her duty (Lavanya, 2016).

Howie (2006) investigated counterterrorism in the context of the workplace, and Eriksson in 2013; Mikael looked into the kidnappings of tourists and humanitarian workers by Al Shabaab. As a result of his research, the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) invaded Somalia. It has been demonstrated that terrorism methods can affect domestic politics, for instance, by changing the priorities of people and elected officials. Mikael (2013) merely discussed the fact that terrorism can occur in both wealthy and poor nations, without making any

connections to political processes. Previous studies have not considered the fact that terrorism has wider political repercussions than just elevating national security to the top of the political agenda.

Byman (2019) claims that for a major portion of modern history, "hard power" measures used by security agencies to combat terrorism included information gathering, law enforcement, and the selective employment of Special Forces and the military. Although knowledge in preventing and combating terrorism has grown throughout time, few states have devised and put counterterrorism-focused policies into action. The literature has a section devoted to the counterterrorism strategies' less than ideal results. It illustrates how governments frequently employ two tactics, aggressive (or preemptive), and defensive, either in addition to or in place of one another. By demolishing the infrastructure and training facilities of militants and dismantling their networks across many geographies, law enforcement agencies actively attempt to thwart possible assaults. Preventive measures aim to destroy or at the very least curtail the ability of militant groups to launch terrorist operations against the state. Conversely, defensive measures try to lessen the likelihood of an assault by making the target more difficult as well as the potential harm if an attacker succeeds.

The systematic study of terrorists' lives, the distinction between various terrorist types and groups, and a nuanced understanding of each terrorism within its own unique cultural, historical, and political context should all be taken into consideration when determining the nature of terrorist interventions. To try to analyze terrorism in terms of underlying factors



(social, economic, demographic, political, or cultural) is insufficient at best and inaccurate at worst. Only concentrating on fundamental structures offers minimal predictive power. 'Root causes' may actually have more of an impact on the course of terrorism than its initial manifestation since they define the level of social acceptance for violence by legitimizing complaints. The prevalence of religious and/or holy terrorism in Kenya at the moment raises serious security issues.

As argued by Mulinari (2019) the terrorist attacks occurred few months after USA designated the group as a terrorist organization and since 2006, terrorist group received greater attention. For example, the use of suicide bombing, presence of foreign fighters, their announcement to pay loyalty to Al-Qaeda network and the Kampala (Uganda) attacks in 2010 are attacks associated with Al shabaab. This is the sign that the terrorist group had been training young people from across the borders of Somalia to include Kenya, Uganda and even Nigeria. Indeed, Al shabaab is one of the Al Qaeda's allies that holds significant territorial control and has been cited as an example of an Islamic ideology led by prominent leader Anwar Awlaki.

Al-Shabaab is the only self-declared ally of Al-Qaeda with significant territorial control, and well-known ideologues like Anwar Awlaki have cited it as an example of an Islamic system of government. The organization is also global in that it has contacted the Somali diaspora, raising Western concerns about Al-Shabaab's activities. These elements could have affected the 2008 US classification of Al-Shabaab as a terrorist group, as well as the 2009 designations by Australia, the UK, and Canada. The UN Resolution 1844 and the EU's EC

356/2010 directive have also targeted Al-Shabaab and supported its designation as such. The organization also runs training centers where Somali teenagers are exposed to Al-Qaeda doctrine. These centers serve as a training ground for recruits who are drawn to Somalia in search of jihad but may be able to continue the fight at home.

According to Joannis (2011), this is similar to Somalia in that the country's vocabulary has always included strengthening religious rhetoric. Al-Shabaab's symbolism was defined by a religious discursive game, which also gave the group's speeches momentum and guaranteed it a certain level of support in a society where religious symbols had become more prevalent since the fall of the Somali state. Al-Shabaab was given freedom to grow in a vacuum of ideology. Hansen It was the case in Iran with relation to Marxism and Liberalism, as Moaddel (1996) asserts. According to Mesoy and Karadas (2009), the Middle Eastern scenario encouraged the growth of Islamism. In certain ways, Somali civilization was modeled after that of the Middle East and Iran, were adversaries.

According to Potter and Hepburn (2012) what happened in Somalia between in 1960 and 1969 has continued to attract scholarly attention – it was tested, discredited, and abolished by popular military coup. The system that took over was a military dictatorship who were inspired by Marxist ideology (1969-1991), and this proved to be corrupt and based on clannism. Therefore, clan-based warlords that followed gained increased power from 1991 but later failed to protect the people from their own clan. In this case, several regimes – democracy, Marxism, nationalism, and clannism – had been tried but yielded very little to the people of Somalia.

As argued by Mulinari (2019), religion can be seen as a game in which players, including instrumentalists who aren't true believers, must abide by a set of rules in order to participate. A religion contains fundamental principles that you must follow in order to be considered a member of that religion. If one defines themselves as outside of the religion and disagrees with its fundamental tenets, they are not considered to be a member of such religion. According to Scott Thomas (2014), religions are often dynamic norms for acceptability of particular activities that vary through time.

According to Potter and Hepburn (2012), Somalia is a stronghold for views that consider the presence of occupying militaries as a major factor in terrorism, at least in the form of suicide attacks. It has been stated that Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia between 2006 and 2009 gave rise to favorable conditions for terrorism. The invasion of Ethiopia, according to renowned scholars like Roland Marchal (2011) and Robert Pape (2003), was vital for Al-Shabaab recruiting from 2007 to 2009 and even for the formation of the group. A same line of reasoning may be found in Menkhaus (2014), a prominent expert on Somalia, who shows how hostile Western policies and Ethiopian.

Al-Shabaab is more of an outcome of Somalia's insecurity than it is of al-Qaeda ideology imported there. It is crucial to recognize the role that global informal networks play in this process. Sageman (2015), for instance, makes the case that social links frequently come before ideological ties and are utilized to enlist jihadists. Al-Shabaab was created by a group of former Afghan war veterans, and al-Qaeda supporters spread its ideologies.

Every Somalia may trace his clan back to his ancestors because the Somali clan structure is fundamentally patrilineal. Most Somalis will develop some allegiance if they share a father's side ancestor, and the closer this ancestor is to you, the stronger your bonds of loyalty will become. Sub-clans within a clan frequently assert that they sprang from different brothers of the common clan patriarch. Clan in Somali society commands more than just allegiance; it also serves as a manufactured filter for social reality because clans frequently gather in the same locations, even in the diaspora. Members of a clan will frequently gather together, discuss the same topics, and build a common reality in order to create a common discourse.

Researchers who have conducted in-depth fieldwork on Al-Shabaab are also the basis for the reports of the International Crisis Group (ICG). The work of the Crisis Group offers a singular opportunity to follow Al-Shabaab in an English book because it has tracked Somalia over time. It covers Somalia's anti-terrorism efforts. The organization's origins can be traced to a shadow conflict between the United States and Al-Qaeda in East Africa, in which the US tried to utilize warlords to execute network members, as described in *Losing Hearts and Minds* and *Somalia's Islamists*. It was in this environment, according to the accounts, that the core of Al-Shabaab is alleged to have formed in 2003. This new group of more extremist Somalis. The accounts also cover how the gang first relied on the Ayr clan for security. In-depth study of the group was provided in the 2010 report *Somalia's Divided Islamists*, which also made the argument that its support was waning in part due to Ethiopia's withdrawal in 2009 and in part due to its aggressive use of suicide assaults, including the 2009 attacks on graduation ceremonies.

Numerous researchers have also addressed the problems of foreign occupation and general humiliation. Roy (2013), Choudhury (2009), and Victoroff (2006) provide in-depth discussions of identity concerns and a useful overview of psychological issues, respectively. Another problem is a lack of socioeconomic and political integration. In many of these narratives, the Somali diaspora is already weak since; in general, Somalis living abroad are poorer and less educated than other diaspora groups, which foster a feeling of embarrassment. It should be highlighted, nevertheless, that cases of radicalization frequently occur in very affluent sections of the diaspora; in fact, jihadists frequently appear to be well-off, young men who have children. Nevertheless, occupation and humiliation are significant, albeit indirect. Mulinari (2019) asserts that methodological challenges faced when researching Al-Shabaab may be the cause of some of the controversies mentioned above as well as some of the shortcomings in the analysis of various themes thus far. First, there are restrictions on entering areas under Al-Shabaab control. The organisation has a reputation for regularly killing suspected spies, and even Al-Shabaab-controlled gangs fear the Amniyat, its secret police.

It is also important to note that lack of access to information on Al shabab controlled areas makes research on the terrorist organization challenging as they will rely on what is termed as ‘Nairobi reality problem’. Most often, sources within the diplomatic community and those working at NGOs are considered to be self-referential. Several reasons are available to treat statements made by the group terror group with caution. In the first place, such statements can be influenced by several issues other than the ideology – the need to harness

funds from Middle East and the need to recognize and belong in the larger group called global jihad movement. Second, some websites may be hosted by more radical individuals on the fringes of al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab's various texts may have been inspired more by its global views than by the beliefs al-Shabaab truly held.

According to Potter and Hepburn (2012), the first terrorist attacks in Kenya recorded in the Global Terrorism Database occurred in February, March, and April 1975, when Maskini Liberation Front attackers attacked Starlight in Nairobi. It was when I blew up a nightclub. Summerhouse by President Kenyatta of Mombasa. While there were relatively few terrorist attacks in Kenya during the 1970s and his 1980s, his string of 30 attacks in 1992 led to a number of attacks in the months leading up to Kenya's first multi-party elections. He killed over 150 people. In 1997 and towards his 2007 elections, terrorist violence in Kenya increased again. By contrast, the 2002 election was relatively peaceful. Kenya's deadliest terrorist attack occurred in August 1998 when Al-Qaeda targeted the US Embassy in Nairobi. The suicide attack killed more than 200 people, including 12 Americans, and injured 4,000. Since then, al-Shabaab has been responsible for a rapid and significant increase in terrorism in Kenya, with nearly 100 attacks he carried out between 2008 and 2012.

Kenya's invasion of southern Somalia began after the kidnapping of two Spaniards working for Medecine's Sana Frontiers in the Dadaab refugee camp. The kidnappings are said to have been carried out by al-Shabaab militants. The Kenyan government claimed its military deployment was approved by the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG).

Kenya's foreign minister said the deployment of the Kenyan army was at the request of the TFG. The Kenyan military said it had no definite end date for the operation, but indicators of the mission's success had broken al-Shabaab's capabilities. Al-Shabaab's first attack in 2011 was on Monday, October 24, 2011, around 1:00 am, at a workers' bar called Mwauras in downtown Nairobi's Mfangano Road at 3 pm. A grenade thrown killed one person and wounded more than 20 others. According to police records, the weapon used was his F1 grenade made in Russia. A second explosion occurred later the same day when a grenade was thrown into the Machakos bus station from a moving vehicle. Since then, 59 men and 10 women have been hospitalized, two of them in intensive care and five confirmed dead. The attack occurred just two days after the US warned of an "imminent" terrorist attack. US warnings implied al-Shabaab would retaliate in response to Kenyan forces invading Somalia in mid-October.

Al-Shabaab was allegedly responsible for a couple additional attacks in October, according to Mulinari (2019). In addition to the East African Pentecostal Church, a military convoy, and a Holiday Inn hotel were also assaulted by Al-Shabaab in November 2011. In December 2011, the militant group is accused of carrying out nine attacks in Kenya, some of which left casualties and injuries while others had no casualties. Al Shabaab terrorists carried out a number of attacks in the first few months of 2012 between the months of January and June.

Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack that killed a police officer and a civilian and injured two other civilians. In March 2012, four of his grenades were thrown into his bus station in Machakos, Nairobi, killing six and injuring more than 60. Sunday, April 29,

2012, at approximately 8:00 AM: At 50am there was an attack on the Church of God's House of Miracles on Ngara Estate in Nairobi. As the daily reported, an assailant named Amar walked in and out of the church. He later came back, sat in the back seat, and threw a grenade at the believers who were called to the pulpit by the pastor. Experts said the grenades used were made in China. One person died and 11 were admitted to Kenyatta National Hospital. On Tuesday, May 15, 2012, three grenades were thrown at his Bella Vista nightclub in Mombasa, Kenya, killing one person and injuring five others. The attackers continued to fire indiscriminately after Bellavista was denied entry to his club. In addition, attacks at Jericho Beer Garden, Kisauni Constituency in Mombasa, Kenya, on Sunday, June 24, at about 10 p.m. East Africa Time (EAT). Customers crowded the bar to watch the England vs. Italy football game from the UEFA European Championships 2012. One person was killed instantly by the explosion, while two more perished from their wounds while being treated at the Coast main hospital. Another 30 people were hurt, including a 9-year-old suspect who was thought to be one of the attackers.

According to the Watch Group's 2013 report, al-Hijra and its supporters "suffered a setback from the disruption of al-Hijra's operations and the unexplained killings and disappearances of its members by international and regional security agencies. There is. The report said al-Hijra fighters returning from Somalia following the defeat of al-Shabaab and its devastating operations in Kenya "have had previous ties to al-Qaeda in East Africa since late 2012. A statement attributed to al-Hijra in late 2012 warned that they were shifting their focus to "jihad in the East African region, with a clear focus on Kenya." bottom.



Countering terrorism appeals requires certain interventions with its narrative understood by all stakeholders. According to Mulinari (2019) the US government had to impose sanctions on individuals (Khalif Adale, Abdullahi Jeeri and Khalif Afgoooye) who offer financial support, procurement of weapons and conducted recruitment for Al shabaab in Kenya and many other parts of East Africa region. Further observation indicates that an unidentified young man in a Mosque proclaimed he was travelling to Somalia to join Al shabaab an affiliate of Al-Qaeda. There were also reports of British woman, Samantha Lewthwaite (also known as White Widow) who was most of Western wanted terrorist and lived in East Africa linked to Logo, Ahmed and Al-Hijra because she was an active member of Al shabaab who carried out attacks in non-Muslim areas. Samantha was a widow of London based terrorist, Germaine Lindsay accused of terrorist attacks which killed over 400 people during the famous 7/7 attack in London (Guzek, 2019).

The threats posed by Al shabaab are similar to those exhibited by Al-Qaeda. An audio recording shared by Al-Qaeda leader, Osama Bi Laden in April 2009 targeted residents of Somalia. He sensationally incited them against foreign interventions who were in the country to restore peace, "In recent years, the war that has been going on in your land has been between Islam and the international community. It's a war in the world and I'm urging the Somalis to continue on the path of Jihad". With the presence of Al-Qaeda sympathizers in East Africa and the active presence of Islamic extremists in Somalia continue to pose huge threat to US and its allies. More interestingly, reports of Alshabaab recruiting its members in US territory raises many concerns about the threat to its land and possibly citizens as domestic terrorists or generally engaging in terrorism activities.

Indeed, countries in East African are under threat from various groups using terrorist tactics. The U.S. counter-terrorism policy shares a common extremist ideology with al-Qaeda and its success may benefit al-Qaeda goals, with his multinational AQ operatives in the region and those like al-Shabab. Focuses on local groups. The United States conducts a variety of overt, covert, and covert programs to counter the threat of transnational terrorism in the region. These efforts are part of what the Bush administration called the "global war on terrorism" and what the Obama administration called "a global campaign to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al-Qaeda." is. Al-Shabab has carried out approximately 550 of its terrorist acts since leaving the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2007, killing more than 1,600 people and injuring more than 2,100 others. Less than 10 attacks were connected to al-Shabaab in 2007, but more than 200 were in 2012.

Terrorist organizations aimed to inspire confidence among their members, something that has witnessed an increase in Al shabaab activities in Somalia. In fact, the terrorist group has expanded their operations deep inside Kenya in what was perceived as retaliation to Kenya's military intervention in Somalia. Empirical evidence showed about 22.7% of Al shabaab attacks by 2012 occurred in Kenya especially in Garissa (13 attacks), Nairobi (8 attacks) and Wazir (4 attacks), Mandela (4 attacks), and Ifo (4 attacks). The targets of al-Shabaab attacks are varied, with the most common being individuals and property (25.9%), armed forces (22.4%), states (13.9%), police (9.9%), businesses (5.1%), and diplomatic agencies, (4.0%) and journalists and media (4.0%). Al-Shabaab has attacked military targets in various

countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Turkey, and Uganda as well as his multinational AMISOM forces in an attempt to gain control of Somali territory.

Mulinari (2019) notes that the group's deadliest attacks are often characterized by attacks on military targets, leading to widespread clashes and deadly bombing raids, such as in 2010 claim. Kampala, Uganda. Of his 548 attacks on al-Shabaab from 2007 to 2012, 30 of them were suicide bombers. These attacks killed 331 of his people, including the attackers. For Kenya, Al-Shabaab's most commonly used tactics include bombing and armed attacks, which account for 72.6% of attacks. Even though he was responsible for nearly 90 kidnappings between 2007 and 2012, the group held hostages at Westgate shopping mall during that period. In Kenya, the attack on the Westgate shopping mall was the only recorded al-Shabaab hostage barricade attack so far, in which the perpetrators occupied the place and held the hostages on the spot rather than kidnapping them. As we observed in Nairobi, the perpetrators of these incidents often come into conflict with security forces before the situation is resolved.

The National Counter-Radicalization Strategy aims to be a flexible framework to guide prevention-based initiatives to counter radicalization to terrorism and, in turn, violence. In particular, this strategy can adapt to an environment in which the threat of terrorism and the means by which it is expressed are constantly changing (Bognoe, 2016). The strategy also raises awareness of what is currently known about radicalization to violence so that practitioners, frontline workers, and Kenyans at large are better prepared to prevent it. Being armed with up-to-date information and tools is critical to implementing effective prevention

efforts. Finally, the strategy aims to be a tool for ongoing dialogue with Kenyans and to facilitate discussion on this difficult issue. This strategy promotes the kind of cooperation between the Kenyan government and its partners. This is essential to ensure that our efforts to counter radicalization and violent terrorism are responsive to local realities. As we continue to expand these connections, together we increase our collective ability to keep our communities safe.

The situation in Kenya shows that the immediate fear and loathing of terrorism has become dull for the majority of the community, and technology can provide wise advice to communities on how to coexist with terrorism and the threat of terrorism (Bognoe, 2016). Science, Technology, and Innovation (ST&I) has a role to play in keeping terrorist threats in perspective and ensuring that resources are not wasted hunting down phantoms (UN, 2010). The Kenyan Constitution of 1972 provides for the role of the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) as defense and protection). Protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic, assisting, and cooperating with other authorities in times of emergency or disaster, and restoring peace across Kenya (Ministry of Defense, 2020).

Kenya argues that from the outset, successive governments have failed to focus on science, technology, research, and innovation to enhance national security needs. Both dealt with the issue of terrorism and counter-terrorism, pointing out that current actions by al-Shabaab are claiming thousands of lives. In addition, Kenya has developed District Action Plans to Combat Violent Extremism in all of her 47 districts and, with the help of the KDF, further implements her 2020 National Counter-Violent Extremism Strategy of the Ministry of Defense. Did. This reality remains today, and for these reasons, this study aims to analyze

the role of science, technology, and innovation in counterterrorism in the case of the KDF effort.

On the one hand, repression involves physical confrontation that paralyzes extremist plans of destruction, such as bomb attacks. Through legislative, judicial, and executive branches, modern states use methods such as arrest, surveillance, intelligence, and imprisonment to neutralize harmful terrorist efforts. The soft approach, on the other hand, seeks to devalue terrorist ideologies through anti-ideological discourse against extremist ideologies that foster political violence. Through a soft approach, extremist organizations and leaders expose the ideologies of terrorist hatred and violence. Intellectual power includes diplomacy, persuasion, capacity-building, and the strategic use of power and influence in cheap, political, and socially just ways, essentially military power, and all forms of diplomacy. includes use. Perforated borders, building walls, stepping up patrols, setting up intersections, IEDs, including CIED training and infrastructure building at all training institutes, our engineers assisting in building increase.

Lessons learned from terrorist attacks in Somalia, Mount Elgon, and the Northeast show that the Kenyan Defense Forces are unprepared for the scale of threats facing the Republic and its people. Like its neighbors, the KDF is primarily an infantry force with little mechanization or rapid response capabilities. The KDF was able to prolong traditional defense conflicts but was unable to respond quickly and effectively in the face of asymmetric and unconventional threats. The 2015 Garissa attack, which took a staggering eight hours for GSU and KDF forces to arrive, left more than 100 dead and made clear to the

Ministry of Defense that it was unable to protect Kenyans. showed. The same is true for victims of the Somali conflict. There, our troops were captured defenseless and slaughtered by mobile, heavily armed militants. Some were asleep. It is therefore clear that the Kenyan army needs to change to become more flexible, capable, and mobile. The days of marching into battle are over. The Kenyan Armed Forces need to be effective and well-trained while being able to respond quickly to threats from across the conventional and unconventional spectrum.

Kenyan forces deployed abroad or domestically in combat roles should ideally operate in battle groups similar to those deployed by British, Australian, or Canadian armed forces. or centered around an armored battalion, with temporary support elements added as needed. Battlegroups typically allow smaller maneuvering units with the same support as large group-sized brigades, allowing for coordinated action using multiple maneuverable and flexible units. Both EASTCOM and WESTCOM will be reorganized, and the individual battalions will be combined into a combined arms brigade group. Similar to what international army – British and Australia - Government of Kenya strengthened its fight against Al-shabaab by reorganizing its army into brigades under two commands; EASTCOM and WESTCOM and these organizations and arrangements could be summoned to active duty.

As the Somali conflict has shown, the Kenyan Air Force is unable to defend Kenya and its airspace and support ground forces. Several attacks on his KAF airfield during the conflict led to the diversion of Kenyan Army units to provide cover. This was an unacceptable drain

and a diversion of resources that could otherwise have been devoted to the front lines. Take responsibility for protection and airfield security. In 2020-2030, KAF will seek replacements for the venerable F-5 light attack aircraft and expand its transport capacity to better support its KDF operations abroad and in remote areas.

In terms of protecting Kenya's waters, Kenya Navy was equipped with modern ships and guards onboard as well as ashore. Indeed, terrorist groups engaging in drug smuggling and other illegal business that supports them is likely to increase and hence it became apparent to enhance the strength of the Navy. In addition, restructuring and revised training standards, the average Kenyan rifle battalion is significantly under-armed and poorly equipped compared to its contemporaries abroad. With the goal of creating a mobile and flexible force, the Kenyan Army will consider buying more transport and combat vehicles while modernizing the equipment of the average soldier. The acquisition of more than 100 of his T-72 main battle tanks in the early 2010s already allowed for relative modernization of the Army's tank battalions, leaving only artillery, infantry, and engineer units.

As the world moves forward, cooperation between the KDF and its regional and global allies will remain essential in the decades to come. Some may argue that Kenya's counterterrorism policies after Westgate and Garissa university attacks have been success as the past few years have not witnessed any major terrorist operation in Kenya. In any case, the Kenyan military can work effectively with friendly forces. Other African countries in focus include Tanzania, Uganda, Somalia, South Africa, and Nigeria, while foreign powers include China, India, the United States, and other Commonwealth countries. Only with friends and partners

can we face the dangers of an increasingly unstable world. It is important to note that any victory over terrorist attacks is only achieved when they are no longer carried out more attacks completely. Literature has shown that a victory over terrorism should replace a culture of fear among the civilian population with respect, vigilance, and solidarity.

The Kenyan perspective shows that understanding the complexities of violent extremism is a prerequisite for effective CVE policy. All interested countries should consider these non-binding best practices, considering local needs and conditions, different histories, and cultures when seeking to develop and implement CVE policy and/or program within the country. We recommend that you consider applying for the practice. These best practices can also be used to shape the bilateral, multilateral, technical or other capacity-building assistance offered in this area. Programs, policies, laws, or actions put in place to promote these good practices shall comply with all relevant laws, including customary international law, international humanitarian law where applicable, and international human rights and refugee law. States must fully comply with their obligations under international law.

The government has also established a National Counter-Terrorism Center whose main role is to coordinate counter-terrorism efforts through government departments such as the National Intelligence Service, the Kenya Defense Forces, the Kenya Police Department, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Ministry of Coordination by the Central Government. Immigration Office, Refugee Affairs Office, and National Registry Office. It also includes officials from the Public Prosecutor's Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, the Ministry of East African Affairs, Trade and Tourism, the



National Treasury, the Ministry of Devolution and Planning, and the Ministry of Information and Communications, and Technology, and the Department of Environment, Water and Natural Resources.

Counter terrorism decisions are reactive because terrorism is clandestine and the groups that practice it are small and unpredictable. Those characteristics also create serious challenges for governments in terms of finding a balance between protecting the rights and liberties of their people and protecting their lives from the threat of terrorism. As a result, many scholars in the field of terrorism, with a desire to find a solution to this problem, tried to tackle questions like: what types of measures are governments able to use against terrorism? Are those measures in accordance with the rule of law? And are they effective or not? Those questions in turn created two basic models of counterterrorism: the criminal justice model and the war model. In addition, as Crelinsten and Schmid indicate, although use of force against terrorists can be effective in destroying their coercive capabilities in the short term, there is also a high probability of creating cycles of violence and counter-violence, revenge and counter-revenge or creating more political leverage for terrorists by creating public sympathy, which in turn provides a new recruitment ground for terrorist organizations. (Crelinsten, & Schmid, 1992).

## **2.11 Summary of the Literature**

The study has examined effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies adopted in Kenya. As terrorism cases increases, it challenges governments to rethink how they can confront rising cases of attacks attributed to its capacity limitations (law enforcement agencies that are weak

and/or unable to actually track and obtain evidence on terrorist financiers and money launderers) and an inability (or unwillingness) to tighten security and enforce border controls. Literature has shown that Counter-terrorism focuses on both eliminating the causes of terrorism and preventing it through a variety of approaches. Counter-terrorism includes the practices, tactics, frameworks, techniques, and strategies employed by governments, militaries, law enforcement, and corporations to counter real and imagined threats and/or acts of terrorism. Especially given the growing threat of violent extremism around the world.

Therefore, the general intervention measures in the discussion of counterterrorism highlights importance of ensuring effective framework to guide how government confronts the group. What is more important is the fact that any success to prevent terrorist attacks can be determined by the degree in which the behavior of terrorists is influenced; hence policy makers are likely to understand deeper the main aims of terrorists. It seems most governments have been focusing on defeat as acknowledgement of victory in the counterterrorism debate, but this may not be the case.

The post-9/11 period witnessed the introduction of a veritable panoply of new Anglo-American counter-terrorism measures such as identification and proscription of new forms of terrorist behaviour. As part of international support, USA and other countries are increasing counter-terrorism assistance. Indeed, beyond explicit measures to provide assistance to Africa's security architecture and to fight terrorist finance, there are a variety of "security cooperation" tools that in one form or another contribute to the fight against terrorism in the region. These include the traditional forms of security assistance

(international military education and training), humanitarian assistance, combined training, and exercises. Locally, Government of Kenya continue to devote more resources and attention to counter-terrorism but the evident threats points to inadequacy of these strategies. In the aftermath of Westgate and Garissa university attacks, it is clear to academics and policy experts that Kenya still relies on Western countries for security support. Due to a mix of geographical, regional, historical, political, economic, and socio-cultural variables, Kenya has recently become a target of international terrorism.

Additionally, building of relations of trust between security agencies, civilian population and other stakeholders such as NGOS and civil society is evident but some scholars question if capability to address terrorism considering each has unique interest. However, what is needed is direct contact among all the stakeholders but if the engagement is disingenuous, it can fail to develop appropriate strategy that effectively helps in preventing terrorism and extremism. An enhanced citizen participation in counter-terrorism policy area can be found in the upsurge of US and UK community-based counter-terrorism initiatives (Spalek & Lambert, 2008, Klausen, 2009, p. 416; Ashindorbe, Afatakpa, & Owonikoko, 2021). These have overwhelmingly targeted those populations deemed host to specific, internal, ‘suspect’ communities and have included the ‘outreach and engagement initiatives’ of the DHS's Engagement with Key Communities Team, such as the 2007–2008 ‘Roundtables on Security and Liberty’ with representatives from Arab, Muslim, Sikh, South Asian and Middle Eastern American communities (Taylor, (2020).

There is an acknowledgement of the government being committed to a fundamental shift of power away from central government to communities, families, and individuals (through the ‘Big Society’) so that the knowledge, access and influence of people and communities to challenge extremist and terrorist ideology is valued. With the focus continuing to be oriented at terrorist activities that are planned by certain extremist Islamic-affiliated groups, and in view of the persistent tensions surrounding related political issues such as the war in Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia, it is clear that terrorism will remain a central driving force in forging cooperation among police and security agencies in the East Africa and elsewhere in the world. Terrorism, in general, and Islamic extremist terrorism, in particular, will surely remain important elements in shaping efforts of security agencies in Kenya, because they are perceived as major threats to national security.

It is important to highlight that the involvement of wide- ranging state and non- state actors at a local level suggests that there may be ‘space’ for interpretation and that well- placed actors can mediate nationally driven policy agendas (Barnes et al., 2007). There is therefore room for state- instigated policies and practices to be questioned by communities and other actors. Moreover, some counter- terrorism initiatives have grown directly out of grassroots, ‘street-based’, community context which have at their core the aim of helping individuals deemed at risk of committing acts of terrorism rather than supplying the state with information.

## **2.12 Knowledge Gap**

Over the past ten years, numerous terrorist attacks have taken place in Kenya. Since the beginning, their occurrence has attracted intense debate among scholars and practitioners to

better understand the conditions, motivations, impacts, and many other facets of the phenomenon. This is especially the case after specific events, such as the September 21, 2013, Westgate mall attacks and the 2015 Garissa university attacks that garnered attention from audiences not only in Kenya but across the world. These devastating and highly consequential events can bring greater attention to and interest in the field, especially from new disciplines. Consequently, Government of Kenya responded through various strategies to confront the increasing terrorism activities in the country.

Some of the notable efforts if the government's continued to use the Prevention of Terrorism Act (amended in 2014) to investigate and prosecute terrorism but terrorism case trials often proceeded slowly and inefficiently. Besides, counter-terrorism activities were also incorporated in the annual budget and even the Vision 2030. As terrorists continued to exploit Kenya's uncontrolled land borders to conduct attacks, the government in 2019 opted to build a border security strategy, but hurdles remain.

Although Kenya has continued to enhance its counter-terrorism, many studies focus almost exclusively on broader interventions and do not consider effectiveness of specific approach. There is inconclusive debate on strategies adopted by Kenya can address terrorism activities, for example, legislations, law enforcement, border security, countering the financing of terrorism, countering violent extremism, and regional and international cooperation. Many of these interventions have become part of Kenya's daily lives and discourse, but we have no idea whether or not they fulfill the promise of reducing terrorism, terrorism-related risk or harm as there is no research to support these interventions. Indeed, some of these

interventions may also have collateral and unintended effects of reducing civil rights or our quality of life. Therefore, it becomes very important to examine the effectiveness of the counter-terrorism strategies adopted in Kenya.

## **2.13 Theoretical Framework**

In most countries around the world, the threat of terrorism has been used to justify radical new legislation that gives police and intelligence agencies unprecedented powers to confront the group. In this section, the study highlights theories adopted to explain effectiveness of counterterrorism. These theories include social learning theory, liberalism theory, human needs theory, and soft power model and securitization theory.

### **2.13.1 Social Learning Theory**

Social learning theory (SLT) was developed by Albert Bandura in 1977 and observes that human behavior is learned observationally through modeling, or by simply observing others (Mills, Freilich, Chermak, Holt, & LaFree, 2019). According to this theory, people learn to be aggressive by observing others acting aggressively to achieve some goal or being rewarded as a direct result of committing violent terrorist attacks, anti-terrorism. First, social learning theory directly linked criminal behavior to individually learned traits through diverse and dynamic human interactions in environments conducive to violent and uninhibited behavior. In the 21st century, as terrorist attacks become more frequent in the United States, this psychosocial theory is further used to seek acceptance and understanding by native recruits from religiously or politically motivated terrorist organizations.

According to earlier studies, SLT has been well suited for studying cyber related crime cyber enabled and online radicalization (Pauwels & Schils, 2016; Pauwels et-al, 2014). The

SLT explains terrorism as a learned through aggressive behaviour and are not different from other aggressive behaviours; hence offers a theoretical explanation of how individuals filter issues because of their role in the determination of available opportunities. The learning of deviant behaviors is dependent on the reinforcers being not only effective but also available. Regarding suicide bombers, Schulze (2018), a more specific group of terrorists, states that many terrorists are "violent true believers" or "protected by an ideology or belief system that equates murder and suicide." suggesting that it can be described as an individual. Legitimate means for achieving a particular end" They are characterized by a set of characteristics such as: Belief and understanding that suicide is a terrorist weapon, urges of envy (e.g., desire to harm or destroy desired characteristics of target), feelings of helplessness, history of depression or despair (fluctuations and social level of emotional isolation), sense of entitlement, capacity for emotional detachment, sense of abbreviated future, and use of predatory violence to achieve goals (Meloy, 2018).

According to theory, terrorist organizations and their members are indoctrinated into ideological systems that dehumanize their enemies. He points out that when we endow others with common human qualities, we enable empathic connections with them, or by categorizing them as people with no common human traits, terrorists are able to distance themselves from the normal empathetic urge to harm those individuals. deny or suppress their own personal moral sanctions for inflicting harm on any human being. Finally, terrorists often minimize or ignore the harmful effects their actions can have on their targets.

Social learning theory states that people become aggressive by observing how others act aggressively to achieve specific goals or are rewarded as a direct result of violent behavior. Terrorism is an advanced study, specialized in the field of terrorism and counterterrorism (Sieg, 2021). According to Kuwali (2020), from this perspective, terrorism collides with scholars arguing that comprehensive social processes, arising from the accumulation of social power, can be understood using SLT. This theory has been selected for this study because it helps in understanding the personality of individuals who are determined to carryout terrorism activities in the society, and security agencies trying to prevent such attacks will have a greater potential of identifying and dealing with the psychosis that accompanies these aggressors.

### **2.13.2 Soft Power Model**

The soft approach seeks to devalue terrorist ideologies through anti-ideological discourse against extremist ideologies that foster political violence (Botha, 2014). The United Nations (2019) believes extremist groups and leaders take a gentle approach to debunking the ideologies of terrorist hatred and violence. In addition, soft power includes diplomacy, persuasion, use of capacity development and the expectation of power and influence in cheap, politically, and socially justified ways.

In the Kenyan context, it can be assumed that military force can suppress extremism, but ideology cannot be eliminated. A multi-pronged approach, including soft power mechanisms, is required to win over and win the hearts and minds of segments of society typically recruited, supported, and funded by extremist and radical groups (UN, 2019). The soft power approaches towards terrorist organizations have received scant attention; there



has been modest scholarly inquiry into a soft power approach to counterterrorism. Yet the power of security forces, countering violent extremism in Kenya through Soft power lies in the ability to attract and persuade vulnerable and exposed individuals.

In addition, thirdly, this section argues that applying deterrence and examining countering violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya's security forces, found it that the hazards associated with deterrence theory and practice, are growing too fast, too soon. As deterrence expands into new and uncharted territory, its meaning has been purposefully and profoundly broadened the scale of security services in VERLT. Therefore, how VELT is conceptualized and fought by security forces is also highly relevant from a societal perspective, as it impacts the daily lives of thousands of people across globally, nationally, regionally, and locally.

Many governments have used military forces to combat terrorism, and this is considered very useful although it might not be the only option available, especially among democratic states. In fact, it was until recently when most countries used their armed forces to combat terrorist forces, but few have been aware of the various situations in which armed forces may or may not be needed. It is further argued that in some instances the use of military forces only radicalizes more potential enemies than pacifies them, but deterrence has also to be there, and the military probe strongly making terrorist to tactically withdraw whenever they feel weakened or overpowered during the fight.

The recent rise in global terrorism is alarming, but it also reaffirms the failure of our full-strength military approach to counter this phenomenon. Analyze soft power as a counter-terrorism tool with a cooperative role. The case of Boko Haram, an Islamic extremist group operating in northern Nigeria, is analyzed. This group is getting more and more attention. The group becomes bolder and more violent. Boko Haram is unlikely to be completely defeated militarily. "Soft power" plays a key role in the ability to attract moderates and reject extremist new recruits. Islamic education is considered a key tool in this soft power counterterrorism strategy. Islamic education refers to the totality of a person's education within the content and context of Islam. Effective counter-terrorism focuses on both eliminating the causes of terrorism and preventing it. Counter-terrorism also ensures that safeguards are taken against potential attacks and preparations are made to deal with their consequences. A key determinant of counter-terrorism strategy is the governmental structure within a nation. Kruger and Crenshaw argue that democracies are more likely targets for terrorists than dictatorships.

Democracies also find greater obstacles in responding to terrorist activity due to the open nature of democratic societies, combined with scrutiny by human rights groups and the media. Kenya, a fairly good democracy compared to Ethiopia, a dictatorship, has had to contend with human rights groups that oppose its anti-terrorism laws. Soft power is seen as "a nation's ability to evoke the attraction, admiration, and aspirations of other nations (from foreign policy and political values to cultural exports) without coercion." Rather than relying on their ability to coerce, soft-powered nations use the inherent attractiveness of that power to advance their foreign policy goals.

### **2.13.3 Securitization theory**

This theory was developed by Ole Wæver in 1995 and it argues that political issues identified as extreme can be urgently dealt especially if they are labelled as dangerous and alarming by authorities or securitizing actors including politicians, police, intelligence, and customs officials (Bertrand, 2018). What is central to this theory is the decision maker's rhetoric structure especially when trying to frame an issue and trying to convince audiences to look beyond politics. For example, following attacks in major town sin Kenya, Al shabaab became a high priority issue on security agenda mainly after the military invasion of Somalia. The terrorist organization has presented as a threat to the security of the sovereignty of Kenya.

The primary argument in the theory is that security is a "non-verbal" speech act, and just saying "security" makes a difference. "If you call something a security problem, it becomes a problem" (Wæver 2004). By determining that the existence of a particular reference object is at risk, the securitization actor asserts the right to take extraordinary measures to ensure the continued existence of the reference object. Problems are moved from the realm of ordinary politics to the realm of emergency politics, where they can be dealt with quickly without the usual (democratic) or political rules. It is important to note that the securitizing actors objectively analyze security threats and attempt to resolve them through various missions.

According to the Copenhagen school, security is a speech act about how a particular problem (military movement, migration, environmental degradation) can be socially treated as a threat, rather than whether the threat is real or not. Can be regarded as it was

constructed. The concept of speech act has a long tradition in philosophy and describes the idea that something is done by saying something. In the same way that naming a ship is a speech act that makes a difference, speaking of "safety" is seen as an act that can pose a threat to any kind of issue (military, political, economic, and environmental). Can do. But not everyone can mention that Ole Wæver and those who believe in Copenhagen think security is securitization.

It is evident in most countries that terrorist attacks have seen framing based on 'us' and 'them' and what is more interesting is that they have implicated the 'others' approach in the discussion. For example, when British military acted in Syria in December 2015, David Cameron, Prime Minister argued that "we face a fundamental threat to our security" from terrorist group, Islamic State who have attacked 'us' because of who we are and what we do. Similarly, in France, November 2015 Paris terrorist attack, President Francois Hollande noted that "France is at war against jihadist who attacks France because France is a country of liberty". In Kenya following April 2015 terrorist attacks on Garissa University, President Uhuru Kenyatta argues that "they were not expressing a legitimate political aspiration and were not killing in response to oppression". He further noted that Kenyans must ask where the religious leaders are and also the parents of young being radicalized. This theory explains how security actors ensure their audience understand security strategies to successfully implement extra-ordinary measures, counter-terrorism strategies.

Owing to increased terrorism activities, most African countries have concentrated or committed resources to actively confront threats posed by the terror group in the region. A

dynamic counter-terrorism strategy is thus crucial (Brydem, Matt & Bahra, 2019). For instance, through initiatives of counter-terrorism in Africa, the combined joint taskforce and the National Counter Terrorism Center illustrates efforts by Government of Kenya to sustain its fight against terrorism from international, regional, and locally. However, setbacks still exist in as far as organization and effective implementation of counterterrorism is concerned.

Unlike counterterrorism, which takes a repressive approach to addressing the criminal space, P/CVERLT is non-coercive in nature and focuses on preventing and counteracting radicalization processes that can lead to terrorism. P/CVERLT's efforts are pre-criminal and therefore do not involve prosecution, arrest, or other repressive measures. Therefore, the purpose of P/CVERLT is to target people already in the realm of crime, i.e., H. communities deemed susceptible to violent extremism, rather than planning or carrying out terrorist activities increase the resilience of the population and assist individuals willing to reintegrate into their communities away from violent extremism. According to Bertrand (2018), countering violent extremism conducive is crucial to effectively fighting terrorism in East Africa. The Kenya Defense Forces launched operation 'LINDA NCHI' on 14th October 2011.


Soft power programs in the fields of violent extremism and countering violent extremism are dominated by discourse frameworks emanating from Western, especially American epistemology and culture, transforming these disciplines through alternative cultures. and there is an urgent need to enrich the theoretical perspective. This includes deepening our understanding of violent extremism from non-Western cultural perspectives, but also using different languages, religions, and languages to inform culturally sensitive approaches and

practices in African contexts. This includes producing research on cultural, psychological, historical, political, and social contexts.

In Kenya the community has voiced concern that possible restrictions on the conduct or communication of research could be counterproductive for improving national security. For example, the County Government of Lamu continues to struggle with an upsurge of terrorism activities, (Botha, 2014). This leads to the scholarly quest to know whether counterterrorism strategies put in place are effective or not and, to know what extent, that technology is doing right to counter terrorism through the Kenya Defence Forces in Somalia. In the Kenyan context as the immediate fear and loathing of terrorism becomes blunted for the great majority of the community, engineers will have a role in providing wise counsel to the community on how to live with terrorism and the terrorist threat. The United Nations, found that in both the Kenya Defence Forces, have been dealing with terrorism and counterterrorism issues, and the current actions of Al-Shabaab have left thousands of people maimed, dead and displaced.

## 2.14 Conceptual Framework

This study set out to examine the effectiveness of anti- terrorism strategies adopted to counter terrorism in Kenya.



**Figure 2.1 Conceptual framework**

Source: (Researcher, 2023)

The expected cause (counterterrorism strategies, institutional framework, challenges, and opportunities) are the independent variables (predictor) while the expected effect (counterterrorism strategies) is the dependent variable. In other words, counterterrorism depends institutional framework including procedures, regulation, or strategies. Causal relationships often involve several independent variables that affect the dependent variable. To visualize the expected cause-and-effect relationship, the study will use the basic design components of boxes and arrows. Each variable appears in a box. To indicate a causal relationship, each arrow should start from the independent variable (the cause) and point to the dependent variable.

It is worth acknowledging that several variables interact in this study to produce some observed effects. For example, the independent variable can be altered to measure the changes in the dependent variable when intentionally choosing to change the forms of terrorism, consequences of terrorism, or the strategy adopted by the government, it is possible to increase or decrease the threat to national security in Kenya.

The defense against terrorism requires both local and international responses, in full respect for human rights and the principle of the rule of law. At the local level, this requires that challenges such as funding requirements, knowledge gaps and legal regimes are addressed. The state, local and international actors seek to identify those responsible, establish accountability, and prosecute them in accordance with fundamental human rights, due process, and the principles of justice to enhance cohesion, terror awareness and social capital.



Terrorist strategic levelheadedness may be witnessed in the successful completion of terrorist actions. The events of success comprise terrorist tactics, terrorist fatalities and victims, terrorist attack power, terrorist groups and terrorist phases of learning. There is widespread agreement to support the effectiveness of counter-terrorism responses (both passive and active). However, there are signs that functional answers may generate retaliatory violence. Prior research about the effectiveness of counter-terrorism is very scanty owing to the lack of reliable empirical data. Moreover, research on terrorism in the East Africa region can provide an important insight but the conclusion that has been reached is the studies are more speculative.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents the research methodology adopted by the study. This includes information on the study area, research design, and target population. The chapter also discusses the sampling technique and procedures used to select the respondents, as well as the instruments for data collection and methods of data analysis.

#### **3.2 Geographical description of Study Area**

The study was conducted in Lamu West sub-county, one of the two sub counties in Lamu County. It is located Northern Coastal in Kenya. Lamu county borders Kilifi County in Northeastern, Garissa County to the North, and Northeastern part of Somalia. The subcounty has eight divisions namely Mkomani, Shela, Amu, Hindi, Hongwe, Mkunumbi, Bahari and Witu. The main economic activities in the study area include livestock production, crop farming, tourism, and mining (mainly quarrying).

The subcounty has been selected because of its unique topography which favors insurgency and terrorism as it borders Somalia, a region regarded as home to terrorist group, Al shabaab (Arslan, Mohamed, & Cetinkaya, 2023). The study area has also been selected because of Western tourists who had bene targeted by the terrorist group and continue to face similar challenges. The Manda Bay military facility is used by the US military in its operation within the region hence, it was considered viable location where the researcher can get important information to compile the study.

### **3.3 Research Design**

A descriptive research design was used in this study. The choice of research design has always been used when researchers attempt to answer such questions, ‘what is’ or ‘what are’ (Ravndal, 2018). Therefore, the research sought to answer the main question, ‘what are’ – what antiterrorism strategies are adopted and how effective are they in countering terrorism. According to Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2009), descriptive research design seeks to provide accurate profile of a person, events and/or situations. As such the design allows the researcher to undertake profile of described important aspects of the phenomena of interest from organizational, individual, or industry-oriented context. These include stakeholder-partnership engagement, institutional framework, public response and security agencies response.

### **3.4 Population of the study**

Target population is the entire set of study units in which the research data can be used to make inference and define the units that study findings seek to make generalization. In this study, the target population were experts in the field of terrorism and security matters (multiagency and multi-stakeholders). Moreover, it includes employees in various employment cadre in security agencies in Kenya (KDF, Kenya Police, terrorism, and immigration among others (see Table 3.1)

**Table 3.1 Target Population**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Population frequency</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Social Advocacy Groups (Human Rights)	3	7
Ministry of Interior	3	7
Kenya Defence Forces	7	16
Kenya Police Services	7	16
Kenya Prison Service	3	7
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	3	7
National Intelligence Services	2	5
State Law Office	2	5
Women Representative	2	5
Youth Representative	5	12
Private Security	6	14
Total	43	100

Source: Lamu West Sub County Security Committee (2023)

### **3.5 Sampling technique**

The study did not select a smaller portion of the population since it was fit to be used in the study. Therefore, the study adopted a census method where all members of a population are analyzed and for this study all the 43 study participants were considered for the study.

**Table 3.2 Study population adopted through census**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Population frequency</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Kenya Defence Forces	3	7
Kenya Police Service	7	16
Members of Parliament	3	7
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	5	11
Ministry of Interior	3	7
National Intelligence Services	2	5
Private Security	6	14
Social Advocacy Groups (Human Rights)	2	5
State Law Office	6	14
Women Representative	2	5
Youth Representative	5	12
<b>Total</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Author, (2023)

### **3.6 Data collection instruments**

The data used in this study include both primary and secondary where primary data sources were obtained from responses generated during data collection while secondary data sources were collected from published materials as consulted by the study. The primary data is considered more reliable and offers a higher confidence level with trusted analysis and can have direct occurrence of events. Questionnaire and interview schedule are the main data collection used.

### **3.6.1 Questionnaire**

This was the main data collection instrument used and consisted of structured close-ended questions. The questionnaire was divided into two parts: Part one contained general questions on the characteristics of the respondents while part two contained questions on the research objectives. Questionnaire were administered on the members of the public who are part of the peace committee (these were sought from the various local chief's office in the sub county), business community and NGOs operating in the area (Haki Africa); this questionnaire will cover the study's objective in detail. The study used follow up with interview on each key stakeholder upon filling the questionnaire. The researcher selected the questionnaire because it saves time, is less costly and offers anonymity allowing respondents to confidently fill the questionnaire without fear.

The study adopted the Likert scale with each question containing a 5 response option for the study participants to indicate the degree of agreement or disagreement offered in a multiple based format (Kombo & Tromp, 2006). The Likert scale has been used because it is universally used in most surveys and hence quickly understood by respondents. It is thought that the Likert scale can easily be quantifiable, and its findings can easily be computed for statistical analysis.

### **3.6.2 Interviews**

The interview schedule is a data collection tool used to collect data for open ended questions (qualitative data). In the study, an interview was used to collect data from security experts and university scholars and allows the researcher to interact with study participants. During

this process, the researcher can observe non-verbal cues. As such, the study used an unstructured interview approach allowing for open, in-depth engagement on the research topic. Denzin and Lincoln (2011) observe that unstructured interviews allow the researcher to have an in-depth knowledge on the complexity of the situation without any prior categorization.

In addition, the researcher used an interview to fully understand participant's understanding of effectiveness of institutions and challenges that have affected strategies adopted locally to address terrorism. It also allows the researcher to probe further for deeper understanding. Consequently, analysis and reporting of the findings reflects views of the study participants and the researcher participants by guiding the data collection process.

### **3.7 Data collection procedure**

As part of the procedure to collect data, the researcher submitted a signed research proposal to the University for consideration and approval. Upon receiving a letter of approval, the researcher pre-visited the selected pilot (Wajir County) area to familiarize himself and sought permission to conduct research within the premise. During data collection, the researcher administered questionnaire and those who were absent, the questionnaires were dropped for them to fill, and researcher picked at a later data. The researcher continued to monitor the questionnaires that were dropped to increase responsiveness.

Moreover, three research assistants were employed to help in the administration of the questionnaire. The main idea is for the researcher to complete the data collection process within the timeline. Further, the training ensured researcher assistants understood ethical

principles that guide the research process, and this training took five days. Upon completion of the training, they were given a number of questionnaires and allocated certain locations within the study area.

### **3.8 Pilot study**

According to Hassan, Schettner and Mazza (2006) pilot study is a small/mini study required to test research protocols and can help in planning and where possible modify the main study. Browne (1995) recommended researchers can select a sample of over 30 per group while Julious (2005) suggested that 12 per group is adequate. Moreover, an appropriate sample size should be determined in order to understand the feasibility of the recruitment of respondents. Therefore, a pilot study was conducted among 12 respondents in Mombasa County, owing to the fact that it has suffered an upsurge of terror attacks, in addition to challenges, and opportunities in in Mombasa County. The pilot incorporated insights and perspectives of practitioners and researchers in Mombasa County. The pilot study is always conducted to ensure the questionnaire addresses the study questions and is used to test if the questionnaire is appropriate and well designed, whether respondents can understand and presented in a consistent manner.

### **3.9 Methods of data collection**

The data obtained from the questionnaire were analyzed to establish the relationship between objectives of the study. The descriptive statistics are central tendencies, standard deviation, and frequency tables. A statistical package for social science (SPSS) version 23.0 was used to run the data, statistical output. Initially, the data collected were identified,



analyzed, and reported. The qualitative data was analyzed based on emerging themes. Content analysis, a qualitative analytic approach for identifying, analyzing, and reporting some patterns (themes) in the data. A coding system was used to find a quick and easy way to organize the data to be analyzed. Moreover, codes were used to identify particular responses. Once the data had been coded, it was entered into the computer for analysis. The study findings were presented in form of frequency tables, graphs, pie charts and narratives.

### **3.10 Reliability**

As put forward by Fraenkel and Wallen (2003), reliability of the research instruments is the degree which ensures the test is free of errors of measures because the errors can occur. In addition, the reliability of research instrument is the consistency of a research tool required to measure same phenomenon in a given period. It is the extent to which the same individual can score the same results on a measure given. The test is seen as reliable mainly if used by several researchers under a steady condition and still can yield consistent results that are not varying.

The current study used Cronbach's Alpha denoted as  $\alpha$  to measure reliability. The Cronbach alpha, which was developed by Lee Cronbach in 1951 measures internal consistency – how closely linked sets of items of a group. The Cronbach's Alpha is expressed as a number between 0 and 1. The resulting  $\alpha$  coefficient of reliability ranges from 0 to 1 in providing this overall assessment of a measure's reliability. As such, if all of the scale items are wholly independent from one another, most certainly  $\alpha = 0$ ; and if all the items have high covariances, then  $\alpha$  can be close to 1.

### **3.11 Validity**

Validity is described as how well research results among respondents represents a true picture of findings among same individuals outside the study. In addition, validity measures the accuracy of an instrument. In other words, the extent to which data collection instrument consistently has the same results if it is used in the same situation on repeated occasions. Validity can be measured by theoretical and empirical evidence where theoretical is the idea of operational measures while the empirical describes a situation in which validity is based on quantitative analysis involving statistical technique.

### **3.12 Data Analysis**

The data obtained from the questionnaire were analyzed to establish the relationship between objectives of the study. A Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) version 23.0 was used to analyze the data. The descriptive statistics generated were central tendencies, standard deviation, and frequency tables. The qualitative data was analyzed based on emerging themes. Content analysis, a qualitative analytic approach for identifying, analyzing, and reporting some patterns (themes) in the data. A coding system was used to find a quick and easy way to organize the data to be analyzed. Moreover, codes were used to identify particular responses. Once the data had been coded, it was entered into the computer for analysis. The study findings were presented inform of frequency tables, graphs, pie charts and narratives.

### **3.13 Ethical consideration**

According to Bryman and Bell (2007) research participants should not be subjected to harm in any ways whatsoever. As part of the research process, the researcher obtained introduction letter from Kisii University immediately research proposal was approved. The researcher also applied for a research permit from the National Commission of Science, Technology, and Innovation (NACOSTI). In order to ensure the research, adhere to procedures, all the sources used by the study were acknowledged. The researcher pre-visited the study area to familiarize himself with the area and also understand the environment and interact with the target audience who had been informed of their right to participate in the study.

Since the study dealt with human participants, they were assured of full confidentiality, and this motivated them to actively participate in providing the required information to complete the research project. The personal information was only used for the purpose of the study and the respondents will not be revealed to any other source.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

The chapter presents findings guided by the objectives of the study. First, the chapter presents the response rate and then demographic characteristic of the respondents. The chapter also presents findings of the key objectives and concludes with a summary of the chapter. The findings are presented logically as per specific objectives in the study.

#### **4.2 Response Rate**

A total of 43 questionnaires were administered to the respondents. According to Fincham (2008) a response rate of approximately 60 percent for most research should be the goal for researchers. In order to achieve higher response rate, the researcher employed research assistants who were familiar with the area, pre-visited the study area to understand the working schedule of the target respondents and administered the questionnaires rather than leaving them for self-administration. All the 43 questionnaires were filled in properly and returned giving a response rate of 100%.

#### **4.3 Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents**

The study in Table 4.1 presents the findings of distribution of respondents based on their demographic characteristics. It shows how the researcher targeted diverse individuals to get information on counter-terrorism and effective strategies that can help confronting it.

**Table 4.1 Demographic Characteristics of the sample (n=43)**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Category</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Gender	Male	25	58.1
	Female	18	41.9
	Total	43	100
Age bracket	Below 30 years	9	20.9
	30-39 years	13	30.2
	40-49 years	8	18.6
	50-59 years	6	14
	60-69 years	4	9.3
	Above 70 years	3	7
	Total	43	100
	Marital status	Married	19
Widowed		7	16.3
Divorced		3	7
Separated		3	7
Single		11	25.6
Total		43	100
Highest level of education	Primary school	3	7
	High school	5	11.6
	Tertiary institution	20	46.5
	University	11	25.6
	Other	4	9.3
	Total	43	100

Source: Survey Data (2023)

Analysis in Table 4.1 presents distribution of respondents by their demographic information. Majority 58.1% of the respondents were male compared to 41% female and this demonstrates the level of representation with regard to all gender. In terms of age brackets, most of the respondents were aged within the bracket of 30-39 years old (30.2%) and below 30 years (20.9%) suggesting most of them were below 40 years. Moreover, respondents within the age bracket of 40-49 years accounted for 18.6% while 14% were aged between 50-59 years, 9.3% were aged 60-69 years and those who were 70 years and above accounted for 7% of the total respondents. Considering youth are active targets and active group in society, this means the study benefited a lot from their knowledge about terrorism activities. Most certainly they often interact with terrorism issues through media or read stories about the same and hence they are best placed to provide information on countering terrorism.

Regarding the distribution of respondents by their marital status, the majority 44.2% of them were married followed by single at 25.6%. Furthermore, while 16.3% were widowed, 7% indicated their marital status as divorced and another 7% separated. The study also (in table 4.1) presents distribution of respondents based on their level of education. Most of them had completed tertiary institution (46.5%) and university (25.6%). Some respondents (about 9%) had attended short courses, while others didn't have any form of educational qualification. This means most of the respondents had requisite literacy skills to understand the contents of the questionnaire, hence were able to read and respond to the questions without many difficulties.

#### 4.4 Prevalence of counterterrorism strategies adopted in Lamu West Sub County

The study examined effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies adopted in Lamu West Sub County and a summary of findings have been presented in Table 4.2 below:

**Table 4.2 Prevalence of counterterrorism strategies adopted in Lamu West Sub County**

Variable	Category	Frequency	Percentage
Do you agree with the strategies adopted in this region to counterterrorism cases?	Yes	32	74.4
	No	11	25.6
	Total	43	100
Has there been any an attack or attempts to attack by terrorist groups in this region?	Always	4	9.3
	Often	14	32.6
	Sometimes	13	30.2
	Rarely	11	25.6
	Never	1	2.3
Total	43	100	
The terrorist attacks involved one or fewer number of people or were executed by a larger terrorism group?	Yes	40	93
	No	3	7
	Total	43	100
What is the level of trust that you have in the counter terrorism measures taken to address terrorism cases in this region?	No trust	9	20.9
	Some trust	21	48.8
	Complete trust	13	30.2
	Total	43	100

**Source:** Author, (2023)

As shown in Table 4.2 the study tested the overall level of agreement among residents on counterterrorism interventions by the Government of Kenya. Although respondents agree

there had been more attacks, the findings reveal the existence of government's effort in combating terrorism in the region. This agrees with Securitization theory which argues that to government's nation branding approach influences behavior changes through agenda setting of other nations and people. For example, a significant (74.4%) of the respondents believe that the strategies that had been used in Lamu West Sub County to counter terrorism were very effective except for about a quarter (24.6%) who hold a contrary view. This is in total agreement with the previous studies which found out that civilians' participation in counter terrorism activities especially in terms of the support they offer to security agencies increases intelligence gathering, combat strength and military involvement in countering terrorism (Omenma, & Hendricks, 2018).

Concerning the frequency of attacks, or attempts to attack in the last three years, the findings from this study reveal that only 2% report of no chance that terrorists' attacks could occur. However, the majority believe that attacks occur almost every time or always. The above findings imply that although respondents had faith and strongly believe in the current counter-terrorist strategies in the area, they reported more attacks meaning confronting domestic terrorism at times might become a challenge. However, there is some drop in attacks, and it becomes important to strengthen the available strategies.

Most certainly this rate of attacks could be attributed to what researchers call invasion by 'non-indigenous' into Lamu West Sub County (Small Wars Journal, 2014). Furthermore, respondents pointed out that Lamu was one of the only few counties in Kenya where almost 50% of the population are non-indigenous and as Cannon, and Ruto Pkalya, (2019)



questions why Al shabab has always attacked Kenya suggesting that the terrorist group targets Kenya more than other frontline states because of the opportunity spaces linked to Kenya's international status. The study argues that the large number of non-indigenous living in the region most likely attracts attention of terrorism especially their urge to kidnap international tourists visiting the area.

Further, the majority of the respondents (93%) reported that attacks in the region involved only one or a small number of individuals, and that their execution was linked to a larger terrorist organization. This means terrorists are trained people who understand implication of their activities and they try to minimize impact on their attackers or those who execute their terrorism attacks. Again, by using a small number of attackers, it gives them an opportunity to plan and carry out attacks unnoticed, becoming a challenge for security agencies to intercept or intervene early before actual attacks take place.

It is worth noting that success in countering terrorist attacks depends on security officers' ability to interpersonal trust between themselves and the public. This exactly the case in Lamu West Sub county as demonstrated by the study findings. For example, 20.9% of the respondents had trust while 30.2% of them had complete trust with majority (48.9%) having some trust in the counter terrorism measures used to address terrorism cases in Lamu West Sub County. This level of trust is attributed to the increasing level of partnership between security agencies and members of the public, as well as the recent development in information technologies particularly the Internet where security agencies had invested in and focused more upon signal intelligence. According to Coppock and McGovern, (2020),

mistrust occurs out of concerns existing among law enforcement officers regarding information available in immigration violations retrieved from counter terrorism activities. They also argued that the community lacks trust in law enforcement officers while law enforcement's main concern is the continued criminal activities within the community that have been going unnoticed. In a similar debate, Alam, and Husband (2012) question the ability of a community to handle issues related to terrorism attacks considering their capability.

Civil society organizations always have criticized the government for human right violations. Interestingly, they admittedly acknowledged that the counterterrorism efforts by the government in Lamu county has contributed to the low cases of terrorist attacks. In an interview with representative of human right group in Lamu, the study found that what the government is doing has yielded positive results as terrorist attacks is reducing although we cannot predict how long it will take:

Many arrests done by the police has really reduced cases of terrorist attacks in this area. I believe what is being done by the government is working against terrorist since it helps identify suspects or people who behave in a manner that can suggest they are likely to cause or lead to terrorist attacks. (Male Participant, 56 years).

Again, there were some youth representatives with divergent views on the effectiveness of some measures undertaken by the government on prevent further terrorist attacks. For example, "since we experienced many terrorist attacks in this area, the government has been telling us how they have managed to control yet we always see people being killed by terrorism. Until when can we stop this? (Male Participant, 31 years).

Experts strongly believe that that increasing information through sensitization on terrorism attacks helps the residents engage in preventive measures so that no more terrorist attacks occur, “sensitizing residents about importance of actively understanding how terrorism can destroy the entire community and why it is good to stop them before it occurs. When people get to know how they can stop any attacks, they own it and feel recognized whenever there is any mention of them”. An interview with security expert working in the private security sector added,

Recently we were able to raise alarm because we had been trained in early warning strategies where we can identify unique behaviors among ourselves or anyone who is likely to behave in a manner that can compromise our security in the area. This has proved effective since several cases had been identified and reported (Female Participant, 45 years)

The concrete use of technology in countering terrorism is one of the strategies employed in the region. It was adopted mainly at border points and effectively worked in identifying illegal entry or supplies that can aid terrorism activities. Prevent-related engagements are delivered in conjunction with raising awareness about other risks such as anti-social behaviour, speeding, littering, and so on. Engagement at this level is centred on inclusivity, cohesion, and integration. Additionally, a different important insider hinted at the idea that cutting-edge technical controls for screening and biometric purposes have other capabilities for not just prescreening troublesome travelers. He noted that:

“Although we used to rely more on manpower for our work, we now also use technology. At some border crossings, we utilize software to screen individuals and cargo coming into and leaving the country. We can now catch suspects and find hidden and illegal commodities in tracks that were previously impossible to find. When this technology equipment discovered certain firearms, we saw security personnel in Lamu West Sub County detain some people” (Male Participant, 39 years).

#### 4.5 Stakeholder - Partnership Engagement in Counter Terrorism Strategies

The first objective was to examine stakeholder-partnership engagement counter terrorism strategies in Lamu West Sub-County, Kenya. The findings have been presented in Table 4.3 and as shown, SD is strongly disagree, D=Disagree, N=neutral, A=Agree and lastly SA is strongly agree.

**Table 4.3 Stakeholder - Partnership Engagement in Counter Terrorism Strategies**

Statement	SD	D	N	A	SA	Total
There are several awareness/education forums organized by stakeholders to address terrorism in this region	2%	12%	7%	44%	35%	100%
A shared intelligence-led antiterrorism approach has become effective in addressing cases of terrorism	9%	12%	12%	37%	30%	100%
Multi-security operations have always been initiated and has led to reduction of terror attacks in Lamu	0%	5%	2%	40%	54%	100%
Government has developed several legislations	12%	12%	23%	30%	23%	100%

**Source:** Author, (2023)

This study also assessed the contribution of stakeholder partnership led strategies as a counterterrorism strategy and how it affects national security in Kenya. Table 4.3 provides a summary of the results of the descriptive statistics for the usage variable. Central to the stakeholder partnership approach is the collaboration between the security agencies, community, civil society, and other entities. The findings are in tandem with Soft Power

Model which argues that stakeholders take a gentle approach to debunking the ideologies of terrorist hatred and violence (UN, 2019). The findings indicate a strong agreement among respondents to the ideas that stakeholders in Lamu West sub-County had organized several awareness forums/education programs to address terrorism cases. In an interview, respondents pointed to about six awareness sessions conducted within the region led by civil society such as Haki Africa together with government agencies,

“I attended three such forums and it targeted mainly youth who are seen as the mainly target of Al shabaab terror group. It was informative because I remember how they demonstrated to us how youth were being recruited and how we can help in identifying those people are likely to cheat our youth into joining terror group” (Male Participant, 51 years)

Similarly, there were peace caravans throughout most parts of the county, and this aimed at enlightening the public against terrorist activities, “for 2 days, a convoy of vehicles with anti-terrorism messages traversed here while playing peace songs. There were people with microphones who explained to the people damages that terror groups could do to the people and people seemed to appreciate what was being done then”. It is thought that whether lack of knowledge is a driver in itself on terrorism attacks, there is general agreement among scholars and practitioners that education is very important tools to get to youth and hence it can be used to resolve push and pull factors which may influence young people to join violent extremism.

According to Paraskevas and Arendell (2007), the communicate element of the plan should involve specialized notice and awareness procedures both internally (among the organization's stakeholders) and externally, and not just marketing and recovery initiatives

(media and various target markets). The security role is focused on the quick restart of these procedures and the protection of both employees and clients.

As shown in Table 4.3 intelligence led approach was mainly favored by most respondents as an effective measure to counter terrorist attacks in the region. For example, while the majority (67.4%) were in favor, 20.9% could not agree on the effectiveness of the approach arguing that the very nature of intelligence gathering raises many issues associated with adherence to the rule of law which might hinder its effectiveness. An interview with security officer confirmed this stating gathering of information by police helped in preventing many attacks in the region as some suspected Al shabaab groups were arrested:

“I appreciate the role of intelligence we adopted as we were able to arrest individuals who we later learned they were planning some attacks in the villages” Another security officer adds, I agree our intelligence work well for us but cooperation between the security agencies and the public needs to be strengthened because at times, the public might withhold crucial information for fear of being victimized” (Female Participant, 33 years).

This implies that stopping terrorist attacks depends on reliable intelligence, and that gathering intelligence necessitates some degree of concealment by its very nature. In some instances, disclosing clandestine intelligence-gathering techniques or the amount of what is already known or unknown compromises the operation's effectiveness and endangers lives (Lewandowski, Carter, & Campbell, 2018). The findings also show that 11% of the respondents could neither agree nor disagree with the statement about effectiveness of intelligence-led-approach as a counterterrorism strategy. Understanding intelligence's potential as well as its limitations appears to be a path away from wild conjectures and towards responsible data collecting and analysis. Reliable and timely intelligence is crucial

in the fight against terrorism. The true meaning of tactical and strategic prevention is made feasible by it.

The findings in Table 4.3 above show that overwhelming the majority (93%) of the respondents strongly argued that there has been reduced terrorist attacks since the government initiated multi-security operation in the region under investigation. This was supported by response from an interview two study participants,

“I can say that the teamwork witnessed between government, public and other organizations helped in reducing terrorist attacks which had been happening like weekly. I have personally slept in my house the last one week without wondering what will happen to me next night”. Another respondent adds, “let me tell you, the last three weeks have been hell to us here because we could not sleep because of fear of being attacked at night. Everyone has been terrified by the acts of terrorists who visit your home at night and slaughter you, but I don’t know for how long we will enjoy this kind of stability. Maybe when the government stops what they are doing now, they can come back again. I don’t know” (Female Participant, 29 years).

This suggests that counterterrorism ought to be carried out through inter-agency co-operation and co-ordination, which involves traditional actors ranging from security officers to criminal-justice sectors. These findings further show that fewer number of the respondents doesn’t believe that terrorist attacks had reduced with 2.3% who could neither agree nor disagree about the position that there was reduced terrorist attacks since the government initiated multi-security operation in Lamu West Subcounty. Most certainly this can be attributed to the sustained efforts by the government in collaboration with other groups who actively participated in peace forums and also building linkages amongst themselves to strengthen cooperations in the order to realize the effectiveness of countering terrorism in the region. It is important to recognize that when collaborative approach

witnessed in Lamu County as part of the counterterrorism strategy helped build trust and goodwill amongst themselves.

#### 4.6 Descriptive statistics for stakeholder partnership

The study presents findings of descriptive statistics for stakeholder partnership. These has been shown in Table 4.4 below:

**Table 4.4 Descriptive statistics for stakeholder partnership**

Statement	MW	SD
There are several awareness/education forums organized by stakeholders to address terrorism in this region	3.98	1.94
A shared intelligence-led antiterrorism approach has become effective in addressing cases of terrorism	2.86	2.29
Multi-security operations have always been conducted and has led to reduction of terror attacks	3.30	3.18
The Kenyan Government has developed several legislations concerning strategies used to counter terrorist attacks	3.05	2.60
Mean of weighted means	3.30	2.50

**Source:** Author, (2023)

The results show that there was a high level of disagreements on whether there were numerous awareness/education forums that had been organized by stakeholders to address cases of terrorism in Lamu West Sub County. This was shown by a mean of 3.98 and standard deviation of 1.94 (see table 4.4). The results also show that shared intelligence-led anti-terrorism approach is effective with a mean score of 2.86 and standard deviation of 2.29. On whether multi-security operations had often been conducted and reduced terrorism



cases, it is shown by a mean score of 3.30 and standard deviation of 3.18. Lastly, the proposition that the government had developed several legislations concerning strategies used to counter terrorist attacks had mean of 2.05 and a standard deviation of 1.98. For examples, as an officer at Kenya Police Service puts it, “the government has been using the prevention of terrorism act which was amended 2014 to investigate and also prosecute those suspected to have carried out terrorist attacks but to me, these trials have always proceeded very slow and I think it is even efficient” (Female Participant, 36 years).

It is worth mention that the government has continued to explore on how to effectively respond to some delays in prosecuting terrorist suspects and February 2019, the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP) published national plea-bargaining rules, incorporating them into the Criminal Procedure Code. Consequently, “The effective use of plea agreements could provide a mechanism for lower-level accomplices to cooperate against higher-level terrorism suspects”. According to the findings, one of the contentious which they believed it deterred terrorist group is the Security Laws Amendment Act, 2014, widely believed it strengthened Kenya’s counter-terrorism efforts, and includes provisions on radicalization and publishing offensive material, “I heard in the TV stations about security act which to me it scared people because it would be used to arrest anyone who behaved like terrorist. I might not have read much of the policy issue in that document but that I know it was reported by almost every media and also people used to discuss locally here” (Male Participant, 61 years).

It is evident from the findings that respondents seem to have closely followed responses by the government during the rising terrorist attacks in the region. Some study participants acknowledged to have participated in forums which sought the views of the residents in countering terrorists. For example, an official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out that although she forgot exact legislation, she participated during a townhall meeting, “I once participated in a forum which was aimed at providing views on how to effectively end terrorism and the government wanted our views. It was led by the Ministry of Interior and was presented with many other people from local communities. We gave our views, and we think it helped the government develop measures to protect the public from more attacks from terrorists” (Female Participant, 36 years).

#### **4.7 Institutional framework on counter terrorism strategies**

The study assessed the effectiveness of institutional framework as a counter terrorism strategy. The summary of findings has been provided in Table 4.5 below:

**Table 4.5 Institutional framework on counter terrorism**

<b>Statement</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>D</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>SA</b>	
Security agencies have detected and stopped terrorist attacks early	7%	23%	16%	42%	12%	100%
The security sector has allocated more responsibilities to each security agency thus eliminating ambiguity in security matters	2%	2%	26%	54%	16%	100%
A screening quickly detects and retrieves suspected items hence prevent terrorist attacks	0%	14%	2%	44%	40%	100%
Conducting emergency drills prepares response procedures to mitigate situations after an attack had been effective	2%	16%	12%	54%	16%	100%
The adoption of technology to enhance security in Lamu West Sub County is an effective counter terrorism strategy	2%	14%	12%	30%	42%	100%

**Source:** Author, (2023)

Although the majority of the respondents agree that security agencies had played an important role in countering terrorism by detecting and ultimately stopping more attacks in the region, 30% of the respondents hold a contrary view. According to them (respondents who could not agree), there were some cases of terrorist activities reported to the police, but it took them long to respond and they strongly believed that the attacks in the region had occurred because the police had delayed in responding promptly thereby leading to the loss

of lives and property through terrorist attacks. Most certainly as Glomseth, and Gottschalk, (2009) reports that delay can be attributed to time taken to respond especially police in the counter terrorist police who find it more important to follow regulations and instructions than criminal investigators.

Table 4.5 above indicates that about a quarter of the respondents hold neither positive nor negative responses on whether the security sector in Kenya allocates responsibilities to each other in order to address issues of terrorism effectively. However, the majority 80% strongly believe that ambiguities in the security sector have been eliminated thereby making it easier to deal with any terrorist attacks. Moreover, only 4% of the respondents don't think there is any allocation of responsibilities which might hinder effectiveness to address terrorism issues.

As shown in Table 4.5 above one of the effective ways of countering terrorism is the screening of visitors and passengers. A significant of the respondents (72%) observed that emergence of technologies has given security agencies an opportunity to detect, and at the same time retrieve prohibited items; hence help to prevent terrorist attacks. This points to the need for the Kenyan government to invest adequately on advanced technologies as findings from this study and previous scholars confirm their effectiveness (Ogunlana, 2019). However, 14% of the respondents argued that there is lack of screening in major areas within the sub county thus allowing terrorist to carry its activities unnoticed.

The findings further show that the majority (80%) of the respondents were in agreement that effective measures that have been undertaken to counter terrorism attacks are emergency drills. Accordingly, this has prepared and fine-tuned response procedures among security officers that could mitigate attacks from terrorist. However, 28.6% of the respondents had a contrary view arguing that such drills do not offer positive response. It is also evident from the findings that 11.6% of the respondents had neither positive nor negative response to effectiveness of emergency drills as a counter terrorism strategy. With regard to new technology, the study finds that adopting new technology was effective approach in reducing the hazard of a terrorist attacks. Moreover, fewer than 18% of the respondents did not acknowledge the effectiveness of such measures, especially among the local residents. The findings support and was in total agreement with previous studies which found that the use of advanced technology helps enhance effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures including improved surveillance, threat detection and intelligence gathering, and this strengthens existing systems used by the government (Hunt, Agarwal, & Zhuang, 2023). However, other scholars such as Abrahms, (2008) holds different view arguing that technology has aided ho terrorist undertake their activities especially availability of media as a propaganda tool, communication, and overall terrorist operation He postulates that Kenya's strategic advancement in technology makes it highly prone to terrorist attacks.

Although they strongly believe institutional based strategies are effective, they argued that government agencies need to assure residents on who is targeted in the war on terrorism in the area to ensure residents collaboration. Otherwise, this might create fear among the local

residents who might complicate the war of terrorism by the government and other stakeholders. The informant noted that:

“The government requires a mechanism to effectively inform the public of its decision-making process, particularly when those being targeted are citizens of Lamu West Sub County. First, the government may and ought to provide us with greater information regarding the method through which it makes decisions concerning high-value targets. The government's claims regarding the accuracy of its factual conclusions and the validity of its legal conclusions will be more trustworthy the more it provides information about the number of people paying attention to the issue and the process's rigor” (Male Participant, 51 years).

One of the key informants believes that strong legal systems have the potentials of reducing further terrorism attacks as there will be systematic way of handling it:

“The laws on terrorism should be straightened in order to have one strong command system by putting sub agencies under one administrative structure. It will be difficult to have the problems that we see today especially the terrorists living within the community and carry their activities” (Female Participant, 38 years).

#### **4.8 Descriptive statistics for institutional framework**

The study presents findings of the descriptive statistics for institutional framework and the summary are shown in Table 4.6

**Table 4.6 Descriptive statistics for institutional framework**

<b>Statement</b>	<b>MW</b>	<b>SD</b>
Security agencies have detected and stopped terrorist attacks before they occur	3.28	2.96
The security sector allocates responsibilities to each security agency thus eliminating ambiguity in security matters	3.81	3.35
Screening of passengers has resulted to detection and retrieval of prohibited items thus preventing terrorist attacks	2.67	1.46
The emergency drills conducted to prepare and fine tune response procedures to mitigate situations after an attack have been effective	3.91	3.67
The adoption of technology to enhance security in Lamu West Sub County has increased effectiveness of counter terrorism strategy	3.95	3.60
Mean of weighted means	3.52	3.01

**Source:** Author, (2023)]

Responses regarding the contribution of institutional framework on counter terrorism with regard to Kenya national security in Lamu West Sub County were provided based on a Likert scale ranging from 1-5, where 1 was Strongly disagree (SD) and 5 was Strongly Agree (SA). Further, the responses were analyzed using Weighted Mean (WM) and Standard Deviation (SD) regarding this variable. The results of responses are presented in table 4.6 above.

The findings show that with a mean score of 3.95 adoption of technology was rated as the most effective tool counter terrorism and emergency drills (had a mean of 3.91) was also

cited another notable approach which can be effective in preparing and fine-tuning response procedures to mitigate situations after an attack has been effective. The allocation of responsibilities within the security sector had a mean of 3.81 (SD=3.35) pointing out that this eliminates ambiguities in security issues. The findings also showed that screening of people travelling through airports and other locations in the country leads early detection and can retrieve illegal or unwanted items thus preventing terrorist attacks had a mean score of 2.67 and standard deviation of 1.46 while the view that security agencies had detected and stopped terrorist attacks before they occurred had a mean of 3.28 and standard deviation of 2.96.

In analyzing factors contributing to the effectiveness of institutional framework in the implementation of counter terrorism strategies in Lamu West Sub County, respondents were given the opportunity to offer their proposals. Accordingly, the findings reveal the importance of local organizations and also county government has contributed immensely to the fight against terrorist attacks which has affected the area:

“I believe that the involvement of community-based organizations (CBOs) in spreading anti-terrorism messages to the Lamu public is very important since they understand the area and needs of the people. In fact, I attended the launch of county integrated plans which was aimed at discussed issues of counter violent extremism and how the local community can help in the early detection of suspicious individuals” (Female Participant, 41 years).

Civil society actors are often better placed, more credible, and more knowledgeable and experienced in working with specific groups to help identify and address the grievances that make individuals more vulnerable to terrorism. The respondents unanimously agreed that the deployment of civil society groups who have been championing youth to engage in



alternative activities is crucial to the realization of peace in the region. According to study participant, the deprivation of local resident's human rights has become a crucial problem in the region, resulting in increased violence and violent extremism across countries.

“For a long time, I believe the government had ignored women and youth organization in the fight against terrorism in Lamu area. Since they understand the people, especially the youth, why don't the government actively allow the CBOs and other organizations to lead” (Male Participant, 51 years).

In addition, other respondents paid close attention to the relationship between the security agencies and the youth which according to them has not yielded positive results. In this regard, they emphasized the need to improve how the youth perceives the police; *“the youth always shy away from the police because they perceive them as threats in their lives. They have always been arrested and that is why I believe ensuring they relate well can help or become a strong counterterrorism strategy”* (Female Participant, 37 years). According to Grosskopf (2006), devaluing a possible target lessens its importance to terrorists. The goal here, therefore, is not to increase security but rather to alter the potential target so that, in the case of an assault, the terrorists would stand to lose less. The findings confirm that Civil society has the capacity and experience in working on programmes that foster peaceful and inclusive societies, and mitigate structural conditions that are conducive to the spread of violent extremism.

From the forgoing discussion, it is evident that confronting terrorism demands adoption of various strategies ranging from early detection, shared responsibilities. However, by embracing youth in the counter-terrorism, stakeholders need to build trust or enhance the existing relationship so that they don't shy away. In addition, the study observes that

working with local communities, citizens and sensitizing them on through emergency drills provides the most effective avenue to strengthen society so as to maximize resistance to violent extremism.

#### 4.9 The Public Response to Counter-terrorism strategies

The third objective was to analyze contribution of public response to counter terrorism capacity with regard to Kenya national security in in Lamu West Sub County, Kenya. The summary of findings has been presented in Table 4.7:

**Table 4.7 Public Response and Counter-terrorism Capacity**

<b>Statement</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>D</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>SA</b>	
Increased level of knowledge among residents of Lamu West Sub enhanced counterterrorism	5%	12%	9%	26%	49%	100%
We have taken initiative to learn about how to counter terrorism	7%	12%	16%	35%	30%	100%
Increased availability of information on raising alert has enhanced counterterrorism in this area	14%	7%	12%	23%	44%	100%
I believed recruitment and training of more police/security leads to increased counterterrorism	5%	7%	5%	30%	54%	100%

**Source:** Author, (2023)

There have been increasing calls to adopt newer counter terrorism measures that would take care of the needs of the local community members. According to social learning theory, understanding the personality of individuals determined to execute terroristic acts against

their own society, security agencies and communities trying to prevent such attacks will have a greater potential of identifying and dealing with the psychosis that accompanies these aggressors. The findings show that a significant 75% of the respondents were in agreement that increasing knowledge of community members living in Lamu West Sub County plays a critical role in preventing cases of terrorist attacks because they act as early warning system for security. However, the effectiveness of this approach was questioned especially after September 11, 2001, attack on twin towers of the World Trade Center in United States (US) where most people viewed the approach as redundant in what appeared to be an international, foreign, and highly terrorist threat that needed big, bold, and intentional response (Briggs, 2010). Most certainly such assertion agrees with the results from this study (16.3%) who don't think this approach of enhancing knowledge of community members would help prevent terrorist attacks.

Terrorists may be given access to specific locations and resources because of the position that a resident or employee holds within an organization. As a result, employees may be able to avoid security checkpoints thanks to particular employee privileges or lax security laws, which attack planners would find helpful.

Additionally, the findings from this study reveals that communities play an important role by working together with police and hence majority observed that in Lamu West Sub County, increasing information to residents has helped in raising alerts leading to enhanced counterterrorism. However, 21% of the respondents hold a contrary view pointing out to adequacy or effectiveness of the information provided to the members of the public. The

central premise of community policing can be described as the level of community participation for enhancing safety and social order as well as for solving issues that affects most communities and hence needs to be increased since the police cannot carry out this task on their own. In order to achieve such partnerships, the police should be more closely integrated into the community and should strengthen their legitimacy through policing by consent and by means of improving their services to the public.

On recruitment and training of police/security agencies, overwhelming majority (83%) of the respondents were in agreement that there was need to continue recruiting and training more security personnel on newer ways to prevent terrorist attacks. According to majority of the respondents, the primary areas of concern have in recent past come up and these includes performing threat assessment, identifying people who may be involved in terrorist activities, and technology and information management. Nonetheless, the resources required in order to respond are rarely assembled or organized in such a way that facilitates meeting training needs. The study findings also revealed that there are some training resources available for the security agencies that have not yet developed in-house materials on the area of prevention of terrorism and the level of preparedness among the security agencies. This is in support of previous studies which showed that establishing membership organizations and training entities can provide the information and training that is so important to countering terrorist attacks (Sumpter, 2017).

#### **4.10 Descriptive statistics for public response**

In this section, the study presents findings of descriptive statistics for public response. A summary of findings has been shown in Table 4.8.

**Table 4.8 Descriptive statistics for public response**

<b>Statement</b>	<b>MW</b>	<b>SD</b>
Increased level of knowledge among residents of Lamu West Sub County enhanced counterterrorism	4.02	3.69
We have taken initiative to learn about how to counter terrorism	3.88	3.13
Increased availability of information on raising alert has enhanced counterterrorism in this area	2.28	2.06
I believed recruitment and training of more police/security leads to increased counterterrorism	4.21	3.84
Mean of weighted means	3.10	3.17

**Source:** Author, (2023)

One of the questions regards the capacity of public response as a counter terrorism strategy with regard to Kenya national security. Community members including teachers, or farmers are not counterterrorism practitioners, although they undoubtedly have a contribution to make. This is in tandem with social learning theory which provides the basis for some prevention of terrorism programs. If the assumption is made that delinquent behavior is transferred through the social learning process, then controlling and altering the process or the environment that allows social learning to occur can reduce terrorism. As shown in Table 4.8, the mean scores and standard deviation were calculated for several variables to test its effectiveness. Respondents reported a mean of 4.02 (SD=3.69) that they believe that increase in the level of knowledge among residents in Lamu West Sub County had played an important role in enhancing counterterrorism. Moreover, respondents reported a mean of

3.88 (SD=3.1.3) that there are several initiatives taken for the residents to learn on how to counter terrorism while some reported a mean of 2.28 (SD=2.06) that increased information provides alerts that has enhanced counterterrorism in the area. Results also show respondents reported in a mean of 4.21 (SD=3.84) that recruiting, and training of more police officers has increased counterterrorism strategy. Based on this view, we might point out that given the task's dynamic, experience-based, and information-intensive character, contingency theory would recommend a flatter, more flexible organization with knowledge sharing as a primary contingency element. The linkages between organizational design and knowledge sharing, however, are poorly understood.

#### **4.11 Security Agencies Response to Counterterrorism Strategies**

The study sought to evaluate the effectiveness of security agencies response on counterterrorism strategies capacity with regard to security in Lamu West Sub County, Kenya. A summary of findings has been presented in Table 4.9:

**Table 4.9 Security Agencies Response and Counter Terrorism Strategies**

Statement	SD	D	N	A	SA	
Permanently assigning security officers to fixed location in the community has effectively helped respond to terrorism cases	24%	14%	9%	35%	18%	100%
Intelligence-led policing can help in identification, prioritizing and more effectively tackle issues of concern to the public in general and specific communities	2%	11%	5%	20%	62%	100%
Police interventions which increased detection at certain points in the area has deterred extremists	0%	2%	9%	42%	47%	100%
Police increase patrols, stop and search	15%	9%	3%	30%	43%	100%
Training and monitoring police officers to go beyond traditional and basic requirement	2%	16%	10%	49%	23%	100%
Evaluate and reward ability to effectively address terrorism emergencies	13%	6%	16%	37%	28%	100%

**Source:** Author, (2023)

The study examined the contribution of security agencies response to counterterrorism strategies capacity in Lamu West sub-County. The findings on the aforesaid presented in Table 4.9 above show that terrorism threats have impacted several sectors and security agencies are required to respond to minimize its impact. In this case, findings show that permanently assigning security officers to a fixed location within the community is

effectively rated as one of the strategies that helps in countering terrorism (see Table 4.9 above). It is suggested that social identity salience and social power may be harnessed to reduce terrorist activity by reducing perceptions of threat from the view of terrorist organizations, by reducing perceived threat of terrorist activity from the view of potential targets, and by addressing distributions of and susceptibility to social power as it relates to acceptability of parochial altruism.

Prior studies have identified salient characteristics of communities that likely increase their attractiveness and vulnerability, thus making them more likely to be attacked over others. In addition, prior research has recognized the importance of local law enforcement in detecting and preventing terrorism. According to securitization theory, it is important to note that the securitizing actors objectively analyze security threats and attempt to resolve them through various missions (Tredaniel, & Lee, 2018). The findings showed that intelligence-led policing as adopted by security agencies is effective in responding to terrorism threats or terrorism attacks. Some other strategies that were rated as effective include detections especially at certain random points in the community leading to deterrence of terrorist groups and individual with intentions to harm the public. Moreover, 63% of the respondents strongly believed that an increase in police patrols supplemented with stop and search helps in identifying perpetrators of terrorism at early stages. A significant number 72% of respondent were of the view that training and monitoring by police officers goes beyond traditional and basic requirement and there is need to evaluate and reward security agencies' ability to effectively address terrorism emergencies.



Statements regarding effectiveness of security agencies response counterterrorism strategies capacity were provided to the respondents through questionnaires. The rating that was provided was on a Likert scale of 1-5 where 1 was Strongly disagree (SD) and 5 was Strongly Agree (SA). The responses were analyzed using Weighted Mean (WM) and Standard Deviation (SD) regarding this variable. The results of responses are presented in table 4.9 above.

#### 4.12 Descriptive Statistics for Security Agencies Response

As shown in Table 4.10 below, the study presents findings of descriptive statistics for effectiveness of security agencies response.

**Table 4.10 Descriptive Statistics for Security Agencies Response**

Statement	MW	SD
Permanently assigning security officers to fixed location in the community has effectively helped respond to terrorism cases	4.35	3.98
Intelligence-led policing can help in identification, prioritizing and more effectively tackle issues of concern to the public in general and specific communities	3.16	2.08
Police interventions which increased detection at certain points in the area has deterred extremists	2.56	1.46
Police increase patrols, stop and search	4.30	3.85
Training and monitoring police officers to go beyond traditional and basic requirement	3.16	2.75
Evaluate and reward ability to effectively address terrorism emergencies	3.63	2.34
Mean of weighted means	3.53	2.74

**Source:** Author, (2023)

The study examined contribution of security agencies response counterterrorism strategies capacity and the overall mean score is 3.53. The findings show that respondents reported in a mean of 4.35 (SD=3.98) that permanently assigning security officers to fixed location in the community has effectively helped respond to terrorism cases. The results also show that respondents reported in a mean of 3.16 (SD=2.08) that Intelligence-led policing can help in identification, prioritizing and more effectively tackle issues of concern to the public in general and specific communities with some respondents (mean score of 2.56 and SD 1.46) strongly stating that police interventions which increased detection at certain points in the area has deterred extremists. Police increase patrols, stop and search had a mean score of 4.30 and standard deviation of 3.85 while training and monitoring police officers to go beyond traditional and basic requirement had mean of 3.16 and standard of 2.75. Evaluate and reward ability to effectively address terrorism emergencies had a mean of 3.63 and standard deviation of 2.34.

The measures aimed at national orientation, winning the confidence of the populace, and social re-engineering including granting concessions to the terrorists could arguably in such situations better contain terrorism than the traditional hard approach. The findings concur with similar studies conducted in Nigeria which found that the country had involved military in the fight against Boko Haram (terrorist group) because they believed the sophistication of the terror group was complex and overwhelmed police. However, the study questions the logic behind separating the police and the military in the fight against terrorist especially allocating those different areas within the community.

The study identifies several areas including cooperation in shared intelligence and police-civilian engagement as effective measures which worked or helped in countering terrorist in the area. Applied to the conduct of operations, it could be said that with intelligence, counter-terrorism operations would not be ad hoc and reactionary but planned, targeted, and preemptive. The adoption of advanced technology for counter terrorists and their sponsors, movements, sources of finance, equipment, and other logistics becomes very important. It is important to note that improving the police station's effectiveness in countering terrorism depends on improving police-community relations at the local level. Therefore, training programs must replace the current authoritarian ethos of policing in Lamu West Sub County with an approach that engages the police and the community in a common effort to control terrorist and criminal violence.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents a summary of the study findings, conclusion, and recommendations. The key findings of the study are presents in relation to the study objectives.

#### **5.2 Summary of Findings**

The study examined the contribution of counterterrorism strategies to security with in Lamu West Sub -County. Several results emerged and first, the reduction of terrorist attacks in the region is associated with an increase in overall likelihood of collaborations among stakeholders. The results demonstrate that the strong strategic partnership existing in the area contributed to prevention of further terrorism. In fact, the stakeholder relied mainly on increased detection and hardening which acted as early warning system providing real time information to security agencies to intervene. The results also show that terrorist attacks have dramatically increased security concerns especially in Lamu West Sub County which borders Somalia, a phenomenon which has further problematized security policy in many of its dimensions.

The results also show that one effective approach that has worked well in the area has been multi-security operations conducted randomly in Lamu West Sub County. Some stakeholders have conducted a series of deliberate, sustained campaigns to convince the public that terrorism is a pervasive threat to national security, hence attacked implementation of extraordinary measures including random search of premises or areas deemed hideouts of potential terrors individuals or groups. Experts within the

counterterrorism field content that conducting operations, allows them to be alert of hostile actors long before they launch their attacks against some targets. In fact, most of the respondents were of the view that such operations rely much in timely and actionable information used to assess and prevent any terrorist threat.

Concerning the contribution of institutional framework on counterterrorism strategies in Lamu West sub- Country, the study shows that security agencies in Kenya have always demonstrated their ability to prevent cases of terrorism they had detected and stopped attacks before they could occur. This can be attributed to the fact that institutions charged with managing security of Kenya have cooperated in the fight against terrorism within the institutional framework. Furthermore, the development of intelligence networks is intended to facilitate the gathering of data on potential terrorist activity and the assessment of threat levels. These networks frequently include local law enforcement, intelligence services, and embassies. This was supported by the study findings which showed that significant number of respondents at 84% strongly believed that screening has been positive in detecting terrorist activities especially those who have become the main target of terrorists.

Another approach identified to be effective and tested in Lamu West Sub - County's emergency drills which prepares and fine-tunes response procedures. This can be attributed to increasing terrorist attacks resulting to deployment of surveillance tools to contain terrorists' attacks. This is supported by the study findings which showed that most respondents were in agreement that technology had been used and worked effectively in most areas across Lamu West Sub County. Majority of the residents strongly believe that

surveillance of the community had become a turning point because stakeholders were able to collect, record and process information that helped raise alerts and subsequently respond to any threat from terrorists. This shows that technological investment during this time of terrorist threats is gaining popularity among the stakeholders.

Technology advancements in surveillance enable the collecting of information from many sources, such as social networks and location systems, in addition to the traditional data collection by administrative bodies and related institutional settings. In an effort to better comprehend the cross-border movement of people in response to the threat of terrorism, Kenya has used technology in its border control strategy. In this regard, it is important to note that Kenyan security agencies deployed the "Automated Target System" program as a border control measure.

The study also sought to analyze the effect of public response to counterterrorism strategies. It is clear from the results that trust relationships built with the public, and adoption of a community-focused policing philosophy not only help in preventing terrorist attacks from happening in the first place but also help facilitate an effective response by first responders and emergency personnel. The study findings report in a mean value of 4.02 (SD=3.69) that increase in the level of knowledge among the residents has proved effective in countering terrorism because community engagement initiative tend to have direct contact with the community, it is public, and it involves aspects of partnership and relations of depth.

The study findings demonstrate that the application of community response initiative in relation to counterterrorism illustrates how security agencies in Kenya have engaged with communities as part of a wider strategy of securing community-based intelligence so as to respond to local, regional, national, and international security risks. This was reported by respondents in a mean score of 3.88 (SD=3.13) supporting how the community has actively participated in counterterrorism measures in Lamu County. The results further show that terrorism threats have impacted several sectors and security agencies are required to respond to minimize its impact. In this case, findings show that assigning security officers to a given location within the community is effectively rated as one of the best strategies that help in countering terrorism. Additionally, it is clear from the study findings that deploying technology to counter the terrorist such as, use of Internet.

### **5.3 Conclusions of the Study**

This study has examined the effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies and their implication on national security in Kenya. The study concludes that stakeholder partnership counter terrorism strategy, institutional framework, public response counter terrorism capacity and security agencies response to counterterrorism played an important role in preventing terrorist attacks in the region. These demonstrates Kenya's firmness toward terrorists and practical measures to deter, apprehend, and punish terrorists who have attacked or attempting to carry out attacks in Kenya's soil. For instance, the study observes that some measures adopted by government and other stakeholders in the fight against terrorism proved effective in reducing more attacks. These include involvement of stakeholders, utilizing institutional framework geared towards reducing terrorist attacks and

also community/public response measures which ensures the community provides crucial or building relationship between the security agencies and the community in order to share information to help in early alert which allows the security agencies to respond before attacks occurs. This conclusion aligned with Ahmed, Belanger, & Szmania, (2018), who stated that in as much as community can be used to complement counterterrorism measures, it is important to note that community policing is not a panacea or a turnkey solution for preventing and countering violent extremism and terrorism.

Additionally, it is crucial to emphasize that communities' contributions to countering and promoting terrorism continue to attract major study and policy attention. This study has shown that local communities in Lamu West Sub County may see community-based counterterrorism initiatives as a means of state surveillance and control. Community policing or community-oriented policing is defined as a model of community-based public security management. It aims to replace an essentially reactive and repressive police force, mobilized on law enforcement missions, with a more preventive, anticipatory police force that co-produces security with communities.

In the field of counterterrorism, reliable and timely intelligence plays a major role. It makes tactical and strategic prevention in the real sense of its meaning possible. On one hand it provides security professionals with the opportunity to act before a terrorist attack has occurred, while on the other hand it is the precondition for threat analysis, which enables proper political decision making with a long-term approach towards evolving security



concerns. In order to respond to terrorism, a broad approach is needed, as intelligence and law enforcement are simply a part of a whole set of counterterrorism mechanisms.

#### **5.4 Recommendations of the Study**

The study findings have shown that engaging various stakeholders in countering terrorism reduces or minimizes the impact of terrorism.

- i. There is need to strengthen stakeholder engagement including the famous community policing of ‘Nyumba Kumi’ as this helps seek support from the community and other related stakeholders. These multi-stakeholder practices have the advantage of broadly health including social workers who play a central role in supporting affected families and communities, mental health workers, psychologists who tries to understand terrorism and try to explain the cause of violent behavior.
- ii. There is need to sensitize members of public and security agencies about the importance of conducting joined forums to ensure that all stakeholders contribute to the counter terrorism. By sharing information amongst themselves, security agencies respond to cases of terrorism at an early stage before an attack. Some key multi-stakeholder and multi-agency representatives of the community, especially women, young people, community leaders, and religious figures, who are in a position to make significant and enduring contributions to society.
- iii. The study also found that there are some members of public who still shy away from giving security agencies information for fear of being victimized whenever they offer

such information or participate in counterterrorism in Kenya and hence there is need to enhance security sector reforms for professional policing and fair administration of justice and ensuring the security agencies are trained on how to handle the community members.

- iv. This study further recommends shared collaboration between non state actors and state by creating better mechanisms. This is aimed at improving relationship between the community and police as well as improving efficient and effective counter terrorism measures, for instance, effective border patrol and control, diplomatic actions, county assessment for citizens' participation and involvement in decision making.
- v. Finally, while the security of a government can be understood as the summation of all efforts to achieve peace and stability within its borders, it will continue to depend on essential factors, namely the firm establishment of the rule of law and good governance. The successful implementation of community policing is not exempt from this conditionality.

### **5.5 Suggested areas of further studies**

The study findings showed that although they play a critical role in counter-terrorism, members of the public still fear security officers and this might hinder effectiveness of police officer's in responding to terrorism. In addition, the study found that stakeholder partnership is an area that is increasingly becoming important in countering terrorism as anyone affected directly or indirectly by terrorism seeks to participate in ensuring Lamu

County becomes safe to live or operate. Based on these, the study offers the following recommendations:

- i. Further research can be conducted to investigate perception of members of public on security agencies and how this affects their relationship in the fight against terrorism in Kenya.
- ii. There is need to examine the stakeholder partnership on counter terrorism in other regions. Despite the fact that this is an intriguing conclusion, much more investigation is required to fully comprehend the connections between radicalization, job, and education, particularly in order to establish any causality.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX I: RESEARCH DATA COLLECTION AUTHORITY – THE KISII UNIVERSITY (KU)

  
**KISII UNIVERSITY**

Telephone: +25420 2352059  
Facsimile: +254020 2491131  
Email: [research@kisiiuniversity.ac.ke](mailto:research@kisiiuniversity.ac.ke)

P O BOX 408 – 40200  
KISII  
[www.kisiiuniversity.ac.ke](http://www.kisiiuniversity.ac.ke)

**OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR RESEARCH AND EXTENSION**

**REF:** KSU/R&E/ 03/5/ 578                      **DATES:** 4<sup>th</sup> March, 2022

**The Head, Research Coordination**  
**National Council for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI)**  
**Utalli House, 8<sup>a</sup> Floor, Uhuru Highway**  
**P. O. Box 30623- 00100**  
**NAIROBI - KENYA.**

Dear Sir/Madam,

**RE: ONYARI AKAMA JARED DAS/60258/15**

The above mentioned is a student of Kisii University currently pursuing a Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Peace and Conflict studies. The topic of his research is, *"Effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies and its implication on National security in Kenya: Case of Lamu-west Sub-county, Lamu County, Kenya"*.

We are kindly requesting for assistance in acquiring a research permit to enable him carry out the research.






Thank you,

  
for Prof. Anakalo Shitandi, PhD  
**Registrar, Research and Extension**

**Cc:** DVC (ASA)  
Registrar (ASA)  
Director SPQS



**APPENDIX II: RESEARCH DATA COLLECTION PERMIT – NACOSTI**

 REPUBLIC OF KENYA	 NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION
RefNo: 801576	Date of Issue: 18/April/2022
<b>RESEARCH LICENSE</b>	
	
<p>This is to Certify that Mr.. Jared Akama Ouyari of Kisii University, has been licensed to conduct research in Lamu on the topic: <b>EFFECTIVENESS OF COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES AND ITS IMPLICATION ON NATIONAL SECURITY IN KENYA: CASE OF LAMU - WEST SUBCOUNTY, LAMU COUNTY, KENYA</b> for the period ending : 18/April/2023.</p>	
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801576 Applicant Identification Number	 Director General NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION
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**APPENDIX III: RESEARCH CONSENT FORM**

**Serial No:** .....

I am a student from Kisii University; currently undertaking an academic research study which is an academic requirement by the institution. The research work requires that I collect field data.

The study aims to examine the effectiveness of the counterterrorism strategies employed to address terrorism in Kenya with reference to the case of Lamu West Sub County. It is my humble request that you be part of this research. The goal of this study is to advance the academic literature on Kenyan security and efficient policymaking. Please take your time when answering these questions. Confidentiality is guaranteed and the data sought will only be used for academic purposes.

Thank you for agreeing to participate.

Signature\_\_\_\_\_

Date\_\_\_\_\_

## **APPENDIX IV: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE**

### **Introduction**

This research questionnaire is for academic purposes only and intends to examine Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorism Strategies and its Implication on National Security in Kenya: Case of Lamu -West Sub County, Lamu County, Kenya. Please answer the questionnaire by writing a brief statement or ticking in the boxes provided as applicable.

### **Part A: Demographic Information**

1. Gender?                      Male                       Female
  
2. Age?                               below 30 years  30-39 years  40-49years  50-59 years   
60-69 years  above 70 years
  
3. Which one describes your marital status?
  - a) Married
  - b) Widowed
  - c) Divorced
  - d) Separated
  - e) Single
  
4. What is your current highest level of education?
  - a) Primary school
  - b) High school
  - c) Tertiary institution
  - d) University

e) Others (specify) .....

5. Occupation specialization? .....

6. How long have you lived in this locality? .....

7. Do you think the counter terrorism strategies employed in this locality are effective or have helped prevent cases of terrorist attacks?

Yes  No

How best do you describe these strategies adopted in this region to counterterrorism cases?

.....  
.....  
.....

8. In the last three years, have there been any attacks or attempts to attack by terrorist groups in this region?

a) Always

b) Often

c) Sometimes

d) Rarely

e) Never

9. Does the attack itself involve only one person or a small number of individuals, or was its execution tied to a larger terrorist organization?

a) Yes

b) No

**10.** How would you describe the level of trust you have in the counter terrorism measures taken to address terrorism cases in this region?

- a) No trust
- b) Some trust
- c) Complete trust

**Part B:** Stakeholder Partnership Led Strategies

This section relates to stakeholder partnership strategy as a counter-terrorism strategies and its implications on national security in Kenya.

Likert scale:

Strongly Disagree [SD] (5)

Disagree [D] (4)

Neutral [N] (3)

Agree [A] (2)

Strongly Agree [SA] (1)

Statement	SD (5)	D (4)	N (3)	A (2)	SA (1)
There are several awareness/education forums organized by stakeholders to address terrorism in this region					
A shared intelligence-led antiterrorism approach has become effective in addressing cases of terrorism					
Multi-agency operations have always been conducted and has led to reduction of terror attacks					
The Kenyan Government has developed several legislations concerning strategies used to counter terrorist attacks					

**Part C: Institutional Framework**

The following statements are meant to identify factors contributing to the effectiveness of institutional framework in the implementation of counterterrorism strategies in Lamu West Sub County

Likert scale:

Strongly Disagree [SD] (5)

Disagree [D] (4)

Neutral [N] (3)

Agree [A] (2)

Strongly Agree [SA] (1)

Statement	SA (5)	A (4)	N (3)	D (2)	SD (1)

Security agencies have detected and stopped terrorist attacks before they occurred					
The security sector allocates responsibilities to each security agency thus eliminating ambiguity in matters security					
Screening of passengers has resulted to detection and retrieval of prohibited items thus preventing terrorist attacks					
The emergency drills conducted to prepare and fine tune response procedures to mitigate situations after an attack.  Has been effective					
The adoption of technology to enhance security in Lamu West Sub County has increased effectiveness of counterterrorism strategy.					

11. What are the other factors contributing to effectiveness of counter terrorism strategies in Lamu West Sub County?

**Part D: Community Engagement and Public Response**

1. The following statements are meant to examine level of awareness of the public on strategies employed to address terrorism in Lamu West Sub-County

Likert scale:

Strongly Disagree [SD] (5)

Disagree [D] (4)

Neutral [N] (3)

Agree [A] (2)

Strongly Agree [SA] (1)

Statement	SA (5)	A (4)	N (3)	D (2)	SD (1)
Increased level of knowledge among residents of Lamu enhanced counterterrorism					
We have taken initiative to learn about how to counter terrorism					
Increased availability of information on raising alert has enhanced counterterrorism in this area					
I believed recruitment and training of more police/security leads to increased counterterrorism					

2. In your own opinion, how would you describe the influence of level of awareness in addressing terrorism in Kenya.
- 

**Part E: The effectiveness of security agencies response counterterrorism strategies capacity**

Likert scale:

Strongly Disagree [SD] (5)

Disagree [D] (4)

Neutral [N] (3)

Agree [A] (2)

Strongly Agree [SA] (1)

Statement	SA (5)	A (4)	N (3)	D (2)	SD (1)
Permanently assigning security officers to fixed location in the community has effectively helped respond to terrorism cases					
Intelligence-led policing can help police identify, prioritize, and more effectively tackle issues of concern to the public in general and specific communities in particular					
Police interventions which increased detection at certain points in the area has deterred extremists					
Police increase patrols, stop and search					
Training and monitoring police officers to go beyond traditional and basic requirement					
Evaluate and reward ability to effectively address terrorism emergencies					

**Thank you for your participation.**



## **APPENDIX V: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR KEY INFORMANT**

My name is \_\_\_\_\_, a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) candidate in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at the Kisii University. I would like to interview you about the effectiveness of the counterterrorism strategies employed to address terrorism in Kenya with reference to the case of Lamu West Sub County. I hope the information you provide will help in completing this research project. The interview will take 10 minutes.

1. What do you generally understand by counterterrorism strategies?
2. What are the counterterrorism strategies employed to address terrorism in Lamu West Sub County?
3. How effective are the institutional framework in the implementation of the counter-terrorism strategies in Lamu West Sub County?
4. What are some key factors contributing to effectiveness of counter terrorism strategies in Lamu West Sub County?
5. What are the challenges your organization face in the effectiveness of the counterterrorism strategies employed to address terrorism in Lamu West sub-County?
6. What is the level of awareness of the public on strategies employed to address terrorism in Lamu West Sub County?
7. What is the effectiveness of security agencies response on counterterrorism strategies capacity with regard to Kenya security in Lamu West Sub County, Kenya?


**APPENDIX VI: BUDGET**

<b>ITEM</b>	<b>QUANTITY</b>	<b>TOTAL (Ksh)</b>
Stationery (assorted)		14,000.00
Transport	10	60,000.00
Training /lunch	11	22,000.00
Pretest questionnaire		14,000.00
Typing, printing, and binding		10,000.00
Research assistants	9	50,000.00
Data cleaning and entry	4	12,000.00
Proof reading / editing	2	6,000.00
Contingencies		62,000.00
<b>Total amount</b>		<b>250,000.00</b>

**APPENDIX VII: WORK PLAN**

	Sep- 18	Oct- 18	Nov- 18	Dec- 18	July- 21	Aug 21	Sep 21	Oct 21	Nov 21
Duration 2021-2023									
Concept development and preparation									
Literature review									
Proposal development - draft									
Proposal development - final draft									
Proposal development – approval									
Data collection									
Data processing									
Report writing									
Report submission									


## APPENDIX VIII: STUDY AREA: MAP OF KENYA



Key L- Lamu

Source: United Nations, 2019

**APPENDIX IX: STUDY AREA: LAMU WEST SUB COUNTY**



**Source: United Nations, 2019**

## **APPENDIX X: LIST OF NGOS N LAMU WEST SUB COUNTY**

1. Haki Africa
2. Womankind Kenya
3. Lamu Development Program
4. Aid Education International Kenya
5. Komaza
6. Kuhenza For the Children's Foundation
7. Tawfiq Muslim Youth Organisation
8. Wild Living
9. APHIA Plus
10. ANIDAN
11. World Vision
12. Aga khan Foundation
13. Red Cross
14. Muslims for Human Rights
15. ZindukaAfrika,
16. African Medical and Research Foundation (AMREF)
17. United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
18. Angaza Youth Works (AYW)
19. Center for Development of Enterprise (CDE)

**Source:** Lamu West Sub County Integrated Development Plan 2018-2023

## APPENDIX XI : PLAGIARISM REPORT

### CONTRIBUTION OF COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES TO SECURITY IN LAMU WEST SUB- COUNTY, LAMU COUNTY, KENYA.

#### ORIGINALITY REPORT



#### PRIMARY SOURCES

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